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Summary 
The aim of this thesis it to explore the effects of the 
imputation tax system on the relationships between 
corporate investment and financing decision variables. 
Under the Capital Asset Pricing Model it is shown that 
except with instantaneous relief for capital expenditure 
at 100 per cent, the present Rystem of canital allowances 
may reduce the expected return to an amount below that 
required by the post-tax level of risk. A complex 
equation is derived to show t~e relationship in partial 
equilibrium between the after-tax valuation of the levered 
firm and that of an equity fin~nced firm of equivalent 
operat~ng risk. This includes the effects of income 
tax, capital ~ains tax, corporation tax and risky debt. 
Sufficient conditions for a neutral tax system are found 
although these are shown to be violated in practice, with 
a general preference for debt finance rather than new 
issues of shares. In general equilibrium capital 
structure is found to be irrelevant under the UK tax 
system. For the partial equilihrium model however even 
in a world of certainty it is shown that the borrowing 
versus retention decision is complex. It is observed 
that financial policies may vary over time and are 
sensitive to the effects of capital investment decisions 
~n (i) Advance Cornoration Tax setoff restrictions, (ii) 
debenture interest carried forward and (iii) the marginal 
t~x rate at which debenture interest is relieved. In 
turn capital investment decisions are shown to be 
sensitive to financial decisions in a market which is 
perfect apart from tax complexities. To accom~odate both 
the peculiarities of the tax !'Ules and the simultaneous 
solution of investment and financing decisions, a 
mathematical programming model is presented although it 
ienoted that in practice it eQuId be difficult to solve. 
CHAPI'ER 1 
Introduction 
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The thesis of this work is that in the current state of 
the theory of business finance there are significant unexplored 
relationships between taxation and corporate investment and 
f1ndncing decisions. These stem primarily from the 
peculiarities of the UK imputation tax system. 
1.1. The case for tax neutrality 
In our society the presence of a tax system is inevitable. 
Musgrave and Musgrave (1976) have described three functions 
of taxation concerned with the allocation of goods,the 
redistribution of wealth and the stabilisation of the 
economy. Very briefly they may be summarised in turn as 
follows. In the case of a private good the consumer derives 
benefits to the exclusion of others in return for the price. 
By contrast that there are some pu~lic goods, e.g. national 
defence, public parks and motorwdYs. which once bought by 
one individual or group could be enjoyed by others at no 
marginal cost. For an efficient use of resources the price 
should equal marginal cost, but at a maximum acceptable price 
of zero there is a problem in obtaining the goods through 
a free marKet. However. from a tax system, designed and 
enforced by a political voting process, the public goods may 
be acquired. Second. in order to move towards a socially 
desirable distribution of income and wealth. tax revenues are 
required to be raised through central or local government. 
Third, together with monetary and incomes policies. taxation 
has been used as a vehicle to influence aggregate demand 
:tn tne economy. 
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Although taxation is inevitable the design of the system 
is of crucial importance. It has been recognised (Musgrave 
and Musgrave (1976)) that the system should be designed so as 
not to disturb economic efficiency, assuming the market 
to be otherwise efficient. 
Although the taxpayer suffers a reduction in spending power 
through the payment of tax, he/she obtains benefits to the 
extent that public goods are acquired as a consequence. This 
loss in spending power represents a burden on the economy 
but the acquisition of public goods is a gain. Provided the tax 
system does not incur heavy administrative costs and provided 
there are low costs of compliance, e.g. loss of leisure time 
through filling in tax forms. then the net loss may be 
approximately zero. The loss of income or 'income effect' 
is not an economic inefficiency but an inevitable result of 
raising revenue to finance expenditure. However a second 
effect of taxation is the 'substitution effect' which may 
result in a loss of welfare. If the loss of utility resulting 
from paying the tax exceeds the minimum loss of utility 
necessary to acquire tbe public goods, financed by tax 
revenues, then there is an excess burden of taxation. The 
problem arises as a result of distortions in economic choices. 
We may define a neutral tax system as one which does not 
interfere with efficient choices and which results in a 
minimum excess burden. A requirement of economic efficiency 
is that "the marginal rate of substitution of X for Z,i.e. the 
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amount of Z which the consumer is willing to surrender for an 
additional amount of X, should be equal to the marginal rate 
of transformation of X for Z, being the amount by which the 
output of Z must be cut to produce an additional unit of X 
In a competitive market both rates are equal to the price 
ratio of two products ..• ( Furthermore) the marginal rate 
of substitution of future for present consumption, as valued 
by consumers or savers, should be equal to the marginal rate 
of transformation of present into future goods in production 
with both equal to 1 / (1+i), where i is the rate of interest" 
(Musgrave and Musgrave p.463 (1976)). 
For a neutral tax system these marginal rates of substitution 
before tax should be the same as the respective marginal rates 
of substitution after tax. Otherwise economic choices are 
altered, utilities are changed and an excess burden results. 
The actual measurement of any excess burden is however outside 
the scope of this piece of research. Indeed it would probably 
require an explicit utility function for society as a whole 
(Musgrave and Musgrave (1976) 1. Nevertheless in this thesis 
we shall be concerned with the less philosophical task of 
identifying cases of excess burden and formulating investment 
and financing decision models which aim to be realistic in the 
treatment of taxation. 
1.2. Tax imperfections and financial theory 
The theory of finance is concerned with the allocation of 
resources over different points in time both by firms and 
individuals. It has been argued by Fisher (1930) that an 
individual's impatience to consume depends on the following 
-16-
characteristics of his income stream: 
"1. The size of his expected real income stream. 
2. Its expected distribution in time, or its time shape -
that is whether it is constant, or increasing. or 
decreasing, or sometimes one and sometimes the other. 
3. Its composition - to what extent it consists of 
nourishment, or shelter, of amusement, of education, 
and so on. 
4. Its probability, Or degree of risk Or uncertainty." 
Any initial wealth may also affect the analysis. As to 
firms, "by their production - investment decisions, (they) 
provide a means for individuals to transform current resources 
physically into reSOurces to be available in the future" 
(Fama and Miller p.1. (1972)). Through capital markets 
individuals can rearrange their patterns of spending and 
trasnfer resources from different time periods by borrowing 
or investing in stocks, shares or other securities. 
Without a neutral corporate tax system the marginal rate of 
transformation of present into future goods in production before 
tax may differ from that after tax. Specifically there will 
be an excess burden if the net present value of a project before 
tax is positive, indicating a recommendation of acceptance, 
yet the net present value after tax is negative. It will be 
demonstrated that with a neutral tax system the net present 
value after tax may be a positive fraction of the net present 
value before tax. This implies that the internal rate of return 
before tax may be the same as the internal rate of return after 
tax. In this instance the accept or reject decision of the 
project is not affected by taxation. Consequently with a 
-17-
neutral tax system the marginal rate of transformation 
of present into future goods in production after tax 
equals the rate before tax and also equals 1 / (1+i). 
where i is the rate of interest. 
Consider the rates of substitution of financial instruments. 
In a competitive market the price ratio of debt to equity 
should be equal to the marginal rate of substitution of 
debt for equity and the marginal rate of 'transformation of 
debt for equity. With a nil excess burden. taxation does not 
interfere with the efficient choice between the two. However, 
if the tax system favours debt, for instance, this may result 
1n an increase in bankruptcy costs which will be an extra 
burden on the economy. Furthermore if the tax system 
differentiates between retentions and dividends then the 
marginal rate of substitution of future for present consumption 
after tax may differ from that before tax. Again there will 
be a loss of social utility through the interference with 
efficient choice. 
The differential treatment of dividends and capital gains for 
tax purposes is of course recognised in the literature of the 
theory of finance but is not studied in depth. For instance 
in Fama and Miller (1972) it is .. mentioned in a footnote on 
page 84. Emphasis has been placed on the tax deductibility of 
corporate interest payments following the famous papers by 
Modiglianiand Miller (1958 and 1963). Fama and Miller (1972) 
p.175, go on to state" We could extend a little further this 
analysis of the effects of the market imperfections that arise 
from tax laws. Rapidly however, the conclusions that we could 
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obtain would become more and more ambiguous. and the 
discussion would become more philosophical than analytical 
Thus rather than speculate about the none too clear-cut 
effects of these and other market imperfections on the 
relationships between the financing decisions of firms 
and their market values. we leave the study of these 
effects to future research. both theoretical and empirical". 
It is to this problem of tax imperfections that the thesis 
is addressed. 
A fundamental theorem in the modern theory of finance is 
the principle of separation of the firm's production-investment 
decision from its financing decision in a perfect capital 
market. In perfect capital markets "markets for consumption 
goods and investment assets are a3sumed to be perfect in 
the sense that all goods and assets are infinitely divisible; 
any information Is cost less and available to everybody. there 
are no transactions costs or taxes; all individuals pay the 
same price for any given commodity or asset; no individual 
is wealthy enough to affect the market price of any asset; and 
no firm is large enough to affect the opportunity set facing 
consumers" (Fama and Miller p.277 (1972)). Under the UK 
imputation tax system this separation principle no longer 
holds. Investment and financing decisions become interrelated 
through the effect of dividend policy on Advance Corporation 
Tax and hence on the marginal rate of corporation tax applicable 
to both capital investment outlays and taxable profits arising 
from projects; and also through the effect of capital allowance 
and stock appreciation relief on the carry forward of tax 
charges on debenture interest. This applies even in capital 
-19-
mar~ets which are perfect apart from tax imperfections. 
In a world of uncertainty the theory of finance assumes 
that investor tastes are based on a model of expected utility. 
For operational rules however "we must somehow determine 
either additional restrictions on investor tastes - for 
example, some assumption about the form of utility functions -
or assumptions about common properties of probability distributions 
of returns - for example, all are normal - that allow us to 
describe the different alternatives available to an investor 
in terms of a finite number of parameters." (p.146 Fama and 
Miller (1972)). The two parameter mean-variance model and 
the resultant capital asset pricing model (eAPM) have 
therefore played an important role in the development of the 
modern theory of finance. 
It is simpler to begin the thesis by developing separately the 
investment and financing decision models. The analysis will 
start at the point where the existing modern thecry of finance 
under perfect capital markets has presently reached. In 
analysing the investment decision (chapter 2) it will be 
shown how there 1s an insufficient reduction in risk to 
compensate for the expected slice of taxation. The result is 
a system of corporate taxation which provides an excess burden 
on the private sector through financial disincentives to 
undertake risky investments. As to the financing decision model 
under CAPM [chapter 3) an important extension is developed to 
Modigliani and Miller's work under Corporation Tax by determining 
a solution where the interest on debt capital is not risk-free. 
Furthermore, a personal tax framework is added in order to 
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determine the effects of dividend policy on optimal capital 
structure. 
After the brief literature survey in chapter 4 the finer 
details of the UK tax system are discussed within a discounted 
cash flow framework, initially for the investment decision 
(chapter 5) and then for the financing decision (chapter 6). 
Analyti£ally, these chapters represent on their own 
retrograde steps compared with the theoretical niceties of 
the CAPM analysis in chapters 2 and 3. Nevertheless the 
tedious complexities of the UK tax system need to be spelt out 
within a fairly straightforward model otherwise we would be 
in danger of losing sight of the wood for the trees. It has 
already been argued that the UK imputation tax system 
invalidates the principle of separation of investment and 
financing decisions and so they ara brought together in 
chapter seven. The form of the model is based on a mathematical 
programming formulation normally used in business finance 
in situations of capital rationing. However. it will be 
shown that the complexities of the UK tax system can be 
incorporated in the form of a programming model under 
perfect capital markets as well. Furthermore the carry forward 
provisions of the legislation require a mu1tiperiod model, and since 
the CAPM is essentially a one period model, for operational 
reasons the final model is based on conditions of certainty. 
Uncertainty could to some extent be introduced by sensitivity 
analysis, or formally included by the addition of constraints 
to represent permissible levels of variability of returns 
al though in both cases the principle of parsimony (BhaSkar 
(1978~WOUld long since have been violated and the model would 
lose all usefulness. The grand design is shown in figure 1. 
-21-
Figure 1 The design 
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Since the tax legislation is constantly changing either 
by statute law, case law or extra- statutory concessions 
it is worth emphasising that this piece of work is based 
on the UK legislation as described by the Finance Acts 
1972 to 1979 and other legislation still valid between 
those dates. 
It also needs to he s+,ated that in the conclusion to 
each chapter I shall at times express so~e cursory 
thoughts on the implications of the material. By 
contrast the rigour of the analysis will be contained 
within the inner contents of the chapters.-
Finally a word on notation. Because of the complexities 
of the tax system and hence the numerous variables needed 
for modelling, the notation used is peculiar to each 
chapter. ~lf.y original w'1rkin~s had attempted to achieve 
absolute consistency but inevitably resulted in the 
heavy use of subscripts and superscripts. (The lists of 
notation are to be found at the be~inning Qf each chapter). 
However, sinc~ each iten of notation is described in 
the text when it is introduced, since the variables to 
represent tax ~ates are consistent throughout the text, 
an~ since the~e is consistency in each Obapter, I 
sincerely think that the compromise reached leads to a 
net increase in utility. 
QIAPTER 2 
Investment and risk: the effect of corporate taxation 
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2. 1 . Abstract 
This chapter presents an analysis of the effect 
of taxation on the investment decision of the 
corporate enterprise. Since the Revenue 
participates in profit-sharing and to some 
extent loss subsidies, the possibilities of 
high profits, and perhaps heavy losses, are 
l~ited. However, the reduced variability 
of returns is a reduction in risk, and in 
itself constitutes an investment incentive. 
Unfortunately, tmder the present system of 
capital allowances there is an insufficient 
reduction in risk to compensate for the 
expected slice of Government Revenue. The 
result is a system of corporate taxation which 
provides an excess burden on the private 
sector through financial disincentives to 
undertake risky investments. 
-25-
2.2. Notation (for chapter 2 only) 
a = present value of capital allowances, where 
a = 1 represents 100 per cent capital allowances. 
beta coefficient in a tax-free situation 
= beta coefficient with taxation 
= cOV(kj,k )/var(k ) 
M M 
COV(kj,kM) = covariance of the rates of return of project j 
with the rates of return on the "efficient market~ 
J 
k 
k 
-k 
10 
= investment outlay. 
= discount rate 
= mean rate of return in a tax-free situation. 
= mean rate of return with taxation 
= mean rate of return after taxes on inflows but 
with no relief for capital expenditure 
k 
M 
= mean rate of return on the efficient market portfolio. 
~ 
r 
= an angle such that tan 1= (~-RF)' 
= the risk-free rate of interest • 
= the minimum required mean rate of return in a 
tax-free situation 
= the minimum required mean rate of return on an 
individual project or security j • 
= the minimum required mean rate of return after taxes 
on inflows but with no relief for capital allowances , 
r* 
var(k ) 
M 
-26-
= the marginal rate of corporation tax discounted 
by the time value of money to allow for the time 
lag between the end of each accounting period 
and the tax payment date 
variance of thB rates of return on the "efficient 
market" portfolio. 
-27-
2.3. Introduction 
We have stated the importance of examining whether there is 
a loss of economic efficiency under the imposition of taxation. 
Indeed, one of the desirable requirements of a fiscal structure is 
that excess burden is minimised, the existence of excess burden 
being shown whenever economic choices under a tax system differ 
from those that would have been made had the tax not been 
introduced. 
We shall now conduct an analysis of the effects of corporate 
taxation on the risk-return relationship for a particular firm 
within the framework of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe 
(1964), Lintner (1965). Mossin (1966)). 
2.4. A neutral tax system 
The assumptions of the model may be summarised as fellows 
(quoting Weston and Brigham (1978) and Jensen (1972)): 
(1) all investors are single-period expected utility of 
terminal wealth maximizers who choose among alternative 
portfolios on the basis of mean and variance (or standard 
deviation) of returns; 
(2) all investors can borrow or lend an unlimited amount at an 
exogenously given risk-free rate of interest, RF, and there 
are no restrictions on short sales of any asset; 
(3) all investors have identical subjective estimates of the 
means, variances and covariance of return among all assets, 
that is, investors have homogeneous expectations I 
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(4) all assets are perfectly divisible. perfectly liquid 
(that is. marketable at the going price), and there are 
no transactions costs; 
(5) there are no taxes; 
(6) all investors are price-takers; 
(7) the quantities of all assets are given. 
However, some of these restrictions may be relaxed without 
very serious consequences to the nature of the analysis: 
(a) where the portfolios are not explicitly based on 
means and variances the same results hold provided the 
returns on assets are normally distributed or at least 
symmetric (Fama (1965)) 
(b) Lintner (1969) has shown that the basic CAPM remains very 
similar even if investors do not have homogeneous 
expectations. 
(c) The CAPM has been extended to deal with no risk-free asset 
(Black (1972)) in which case the model is still linear and 
beta is still the appropriate measure of risk. although the 
form of the equation is of course slightly different. 
(d) Mayers (1972) has considered the case where investors hold 
some nonmarketable assets. The appropriate measure of risk 
is now the covariance between the rates of return on the 
security in question and the rates of return on both the 
marketable and nonmarketable assets together. 
Instead of assumption (5) we shall treat any tax imperfections 
on the risk-return relationship with respect to the "efficient 
market" to have been determined prior to the study of the effects 
of alternative treatments of tax for the particular firm in 
question. Although this may at first seem a little strange, it is 
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certainly true that with the peculiarities of the present tax 
system different firms do have different tax profiles. This 
is reflected, for instance, in different balances of capital 
allowances brought forward and different reliefs for capital 
expenditure according to the type of asset. 
The question which now presents itself is whether it is feasible 
to consider disequilibrium states in an equilibrium model. 
For instance in a perfect frictionless market where any 
information is costless and available to everybody, "The 
market value of a firm's securities always fully reflects the 
market value of any extraordinary production-investment opportunities, 
with the result that returns on these securities are always in 
conformance with the equal rate of return principle" (Fama and 
Miller (19721. "If markets are simply in equilibrium, the 
exercise (of computing the NPV of a capital budgeting proposal) 
has a maximum expected incremental value of zero because all 
expected rents have already been capitalised" (Findlay and 
Williams (1980)). The problem is however endemic and we can 
only assume that we are considering a disequilibrium situation 
whereby a particular firm is considering a project unknown to 
and unanticipated by the market. 
Under the model. the minimum required mean rate of return 
for a given level of risk, where risk is priced according to 
the co-variability of a project with the efficient market is 
(11 
where 
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= the risk-free interest rate } 
= the mean rate of return on the "efficient market" , 
covCkj,kM)= covariance of the rates of return of project j 
with the rates of return on the "efficient market" 
-
variance of the rates of return on the "efficient 
market" portfolio , 
tj = the minimum required mean rate of return on an 
individual project j. 
, 
A simplified illustration of the model is shown in Table 1. Although 
the initial example is partly numerical, the same results obtain if 
we adopt a general algebraic analysis. 
The mean rate of return in a tax-free situation is 
k = 90,000 J (2) , 
and the beta coefficient in a tax-free situation 1s 
1 
= 
140 
x ---J- (3) 
Let us now consider the effects of tax relief on t~e capital 
expenditure at the rate of a where a~ 1 for a 100 per cent 
capital allowance. With proportional tax rates under a cash 
flow tax system. we can calculate the mean rate of return 
after tax and a new beta coefficient (see Table 2). 
We now observe that the mean rate of return under our special 
tax system will be 
- 90.000 (1-T*) k = 
Ta J (1-aT*) 
(4) 
and the beta coefficient will be 
~a 1 140 (1-T*) = var(kM) x (1-aT*) J (5) 
, 
I 
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giving 
Era = 
K (I-T*) (6) (l-aT*) I 
and 
~Ta = e(1-T*) (i-aT*) (7) 
. 
Substituting for a = 1 in equations (6) and (7) we derive 
Table 2 Covariance. after tax 
Project returns after tax, 
5: per annum 
Project rate of return on 
net invesnnent of J(l-aT*) 
D~\'iation cf project rate 
of return, for a given 
outcome, from the average 
for all outcomes 
Covariance of rate of return 
on proj ect ,.,.i th that of the 
market 
Possible outcomes 
A 
80,000 (1-T*) 
80,(XX) (I-T*) 
J (l-aT*) 
-10,000 (1-T*) 
J (1-aT*) 
40 (I-T*) 
J (l-aT*) 
B 
90,000 (l-T*) 
90,(X)() (l-T*) 
J (1-aT*) 
o 
o 
C 
loo,OCO (l-T*) 
100,000 (l-T*) 
J (l-aT#O) 
+10,000 (1-1*) 
J (l-aT*) 
100 (l-T*) 
J (l-aT*) 
All 
140 (1-1*) 
J (I-aT"") 
Note: T* = the marginal corporate tax rate discotmted by the time value of money to allow for the time lag 
between the end of each :1ccounting period and the tax payment date. 
I 
~ 
f\) 
I 
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and 
~Tl = (9) \ 
Hence although the tax system under consideration reduces returns 
by the a~ount of the tax bill, it does not alter the ~ates of 
return if 100 per cent capital allowances are given. ~breover, 
since rates of return are llllaltered, deviations of those rates 
of return and covariance are also unaltered. Even if the returns 
had been negative in each "state of nature", the returns after tax 
would have been reduced to (l-T*) times the loss, assuming perfect 
loss relief, with the same general results. 1herefore, given the 
assumptions behind the Capital Asset Pricing Model, a cash flow tax 
system, with the characteristics of constant tax rates, constant 
tax time lags, perfect loss relief and free depreciation, offers 
neither incentives nor disincentives to risk-taking. 
2.5. The r-isk disincentive 1JJith "impe~fect" tax ~eZief 
Let us now examine possible imperfections in the tax system. 
Consider an extreme case where there is no relief for capital 
allowances. Wi th a = 0, we have 
= K(l-T*) 
and 
(10) , 
13.r0 • e(l-T*) (11) I 
from equations (6) and (7). 
The rninimlUll required mean rate of return for the new level of 
risk, denoted STO' is shown in the diagram of Figure 2. Point A 
represents a project whose mean rate of return in a tax free 
situation, denotal K , is equated with the minimum required mean rate 
of return, denoted r, for a given level of risk, S. With taxes 
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on jnflch's but no relief on GJpi tal cxpclldHure we have a new level 
of risk, donot.ccl r,(l-T"""), ,\"hich dctcrnincs a ne\\' min:imtl'll requ1 red 
Figure 2 
RCite 
of 
return 
The Y'iDk dlsincontive with taxes on inflcwD but no 
cap7:ia~ aUowance 
A ,/ 
-------~------------------------------------- I 
I 
I 
I 
-----------------------------~ . ___ t~._ .. _____ ! C ----------------------~~D 
• I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
t 
8 Bctc: coeff i ci en t 
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mean rate of return of rTO' The reduction in the required rate 
of return is given by 
AC = tan ~ ~-a (l-T*~ (12) 
Prom equation (1) 
tan ~ = CKM - Rp) (13) 
therefore 
, 
AC = T*a~ - RF) (14) • 
Now, although full tax relief for capital expenditure would 
leave the rate of return lD1changed, since we are considering 
the absence of capital allowances, the introduction of taxes 
on inflows decreases the mean rate of return by an expected 
tax bill at the rate of (T*K). Since we are considering a 
marginal case in the tax-free situation then 
T*K = 
By substitution in equation (1) 
T*K = 
(IS) • 
(16) 
By comparing equations (14) with (16) we note that T*K exceeds 
AC by the term T*RF• Hence the expected rate of return, after 
taxes on inflows but without relief for capital expenditure, is 
represented by point D in Figure 1, which lies below the line of 
the minimtnn required mean rate of return for a given level of 
risk. Since the expected rate of return is reduced through 
taxation by more than the required mean rate of return for the 
new level of risk, there is an economic inefficiency or "excess 
burden", indicating that the marginal project before tax becomes 
unattractive after tax. 
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Effectively, we have considered the follo'ving situation. Two 
firms are about to Dlvest in a similar risky project. The pre-tax 
returns and their interactions with existing projects are assumed 
to be identical regardless of which firm proceeds with the investment. 
Firm X is in a tax-free situation, although Firm Y pays tax 
it does not receive any tax reliefs on the capital expenditure. 
Hence if t.he project is marginal for Firm X, it will be unacceptable 
for Firm Y and if it is marginal for Firm Y it will be acceptable to 
Firm X. Let us now measure the extent by which Finn XIS project is 
financially attrative in Firm Y's marginal case. 
The minimum required mean rate of return after tax is 
= + (17) , 
being derived directly from Figure 2 and equation (1). 
Note that we are now considering an investment which is marginal 
after tax, and not before tax. Hence 
= 
where 
= 
(18) . 
the expected rate of return after tax on 
inflows but with no relief for capital 
expenditure. 
By substitution in equation (17) we have 
= (19) 
From equation (10) we can substitute K(l-T*) for KTo' where "K 
represents the expected rate of return in a tax-free situation, 
giving 
= (20) .. 
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However, from equation (1) and from Figure 2 \.,re have by definition 
r 
where 
-r 
= 
= 
(21) 
the minimum required mean rate of return in 
a non-taxpaying situation. 
Hence from equations (20) and (2]), the extent by which the expected 
before tax rate of return, in a tax-paying situation but with no 
relief for capital expenditure, must exceed the minimum required 
rate of return in a non-taxpaying situation is 
, 
K-r = (22) , 
giving 
K - r = 
When 
T* = 
RFl" T* .. 
r-T*J 
so per cent, 
Therefore if the risk-free rate is, say 6 per cent, then a firm 
paying taxes on inflows, but receiving no relief for capital 
expenditure, needs to find projects with a before tax rate of 
return of at least 6 per cent more than the required mean rate 
(23) 
of retu~ in a non-taxpaying situation. If the effective marginal 
tax rate is more than SO per cent, a "tax prenium" of more than 
6 per cent is required. If the effective marginal tax rate is 
less than 50 per cent, a "tax premium" of less than 6 per cent is 
required. The "tax premium" is particularly significant where 
stock relief is claimed and Advance Corporation Tax Setoff is not 
• 
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restricted. For instance, if net taxable income is lIDre than 
£85,000 and a cla~ for stock relief is made throughout the 
life of the project, then it can be shown that the marginal 
corporate tax rate is 59.8 per cent (see chapter 5). Ignoring 
the tax time lag, which will create a slightly reduced effective 
rate, the tax premium is given by 
= 0.06 ( 0.598 ) = 0 089 1 - 0.598 .. 
Consider a risky project with a required rate of return of 12 
per cent if no tax were payable and an expected return of 18 per 
cent before tax. The effect of a tax-paying situation, but with 
no capital allowances, is to raise the before-tax required mean 
rate of return to 12 per cent plus 8.9 per cent, giving 20.9 
per cent. FiI'IIS paying taxes on inflows but receiving no relief 
for capital allowances will not be able to undertake such a risky 
project since the 18 per cent expected rate of return is 
inadequate; yet a finn not paying tax will find the project 
attractive since the expected yield will be 6 per cent above 
the required threshold. 
Let us now oonsider the IIOre general case of ex 'f O. Fran 
equation (1). 
= 
Let 
= 
Therefore 
= 1 
~-~ 
[(1 - T*)r L 1 - exT* ~J 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
Mu1 tiplying by 
(1 - T*)r 
1 - aT* 
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throughout in equation (21) we obtain 
= 
(1 - T*)Rp 
1 - aT* + 
From equations (26) and (27) 
(27) 
s· = 1 [(~ - T*)Rp (I-T*) CKM - Rp) S -~ J + \i - Rp - aT* 1 - aT* 
giving 
(1 - T*) Rp [ (1 - T*) 1 S· 1 - (1 - aT*) = (1 - aT*) a -J ~ - Rp 
Since 
~ > Rp > 0, 
and 
1 - T* o < 1 _ aT* < 1, 
then the second term on the right-hand side of equation (29) is 
negative. Therefore 
(1 - T*) 
Bj < (1 _ aT*) 6 
However , given a marginal investment before tax, the mean rate of 
return before tax is equated with the minimum required mean rate 
of return for a given level of risk, denoted a. Therefore 
= r 
(29) . 
. (3D) 
(31) 
• 
and from equation (6) 
= 
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(1 - T*) 
(1 - aT*) 
-r 
and the new level of risk is given by equation (7) reproduced 
below 
= 
(1 - T*) 
(1 - aT*) a 
If we compare equations (25) with (32), and (30) with (33), we 
find that when 
r. 
J = 
, 
then 
• 
The relationship is shown in Figure '3 where 
S* B. 
J , 
for 
r. 
J = • 
Point A of Figure 3 corresponds with point A of Figure a 
When a = 0, symbolising no capital allowance, point D of 
Figure 2 is represented by point F in Figure 3. The greater 
the rate of capital allowance the closer KIa moves up the 
vertical axis towards K, and the smaller the discrepancy 
between s* and BTa' The effect of taxation on a project Which· 
(32) , 
(33) • 
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is marginal before tax is to reduce the expected mean rate of 
return from r to KTa' At this lower rate of return the maximum 
degree of risk acceptable is reduced from e to e*. However, the 
actual level of risk after tax, denoted BTa , exceeds the permitted 
level of S* with the consequence that taxation imperfections make 
financially unattractive a project which was marginal before tax. 
Referring back to the introductory comments, we experience an 
"excess burden". 
2.6.A cZassification of "imperfect" relief by type of expenditure 
In Table 3 we derive the values of a for different types of 
expenditure. Note that time lags between (i) the end of 
each accounting period and the annual tax payment date and 
(ii) the time of the expenditure and the date of the accounting 
year-end have been ignored 
. , 
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Figure 3 'l'hc risk d,:sil1ecn'iive w1:th taxes on inflowD but 
partial ·capital aUolv:;znces 
Rute 
of 
return 
--------------------------------------~ I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
_________________ J G 
I 
I 
I 
L-----------------~------~--------~---.B~e~t~a----· 
6* BTa coefficient 
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Table 3 The present vaZue of capital alZowances as a proportion 
of CODt 
Type of expenditure 
Plant and machinery1 
Scientific research 
New industrial bui1ding2 
Second-hand industrial building first 
acquired in October 1962: 
(a) where the second-hand purchase price in 
October 1978 does not exceed the cost 
h ... 1 3 to t e Inltla owner 
(b) where the second-hand purchase price 
in October 1978 is twice the cost to 
h ... 1 4 t e 1ll1tla owner 
(c) wnere the second-hand purchase price 
in October 1978 is four times the cost 
to the initial ownerS 
Second-hand industrial building first 
acquired in December 1962: 
(a) where the second-hand purchase price 
in December 1978 does not exceed the 
h ... 1 6 cost to t e Inltla owner 
(b) where the second-hand purchase price 
in December 1978 is twice the cost 
to the initial OM1er 7 
(c) where the second-hand price in 
December 1978 is four times the 
cost to the initial OMlcr 8 
Agricultural buildings and works9 
Values of a 
k=10% 
1.00 
1.00 
0.81 
0.32 
0.16 
0.08 
0.70 
0.35 
0.17 
0.68 
k=20% 
1.00 
1.00 
0.72 
0.26 
0.14 
0.07 
0.54 
0.27 
0.13 
O.SO 
Patents 
10 (a) new patents 
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(b) patent with ten years to run11 
Know-how 12 
Notes 
0.53 
0.68 
0.80 
0.34 
0.50 
0.67 
1. The calculation of the present value of capital allowances 
as a proportion of cost ignores (i) tllne lags between the 
end of each accounting period and the annual tax payment 
date, and (ii) the timing of the expenditure in relation 
2. :o=~~~:eO~:4th[la:c:!:t:n;1!:;: e:d: .... +(I+~l'~ 
+ 0.02 [(I+~J ,a 
3. a = Jr [1 + j..+ + 1 + + 1 J 
.J'+ .1 T1\ (1 +kF • •• •• (1 +k) 33 
4. a l' 1 =! x 14 [1 + 1 N + 1 (1 +k) 2 + •.• + (1+~3:J 
1 1 ~ + l!k + 1 1 j S. a=lx34" (1 +k) 2 + •••• +(1+kp3 
1 E + 1 'I + •••• + (1+~~ 6. a=g m + Cl+kJ2 
1 1 [ , '11' 7. a = ! x ~ 1 + I+K + (1+k)2 + •••• + 1J (1 +k)"8J 
1 1 [1 + 1 1 11 8. a=4x~ + Cl+k)2 + •••• + Cf+k)B N 
, ' 1 [1 +A + 1 + •••• + (I+bj 9. QC= om (1 +k) 2 
1 [ 1 + l!k 
' 1 1~ 10. a = 11 + (l+kJ2 + ••••• + (1+k)16 
11. 1 ~+ r!k 1 + •••• + (r~~ a = 10 + "(I+kj-?: 
I 12. a = "6 1 
.1+1< 
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+ 
1 + + 1 l 
.... (l+k) j (1 +k) Z 
since Ci) is accommodated by 'f*, a marginal tax rate discounted 
for the type Ci) lag, and Cii) affects taxes on inflows in the 
same way as tax relief on outflows assuming that inflows and 
out-flows occur at the same time within each accounting yeat. 
For plant and machinery and scientific research, a = 1, reflecting 
100 per cent capital allowances in the year of expenditure as the 
maximum relief. New industrial buildings receive a 50 per cent 
allowance in the year of expenditure together with a 4 per cent 
allowance annually, including one in the first year, until the 
asset is written off. Hence, the final 2 per cent is written 
off in the thirteenth year. Expenditure on second-hand industrial 
buildings is written off over the remaining tax life of the asset. 
Buildings initially acquired before 6th November 1962 are deemed to 
have a useful life of SO years for tax purposes and those, initially 
acquired after 6th November 1962 are deemed to have a life of 25 
years. Where a building was builtin, say, October 1962 and 
acquired by another firm in October 1978, then 34 of the 50 years 
of tax write-offs are still remaining. Where the second-hand 
purchase price does not exceed the cost to the initial owner, 
the second-hand price is written off over the remaining life of the 
asset. However, where the second-hand price exceeds the cost to 
the initial owner, only the original cost may be written off. This 1S 
reflected in a nruch lower value of a. Agricultural buildings 
and works are written off over ten years, new patents over seventeen 
years and others over the remaining life of the patent, and know-how 
is written off over six years. 
Under the Capital Allowances Act of 1968 the ineligibility of 
caFdta1 expenditure for tax allowances is applicable to buildings 
which are either not of "qualifying" type or not of a "qualifying" 
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trade. Nonnally there are no capital allowances for investments 
in buildings not in the manufacturing indus try. In tllese cases 
CL = 0, indicating a JX)tentially strong tax disincentive to invest. Fran 
Table 3 we see that the partial capital allowances represented 
by CL < 1 apply for instance to industrial buildings even of a 
"qualifying" type and trade. Hence, if we accept the asstunptions 
of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, then we must conclude that 
the tax system acts as aJX)tential disincentive to expand factory prEmises 
and other buildings. But even 100 per cent allowances on plant and 
machinery cannot always be relieved against taxable income for 
the year of expenditure or against the three preceding years 
under section l77(3A) of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 
1970. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Although the real world is more ~erfect ~han the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model would imply, it does at least provide an insight 
into the likely "direction" of the effects of taxation on invest-
ment decisions, provided of course that the tax system is correctly 
described by the model. Perhaps the assumptions of immediate 
relief for losses and the application of taxes to cash inflows and 
not "accounting" inflows seem at first to be the more obvious 
violations from reality. Interestingly, if the firm has a large 
balance of tax losses brought forward then profits from a new 
capital project may not be taxable with the result that the invest-
ment decision is not distorted by the tax system. The analysis 
presented is relevant, however, for firms with a high level of 
guaranteed taxable inflows from other projects. As to the 
assumption of a cash flow tax system on inflows, although the tax 
base lies within an accrual accounting framework to a large extent 
the periodic investment in debtors and creditors are self-cancelling, 
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and the increase in inventories is now normally an allowable 
deduction under the stock relief legislation, a modification 
away from accrual accounting principles. At least for the 
purposes of this chapter the approximations are not unreasonable. 
We have shown that under the Capital Asset Pricing MOdel an 
excess burden on the activities of the private sector may occur 
through the effect of imperfect tax allowances on capital 
expenditure. Except in the cases where taxable profits are 
large enough to absorb 100 per cent tax depreciation on plant 
and machinery and scientific research, the present system of 
capital allowances may reduce the expected return to an amount below 
that required by the post-tax level of risk. Alternatively stated, 
the fiscal system does not reduce the level of risk by an amount 
sufficient to compensate for the decline in expected returns. 
Investments requiring extensions to premises appear to be the 
hardest hit, and in particular those in the retail industry, 
since they do not qualify at all for capital allrnvances on 
buildings. It would therefore not be unreasonable to ass~ne 
a priori that the tax system has been partly responsible for 
the low level of investment in this country. 
CHAPI'ER 3 
The after tax valuation of the levered finn under 
the asset pricing model 
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8l, 1 Abstract 
The p.lrIX>se of this chapter is to investigate the effects of the 
jrnputation tax system on the opt:imal capital structure of the 
corp:>rate enterprise. The valuation procErlures derive fran the 
Shape-Lmtner-Mossm Asset PriclnJ M:rlel anj so the conclusions 
are basErl, in e:u:ticular, on a capital market which is perfect 
apart fran taxation canplexities, anj which detennines equilibrium 
prices according to mean anj variance. 
AltOOugh the extension to a risky model differ~ fran that of 
M:digliani ani Miller, not surprisingly the same results of the 
taxless but otherwise perfect \\Or ld pertain. However, we develop 
em im};ortant extension to Modig liani and Miller's \\Ork urrler 
COrp:>ration Tax by detenni.ning a solution where the interest on 
debt capital is not risk-free. MJreover, we incoIFOrate a personal 
tax frart\e'l.Ork based on the British systan anj analyse the effects 
of dividerrl p:>licy on optimal capital structure. 
In partial equilibrium, with homogeneous tax rates, the 
requirements of a neutral tax system are violated in 
the UK situation. By contrast, with heterogeneous tax 
rates there is a, clientele effect and an irrelevant 
capital structure in general equilibrium. 
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3.2. ~otation (for chapter 3 only) 
A 
b 
d 
= proportion of total shares in the levered 
firm held by an investor, 
= the basic rate of income tax 
the net divi0end payout rate, 
cov(r ,k) = covariance of the rates of return on 
j ~ 
D 
g 
h 
security j with those on the efficient 
market portfolio. 
= the market value of debt capital in a 
levered firm , 
= the rate of capital gains tax, 
= the (higher) marginal rate of personal 
tax on investment income. 
b = higher rate of income tax on interest 
D 
received 
b~ = marginal rate of income tax on interest 
D 
received for the marginal debentureholder. 
h = higher rate of income tax on dividends , 
S 
h~ = marginal rate of income tax on dividends 
S 
for the marginal shareholder. 
k = the contractual interest ex~ressed as a 
d 
proportion of the market valuo of debt 
capi tal, denoted D , 
k = the rate of return on the efficient 
im 
k 
m 
market portfolio in the ith state of 
nature • 
= the mean rate of return on the efficient 
market portfolio. 
n 
~ p 
i=l i 
If 
~ P 
i=l i 
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= (k - r ) / var (k ) , where var (k ) 
m s= m m 
denotes the variance of the rates of 
return on the efficient market portfolio~ 
= the probability that the net operating 
cash flow is insufficient to cover the 
debenture interest. 
= the probability that the net operating 
cash flow will be insufficient to cover 
in full both the contractual interest and 
the rep~yment of debt principal, 
= the probabilty of occurrence of the ith 
state of nature, where i=l to - represents 
all discrete states, 
R = the mean cash return to the holder of a 
d 
debt security, after all taxes 
, 
R = the mean cash return to the holder of an 
e 
equity security in a levered firm, after 
all taxes, 
r = the risk-free rate of interest 
Ii' 
R = the cash return to the holder of a debt 
id 
security in the ith state of nature after 
all taxes, 
R = the cash return to the holder of an equity 
ie 
security in a levered firm in the ith 
state of nature, after all taxes 
.. 
-52-
R = the cash return to the holder of security 
ij 
j in the ith state of nature, after all 
taxes, 
r = the minimum required mean rate of return j 
on an in~ividual security j . 
r 
o 
= equilibrium rate of interest on fully 
tax-exempt bon~s , 
W = the mean tax bill, 
T 
~ = the mean cash return to the holder of an 
u 
equity security in an unlevered firm, 
after all taxes 
S = the ma~ket value of equity capital in a 
L 
s 
u 
levered firm , 
= the market value of equity capital in an 
unlevered firm. 
T = the full rate of corporation tax 
T = personal income tax rate on income from 
PD 
debt. 
T" = marginal rate of personal income tax on PD 
T 
PS 
v 
j 
V 
L 
v 
u 
interest from debt for the marginal 
debentureholder 
= personal tax rate for shareholders 
= the market value of security j . 
= the market value of a levered firm(V = S + D). 
L L 
= the market value of an unlevered firm 
(v = S ) • 
u u 
X = the net operating cash flow before tax in 1 
the ith state of nature 
, 
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3.3. Optimal capital structure in the tax-free situation 
1 
tl'lder the capital Asset Pricing M:x:1el the prop::>si tion by 
2 
M:xUgliani and Miller, in their 1958 p:iper, that "the rrarket 
value of any finn is irrlependent of its capital structure and is 
given by capitalising its expected return at the rate appropriate 
to its class" still holds in the tax-free situation. This may 
be proved as follows. 
'!he mean rate of return denoted r of a risky security j may be 
j 
descr iherl by 
rj = r F + A oov (rj,km) (1) 
where r F = the risk-free interest rate 
it = the meanrate of return on the efficient market p::>rtfolio, and 
m . 
var (k ) = the variance of the rates of return. on the efficient 
m 
market portfolio. 
By definition 
CCN (rJ.,k) = ! Pi Cri · - r.) (kim - km) 
-in i=1 J J C2} 
where p. = the probability of occwrence of the ith state of nature, 
l. 
where i=l to co represents all states. 
Expressing our rates of return in tenns of cash flows 
r ij = Rij - 1 
Vj (3) 
, 
• 
-54-
where R .. == the cash returns to the holder of security j in the ith 
1.) 
state of nature. (in a one period roodel it includes a return of both 
interest and capital) 
V. = the market value of security j 
) 
-
Hence r j == :1 - 1 
V. 
J 
Fran (2) and (3) and (4) 
cov (r., k ) J m 
00 
= 1: P i i=1 ~R' .-1) 1.J Vj 
(R - R.) (k. - k ) ij J lID m 
Vj 
FrOm (1) (4) and (5), 
R; _ 1 = r F + ~ E Pi (Ri . - R.) (k. - k ) 
..JL. i1" ,J J lJt\ m Vj ==~ ______ ~~ __________ __ 
Vj 
Multiplying by Vj and rearranging: 
V. (1 + rF) = R. - A E Pi (Ri · - RJ.) (k~ - km) J J i=l J 
Now, where a finn is unlevered 
, 
where 
Xi = the net operating cash flow before tax in the ith state 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) • 
of nature with mean X *{'lbere are tv.o assumptions concerr.ing 
the definition of X. which need to be made explicit. Firstly 
1. 
given (a) the choice of a one-period valuation nodel and (b) 
the assurrption that in states i = 1 to N when 
(Xi - Dkd) (l-T) < D then shares are \\Orth zero, then 
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X. is not net operating cash flow: it is the end of period 
~ 
liquidation value of all the canpany I s assets. This problan 
makes a difference taxwise. Secondly, it will be stated that 
in states i = N+ 1 to 00 the proportion (l-e1) of the tnsi ti ve 
excess proceeds (Xi -Dkd) (l-T) - D will be reinvested. But it 
is ~licitly assumed that retentions earn only the firm's required rate 
rate of return (Le. there are no quasi-rents) .J * 
Hence: 
co 
p. 
~ 
where V = the market value of the un levered finn. 
u 
Fran equation (6) 
* I am extremely indebted to Professor Ken Peasnell for 
these points within the squared brackets. 
(7) , 
(8) 
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(R. - R ) I.e e (k. - k ) J.In m (9) , 
where D = the mrrket value of the debt capital in a levered finn 
I 
j = d represents a debt security , 
j = e represents an equity security in a levered finn, 
SL = the narket value of equity capital in a levered finn 
However, since the cash retuJ::ns to equity holders are given by the net 
operating cash flow after payment of interest and debt capital 
Fram (8) (9) (10) and (11) 
00 
=X-At - -
P (X - X) (kim - km) i=l i i 
'Iherefore fram (7) and (12) 
00 
= X - A t p. 
i=l 1 
andV =V = 1 
u L 1 + r 
F 
~ -). CXN (X,k~ 
where VL = the market value of a levered finn (SL + D) • 
Hence, in a tax free situation, the narket value of any finn is 
independent of its capital structure given 
(1) hanogeneous expectations 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13} .. 
(2) single period wealth maximisation based on mean and variance, 
(3) 
(4) 
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oorrowing and 1encUng at a risk free rate of interest , 
perfect capital markets • 
In prrticu1ar the market value of debt is interesting. Fran Equation (8) 
nay be derived an expression for the value of risky debt capital, which 
covers the situation where it is not certain that c1alms by debt-holders 
will be fully met. In the extrane case where the net operating cash flow 
will be insufficient to meet clallns of debt capital and interest in all 
states of nature, then the returns to debtholders will be exactly 
natched by the net operating cash flow. 
Forrrally 
andD 
where 
= X - A cov (X, k ) rn for N = a> , 
N 
1: 
i=l 
= the probability that the net operating cash flow 
. will be insufficient to cover roth the contractual 
interest and repayment of principal. 
If the debt claims are never fully met in all states of nature, then 
debt capital is essentially an equity investment and hence the relevant 
risk premium relates to the systematic risk of the finn's operating 
cash flows. However, as the probability of the cla:ims being met 
increases the risk premium is rErlucErl. 
i.e. A E p, (Xi - X) 
i=l 1 
N 
(kim - k ) In 
~ A 1: Pi (X1, - Rd) (k, - k ) + A E p, (RJd - Rd> (kim - krn> i=l ll!l rn i=N+1 1 J; 
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since x, = R'd for i = 1 to N ~ ~ ~ 
and Xi ~ Rid for i = N+l to 00 , 
and 
It is, of course, assumed that the finn's net operating cash flows 
are not negatively correlated with those of the efficient market, Le. 
the systematic risk is not negative. 
At the other extreme, where the rninllnurn operating cash flow exceeds 
the rep:tyments of interest and capital then 
N 
1: P = 0 
i=l i 
, 
and Rid = Rd for all i 
Hence fran equation (8) 
giving r F = Rd -1 (14) • 
If 
But fram (4) and (14) for j = d, 
-rd = r F revealing as expected that where repayments of interest am 
capital are guaranteed with certainty the market rate of interest on 
debt capital is, in a perfect market, equated with the risk-free rate. 
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3.4. The effect of corpJrate taxation on the valuation of the finn 
Let us now turn to the effects of a tax system based on operating cash 
flaws with perfect relief for losses and tax relief given on debenture 
interest paid. We shall begin by analysing the mean returns to debtholders 
and shareholders and then calculate the covariance of returns to each 
security holder. 
Let n be defined such that for i = 1 to n the net operating cash flow 
is insufficient to cover the interest and hence there is no taxable 
incane. For i = n+l to 00 tax is only paid on the net operating cash 
flow Xi less the interest. Hence the mean tax bill, denoted, R.r is 
given by: 
_ 00 
Rrr = E P 
i=n+l i 
(15) ; 
where kd = the contractual interest expressed as a prop:>rtion of the 
market value of debt capital, denoted D. 
As far as shareholders are concerned they only receive incane when 
the net operating cash flow after interest and tax, [(Xi - Dkd) (l-T~, 
exceeds the repayment of debt capital, D. Hence the mean payment to 
shareholders, denoterl Re is given by: 
R = 'f p. rex,; - Dkd ) (1-T) - 01 e i=N+ 1 ~ Lo£. :J (16) , 
The position with respect to debtholders is rrore canplicaterl. Where the 
net operating cash flow, Xi does not exceed the contractual interest 
payment the firm pays no tax and hence the payment to debtholders is 
Xi' therefore Rid = Xi for i to 1 to n (17) • 
The fact that Dkd-Rid may be positive illustrates that debt may be 
subject to same risk. 
Where the net operating cash flow exceeds the interest payment the finn 
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But if there is still insufficient to repay the debt capital the 
returns to debtholders are equal to the net operating cash flow, 
Xi' less the tax bill of (TXi - TDkd ). Therefore Rid = Xi - TXi + 
TDkd for i = n+l to N (18) , 
Finally where the finn has sufficient incane after tax to repay 
the debt interest and capital: 
Rid = Dkd + D for i = N+l to 00 (19) 
Hence the mean p3.yrne.'1t to debt holders, denoted Rd , is given by 
n N 
Rd = E p.X. + E Pi 
i=l ~ ~ i=n+l 
(X. - TX. + TDkd) + E p. (Dkd + D) (20) .~ ~ i=N+l ~ , 
By way of reconciliation we nay calculate fran equations (15), (16) 
an:1 (20) 
n N N N 
! p. Dkd T - r p.D + E PiX. + E p.X. - t PiX.T '+ t p.DkdT + 
i=N+l ~ i=N+l ~ i=l ~ i=n+l ~ ~ i=n+l ~ i=n+l ~ 
00 E 00 
i "':'N+l p. Dkd + E p.D 
- ~ i=N+l ~ 
n N 
00 
E Pi X. + E p.X. + r p.X. 
i=N+l ~ i=l ~ ~ i=n+l ~ ~ 
, 
(21) , 
As expected, the mean net operating cash flow must equal the mean returns 
to all security holders and the Inland Rt:.venue. 
Finally, fran equations (15) and (21) 
_ - 00 
R + R = X - t p. 
e d i=n+l ~ 
, (22) 
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For the rn:rnent, this canpletes our analysis of the mean returns to 
security holders after corporation tax. 
Let us now investigate the oovariances. 
By definition, 
c:ov(R.,k)= ! p. (Roo -R.) (k. -k) 
J rn i=l ~ ~J J llt\ rn 
= ! P R i ij i=l 
(k. - k) co co 
- R. r Pi kim + R. E llt\ rn J i=l J i=l Pi k m 
, 
.-
• 
Bu t s inc e R. ~ P k = R 
j i=l 1 1m j 
k and R ::; p 
m j 1=1 i 
k = R 
m j 
k 
m 
, then 
c:ov (R. k) = r Pi Ri . (k. - k ) J rn i=l J llt\ rn 
'!his will be used as the definition of the covariance. 
Nc1t1, R. = 0 for 1 = 1 to N ~e 
and, fran equation (16) 
~e = (Xi - Dkd ) (1 - T) - D FOr i = N + 1 to co 
= Xi - TXi + 'IDkd - Dkd - D For i = N + 1 to co 
'1herefore fran equations (23) and (24) for j = e, 
(23) 
(24) 
CI:N (Ri ,k) = ~ p. (k. - k) (Xi - TXi + 'IDkd - Dkd - D) (25) • e rn i=N+ 1 ~ llt\ rn 
Equation (23), rewritten for debtholders, is given by 
c:ov (Rid,k
rn
) = ~ p. R' d (k. - k ) i=1 ~ ~ llT\ m 
Fran equations (17), (18), (19) and (26) 
n 
r p. (kim - k ) 
1=1 ~ rn + 
(26) • 
• 
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00 
+ E 
i=N+1 Pi (k. - k ) llTl m (Dkd + D) 
Fran equations (25) and (27) 
n 
CO\T (R. ,k ) + oov (R.d,k) = I: p. (k. - k ) ~em ~ rn '1~ J..m m ~= 
N 
+ I: p. (k. - k ) 
i=n+ 1 ~ llTl m 
(X. - TX. + TDkd ) ~ ~ 
00 
+ L p. 
i=N+1 ~ 
(k. - k ) 
llTl m 
(x. - TX. + TDkd) ~ ~ 
n 
(27) 
ex. ) 
~ 
= E Pi 
i=1 
(k. - k) (Xi) + r p. (k. - k) (X. - TX. + TDkd ) J..m m ... i:r:n+1 ~ J..m rn ~ ~ 
= r Pi (k. - k ) 
i=1 J..m m 
Now the CAPM valuation nroe1 shows (equations (9) and (8», rewritten 
for convenience, 
= Re - A CO'J (R,k) e m 
- -giving VL (1+rF) = Re + Rd - A {oov (Re , km) + oov (Rd,km» 
From equations (22), (28) and (31) 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
00 00-
VL (1+rp) = X - L p. (Xi - Dkd)T - A (I: p. (k. - k) (X.) -i=n+ 1 ~ ... i=1 ~ J..m m ~ 
(32) 
,. 
, 
, 
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Let us now canp:rre this with the res~tive equation for an unlevered 
finn, the covariance for which is, fran equation (23) 
co _ 
Cov «1-T) X,k ) = (1-T) L p. X. (k. - k ) 
m '111.un m 1= 
'Iherefore, fran equation (6), after corp;:>ration tax, 
Vu (1 + rp) = X (1-T) - A (1-T) 'f 
i=l 
p. X. (k. - k ) 1 1 .un m 
(33) 
t 
(34) 
Therefore X = Vu (l+rp) + TX + A E p. X. (k. - k ) - T)' E p.X. (k. - k) (35) i=l 1 1 .un m i=l 1 1 1lTI m 
Substituting for X in Equation (32) 
co co -VL (l+rp ) = Vu (l+rp ) + T L p. Xi + A E p.X. (k. - k ) i=l 1 i=l ~ 1 .un rn 
CD - CD co 
- TA L p.X. (k. - k ) - T E P'Xi + E p. DkdT i=l 1 1 1lTI rn i=n+ 1 1 i=n+ 1 1 
- A f . Pi (k . - k > (TDkd ) i=n+1 1m rn • 
'lilerefore: 
n n 
V
L 
(l+rF) = V (l+rF ) + T I: p. X. - A E PiTX; (kim - krn> u i=l ~ 1 1=1 ... 
+ T E Pi Dkd - A E p. (k. - k ) TDkd 
i=n+1 i=n+1 ~ lIn rn 
n 
rrherefore VL (l+rp ) = V (l+rp ) + L Pi TXi (1 - A (k. - k » u 1=1 lIn rn 
+.E Pi TDkd (1 - A (k. - k » ~=n+ 1 1lTI rn 
(36) 
Hence V = V + L u T l+rp 
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n 
, E p. X. (1-). '(k. - k » t i=l 1 1 .un m 
+ E p. Dkd (1 - A (k. - k » 
1 l.In In i=n+1 
Where the interest is risk-free n = 0 and kd = r p ' giving 
00 V = V + T r_n E p. (1 - ). 
L u l+rp ~ i=l 1 (k. - k ) JJn m , 
But E p. k. = k, hence 
i=l 1.un m I 
(37) 
v. = V + TDrp L u (38) , 
This is the CAPM equivalent of the M:x1igliani-Mil1er 1963 paper. 
"The value of the levered finn exceeds that of the unlevered finn 
by the capitalised value of the tax relief on the interest p:l.yme.'1ts" 
• • •• "capitalised at the rrore favourable certainty rate r rather than 
at the rate for uncertain streams " •••• where ••.. " r = the rate at 
which the narket capitalises the sure st.reams generated by debts." 
There is a slight discrepancy in that the r.M p:l.per gives 
v = V + 'I'D L u (39) , 
HoWeVer this may be reconciled by amending our one period RD:lel into 
perpetuity so that we capitalise the tax relief on the interest p:l.yments 
in future periods also. Hence, fran (38) 
v =V + 'lDrF(l L u ~ 
.L+rF 
+ • • •• ) 
= ... 
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Nevertheless the M-1l963 p3per does not provide a solution where 
the interest on debt capital is not risk free. But let us consider 
the :implication that since there is a tax advantage to financial 
leverage the greater the leverage the higher the value of the finn. 
Fortunately equation (37) provides the general solution. Let us 
consider the extrene case where the interest is not covered in each 
state of nature, Le. n = co. Hence equation (37) reduces to: 
V = Vu + L T l+rF 
co co -
r p. Xi - A r p. X. (k. - k ) 
i=l ~ i=l ~ ~ ~ m 
Fran equation (23) and (40) 
V = Vu + L T l+rF 
X - A cov (X,k ) 
m , 
But fran equation (13) sl~li.ng the value of Vu before tax, 
VL (after tax) = Vu (after tax) + T (VU (before tax) ) 
Given that 
, 
J 
and by CXJInparison of expressions (40) and (37) we note that the 
CAPM framework supp:>rts the view that with tax deductibility of 
interest p:1yments, maximum financial leverage is predicted. Equation 
(41) is a clumsy expression of the relationship between the predicted 
equilibriun value after tax of the levered finn and the value of the 
unlevered finn before and after tax. 
(40) 
(41) 
• 
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3.5. The effect of personal and cogorate taxation on the valuation 
of the finn 
we shall now incorp::>rate into the analysis an imputation tax system 
such that on payment of a dividend the canpany is required to pay to 
the Inland Revenue a proIXlrtion b of the gross dividend as an Advance 
payment of CorIX>ration Tax (ACT) which we shall assume initially to 
be fully deductible frau the nainstream corIX>ration tax charge. 
Shareholders pay a proIXlrtion 11 of the gross dividend as a higher 
rate tax on investment incane, although they receive a tax credit at 
the l:asic income tax rate of b on the gross dividend, i.e. the ACT 
paid by the canpany is imputed to the shareholders. We shall assume 
that of funds available to shareholders a net dividend payout at the 
rate of d is made. Capital gains tax is at the rate g. Debenture-
holders pay a higher rate tax on interest at the rate h. 
The anount available for IBying dividends- is given by the net operating 
cash flow, less debenture interest, less corIX>ration tax, less the 
repayment of debt capital: 
{(Xi - Dkd ) (1 - T) =" D) for i = N+1 to co , 
'!he dividend IBid is d «(Xi - Dkd) (1 - T) - D) • 
per thereon is b d «Xi - Dkd ) (1 - T) - D) 1 - b 
'!he higher rate tax on the gross dividend is 
h (1 + b) d «Xi - Dkd ) (1 - T) - D) r-o 
The higher rate tax less the tax deducted at source is 
f h (1 +l~b) - l~b} d «Xi - Dkd) (1 - T) - D) = ~ :.@ d «Xi - Dkd ) (1-T) -D)~ 
Hence the dividend receiverl net of personal tax is 
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(1 - h-- b) d «X. - Dk) (1 - T) - D) = 1 - h d «X. - Dkd ) (1 - T) -D) 1-b ~ d 1-b ~ , 
The mean dividend net of personal tax is 
r p. «X. - Dkd ) (1 - T) - D) (d 1 - h) i=N+1 ~ ~ 1 - b 
let the value of the shares in the levered finn at the be:;inning of 
the pericxl be SL. For i = 1 to N shareholders receive nothing, and the 
shares are worth zero. With a capital gains tax rate of g, there is 
a capital loss for tax FUrPJses worth gSL. For i=N+1 to 00 a retention 
1s rrade and hence after paying a dividend the shares are worth, assuming 
a perfect capital market, 
«Xi - Dkd ) (1 - T) - D) (1 - d) • 
capital gains tax for i=N+1 to 00 is 
{ «Xi - Dkd ) (1 - T) - D) (1 - d) - SL } g 
Hence the rrean value of the shares after payment of the divldend and 
after capital gains tax is given lrt 
N 
+ r Pi gSL 
1=1 
'!he rrean return to all shareholders in the form of dividends or capital 
gains, after all personal taxes is therefore 
N R = E Pi «Xi - Dkd ) (1 - T) - D) (1 - h) d + r P.gSL 
e i=N+ 1 1 - b i=l ~ 
+ r Pi{«Xi - Dkd) (l-T) - D) (1-d) - g«Xi - Okd) (l-T) - D) (1-d) + g~ } 1=N+1 
00 
= gSL + r p. «Xi - Dkd ) (1 - T) - D) (d (1 - h) + (1 - d) (1 - g» (42) i=N+l 1 1 - b • 
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By contrast, for a finn financoo. solely by equity capital i.e. for 
N = 0 and D = 0: 
- 00 R = g8 + ~ p. X. (1 - T) {d (1 - h) + (1 - d) (1 - g) ) 
-u u. i=l 1. 1. 1 _ b 
(43) 
rrherefore 
N 
R = R - gS + gSL - L p. X. (1 - T) (d (1 - h) + {1 - d} (1 - g)} 
e u u i=l 1. 1. 1 - b 
00 
- E p. (Dkd (1 - T) + D} (d (1 - h) + (1 - d) (1 - g)) (44) i=N+l 1. 1 - b 
let us now turn to the after-tax returns to debtholders. Firstly, where 
the net operating cash flow does not exceed the contractual interest 
p3yment, the finn IEYs no tax and the net operating cash flow is fully 
p3id to debtholders. Where there is no rep:iyment of debt capital the 
value of the tax loss to debtholders is gD. rrherefore 
Rid :: Xi (1 - h) + gD for i = 1 to n (45) 
secondly, where the net operating cash flow exceEds the iriterest p3.yments 
nIt where there is insufficient to rep3y the debt capital then the 
interest after tax is Dkd (I-h); the rep3yment of debt capital is 
(Xi - Dkd ) (1 - T), am the value of the tax loss to debtholders is 
1 
• 
Rid = Dkd (I-h) + (Xi - Dkd ) (l-T) + g(D - (Xi-Dkd ) (l-T» for i=n+l to N (46). 
Finally, where the finn has sufficient incane after tax to rep3y the 
debenture interest arrl capital 
Rid = Dkd (1 - h) + D for i = N+l to (XI 
Hence, 
n 
~ = E Pi (X. (l-h) 
u 1=1 1. 
N 
+ gD) + E p. rDkd (l-h) + (Xi - Dkd ) (l-T) + gD i=n+1 1.L 
(47) , 
-g(Xi - Dkd ) (1 - ~ co + 1: p. (Dkd (l-h) + D) (48) i=N+1 1. 
• 
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From equations (44) and (48) 
- - -R..:J + R = R - gS + as.. 
u e u u ..--.L.t 
n 
+ L Pi {Xi (I-h) + gD - Xi (I-T) (d(I-h) + (I-d) (I-g» } 
i=I 1-b 
N 
+ L p. {Dkd (1 - h) + (Xi - Dkd ) (1 - T) + gD - g (Xl.' - Dkd ) (1 - T) 1=n+I l. 
- X. (1 - T) (d l. (I-h) + (I-c1) (l-g» } I-b 
00 
+ E p. {Dkd (I-h) + D - (Dkd (1-'1') + D) (d (I-h) + (I-d) (I-g»} (49) i=N+I l. 1-b 
When d = 1, g = 0, b = 0, h = 0, then fran equation (49) 
But since, under these p:rrameters, 
, 
the.'l 
Re + R..:J = X - t p. (X. - Dkd ) T u i=n+1 l. l. (SO) 
'" 
as in equation (22). 
N::>W that we have calculated the mean returns to all security holders let 
us investigate the covariances. Since by definition 
cov (R.,k ) = 'f p. R .. (k. - k ) ) m i=1 l. l.) ~ m 
then fran equation (49) and fran equation (43), we may derive the 
oovariances (see equations (51) to (55) in the appendix). 
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Therefore from equations (54), (55), (49) and (51) (See Appendix) 
n 
+ ~ p. {I - A (k. - k » { X. (I-h) + gD - X. (l-T) (d (l-h)+(l-d) (l-g»} i=l 1. ll11 m 1. 1. I=b 
- 9 (Xi - Dkd ) (l-T) - X. (l-T) (d (l-h)+ (l-d) (l-g» } 1. l-b 
+ E p. (1 - A (k. - k » { Dkd (I-h) + D - (Dkd(l-T) + D) (d(l-h) 
i=N+l 1. lIt\ rn l-b 
+ (l-d) (l-g» } (56) 
The above expression may be rewritten: 
n 
+ t Pi (1 - A (k. - k » {X. (I-h) + gD+gSL- x. (1-T) (d (I-h) + (l-d) (1-g»-gS ~ i=l . llll m 1. 1. I=E U 
N 
+ t Pi (1 - A (k~ - km» { Dkd (I-h) + (Xi-Dkd) (l-T)- g (Xi-Dkd) (l-T) i=o+l 
+ go + gSL - Xi (l-T) (d (I-h) + (l-d) (l-g» - gSu } 
1-b 
+ r p (1 - ). (k~ ... - k
m
}) { Dkd (I-h) + D + gSL 
i=N+l i .. " 
-(Dkd (l-T) + D) (d (I-h) + (l-d) (1-g» - gS } I-b U (57) 
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'!he rationale of equation (57) may be explained as follows: '!he first 
ter.m on the RHS of the equation demonstrates that before tax adjustments 
the value of an unleverErl finn is the same as that of a leverErl finn in 
a perfect capital market. '!he secooo ter.m represents the risk-adjustErl 
value of the tax effects in those states of nature, i = 1 to n, where 
the net operating cash flow is insufficient to cover the contractual 
interest rayments. With a levered finn in such states, debenture 
holders receive the net operating cash flow, X., on which they p:ty 
1. 
personal tax at the rate of h, together with a tax loss on the value 
of the debt D, at the capital gains tax rate of gi and shareholders 
receive a tax loss worth gSL' By contrast, for an unlevered finn the 
net operating cash flow, X., in such states is subject to coqoration 
1. 
tax at the rate T. A prop:>rtion of this at the rate of d is p:tid in 
dividends arrl is grossErl up by l/(l-b), for the :imp.ltErl tax crErlit, 
rut bears tax at the higher rate of hi the rE!'TlClinder of (l-d) is a 
capital gain and taxed at the rate of g, with tax relief on the value of 
the shares S , also at the rate of g. The risk-adjustment is caterai 
u 
for by the expression (- A (kim - k
m
» • 
The third term represents the risk-adjusted value of the tax effects in 
tbJse states of nature, i :: n+l to N, where the net operating cash flow 
is sufficient to cover the contractual interest p:lyments but not enough 
to meet the full rep:lyment of debt capital. Since the interest is p:iid 
in full debtholders receive gross interest of Dkd which is subject to 
personal tax at the rate of h. A partial repayment of debt capital is 
made on the net operating cash flow, Xi' after interest, Dk
d
, and after 
tax at the rate of T. However, this repayment of capital is subject to 
capital gains tax at the rate of g although there is relief on the value 
of the debt,D. As far as shareholders are concerned :in those states of 
nature where there is inSufficient to make the required payments to 
debtholders in full, returns to shareholders are nil, apart fran the 
value of the tax loss~. By contrast, for an unlevered finn the net 
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operating incane after corfOration tax, X. (1-'1'), is available for 
~ 
dividends at the rate of d on which personal tax is p:l.id at the rate 
h/(l-b) as explained arove, and for capital gains at the rate of (l-d) 
on which capital gains tax is r:aid at the rate of g with relief at the 
rate of g on the original value of the shares, Su • 
F:inally, the fourth tenn shows the risk-adjusted value of the tax effects 
for those states of nature, i = N+l, to =, where obligations to debt-
holders are met in full. Debtholders therefore receive the contractual 
interest Dkd on which incane tax is p:l.id at the higher rate h, arrl a 
capital repayment of D. The cash flow available to shareholders is 
given by «Xi - Dkd ) (l-T) -D) being the net operating cash flow Xi ' 
after :interest Dkd , after tax at the rate T, arrl after repayment of 
debt capital D. A proportion thereof, is paid in dividerrls at the 
rate d arrl is w::>rth after personal tax: 
d (I-h) «Xi - Dkd ) (1-'1') - D} l-b 
'!he ranainder is a capital gain and w::>rth after tax relief on the 
original value SL: 
(l-d) (1-g) «Xi - Dkd ) (1-'1') - D) + g~ 
HoweVer, had the finn been unlevererl D = 0 arrl the returns in the fonn 
of dividends and capital gains after all taxes are 
del-h) (Xi (l-T» I 
'1-b 
and 
(1-d) (1-g) (Xi (1-'1'» + gsu respectively. 
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Hence before the risk-adjustment the overall gain after tax to the 
shareholders of a levered firm vis-a-vis those of an tmlevered 
finn are: 
= gSL - (Dkd (l-T) + D) (d (I-h) + (1~) (1-g» - gSu , r=o 
thus explaining the reminder of the fourth term m equation (57), notmg 
that the X. tenns cancel out. 
1. 
Observe that where h = 0, b = 0, g = 0, and d = 1, equation (57) 
simplifies to 
n 
VL (1+rF> = Vu (1+rF) + i~1 Pi (1 - A (kim - km» Xi T 
+ E p. (1 - A (k. - k » Dkd T ~ llll m i=n+1 
as in equation (36) 
(58) 
/ 
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3.B.Sufficient conditions for a neutral tax system 
Let us consider equation (57) in relation to the corrlitions under 
the present tax system which w::ruld be consistent with the M1 irrelevant 
2 
capital structure. Where gearing is irrelevant, by definition 
and 
Hence fran the second-tenn on the right harrl side of equation (57) a 
sufficient condition for neutrality is 
(I-h) = (1-T) (d (I-h) + (l-d) (l-g» 
l-b 
Similarly fran the third tenn 
Dkd «I-h) - (l-T) (1-g» + Xi «l-T) (l-g» 
= Xi (1-T) (d (I-h) + (1-d) (l-g» 
r-E 
and fran the fourth tenn, by substituting for D = gD + D (l-g) 
Dkd (I-h) + 0 (l-g) = Dkd (l-T) (d (I-h) + (l-d) (l-g» 
I-b 
+ 0 (d (I-h) + (l-d) (l-g» 
1-0 
Fran equation (61), with no dividend paid, d = 0, and 
I-h = (l-T) (l-g) I 
i.e. h = 1 - (l-T) (l-g) 
Where there is no retention, d = 1, and 
I-h = (1-T) (I-h) 
r-n I 
(59) 
) 
(60) 
(61) j 
(62) 
} 
(63) , 
(64) • 
-15= 
giving T = b (65) , 
Fran equation (62), we require for tax neutrality when no retention is 
made, d = 1 I 
(I-h) = (l-T) (l-g) as in equation (64) I 
and (l-T) (l-g) = (l-T) (I-h) 
I-b 1 
giving h = 1 - (l-g) (I-b) 
When no dividerrl is p:tid, fran equation (62) for tax neutrality, 
d = ° and (I-h) = (l-T) (l--g) as before. 
Finally, fran equation (63) for tax neutrality, when no retention is 
made, d = 1 and fran the coefficients of Dkd 
(I-h) = (l-T) (I-h) 
I-b I 
giving b = T as in equation (65) 
an1 fran t.he coefficients of D I 
(l-g) ::: (I-h) 
1-6 
,I 
givin=; h = 1 - (I-b) (l-g) as in equation (66). 
For a full retention, d = 0, an:l fran the coefficients of Dk~ in 
a 
equation (63) J 
(I-h) = (l-T) (l-g) as in equation (64) 
Hence, the sufficient conditions*for tax neutrality are 
h = 1 - (l-g) (I-b) fran equation (66) I 
am 
h = 1 - (l-g) (l-T) fran equation (64) I 
giving T = b as in equation (65) 
* I run very grateful to Professor Ken Peasnell for correcting a 
recurrent error in my earlier analysis where I had stated that 
the conditions were necessary rather than sufficient. 
(66) 
• 
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The requirements of a neutral tax system depending on dividend policy 
for alternative states of nature are shown in table 4 below. 
Table 4 Oooditions for a neutral tax system (partial equilibrium) 
ate of Insufficient cash Insufficient cash Sufficient cash 
nature profits to pay profits, after profits to meet 
interest on interest, to all debt 
Dividend debentures repay debt obligations 
Policy capital 
No d1 vidends h=l-(l-T)(l-g) h=l-(1-T)(l-g) h=l-(l-T)(l-g) 
Full dividends b=T h=l-(1-T)(1-g) b=T 
h=l-(l-b)(l-g) h=l-(l-b)(l-g) 
So tar we have assumed a situation of partial equilibrium 
in that the value given for h, the higher r&te of income 
tax, for the marginal investor was exogenously dete~ined. 
Furthermore, it was assumed that this value was the same 
both for the shareholder and the debentureholder. These 
assumptions will now be relaxed 
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3.7 Taxes and market eguilibrium 
In Miller's 1977 paper 4 he has argued against the view 
that bankruptcy costs and agency costs balance against the tax 
advantages of debt finance to result in an optimal capital 
structure. He suggests that the corporate debt ratios in the 
early 1970's appeared to be only marginally higher than those 
of the 1920's despite enormously higher tax rates. "And since 
failure to close the gap cannot convincingly be attributed to the 
bankruptcy or agency costs of debt financing, there would seem 
to be only one way left to turn: the tax advantages of debt 
financing must be substantially less than the conventional wisdom 
4 
suggests" (p.266) • Furthermore he states that the tax deductibility 
of interest payments does not change the result that in general 
equilibrium the value of the firm is independent of its capital 
structure. He begins his analysis under partial equilibrium and 
fol1ow~ Modig1iani and Miller's 1969 paper 5. The· returns to 
the investor who owns a fraction A of the shares in the levered 
firm are 
Interest at the rate of kd on debt of D is offset against the 
uncertain return of X on the firm's real assets. After corporation 
tax at the rate of T the net income is subject to personal 
income tax at t~e rate of TpS. The same income after tax could 
be achieved by investing AS in a twin unlevered corporation and 
u 
borrowing on personal account an amount of 
where 
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TpD = the personal income tax rate on income from debt. 
Since interest is tax deductible the net cost of borrowing is 
= A (67) • 
Together with the income from shares of 
this yields to the investor in an unlevered firm a net return, 
after interest on personal borrowing, of 
= A (X-Dk ) (l-T) (l-T ) (68) • d PS 
which is the same as the return to the investor in the levered 
firm. 
The market value of the investor's interest in the levered firm is 
ASL , whereas the market value of the investor's interest in the 
unlevered firm, net of personal debt, is 
AS 
u 
In partial equilibrium 
giving 
• AS u - A 
• 
[ 
(l-T) (l-TpS) ] 
l-T PD 
S • SL + [ (l-T)(l-Tps) ] D u l-TpD 
D 
But since the value of the levered firm is the sum of 
the values of 
v • L 
equity and debt, or 
(69) , 
(70) 
(71) , 
then 
v - V L u 
-
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= 
This represents the gain from leverage for the shareholders 
in a firm holding real assets. Note that this result is 
dependent on the fact that interest on debt, Dkd, is always 
less than the uncertain operating income of X, and implies a 
risk-free interest rate on debt which would be unrealistic 
particularly for high levels of leverage. 
(72) 
• 
,.. 
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Miller argues (on page 268 4) that "any situation in which the 
owners of corporations could increase their wealth by substituting 
debt for equity (or vice cersa) would be incompatible with 
market equilibrium. Their attempts to exploit these opportunities 
would lead, in a world with progressive income taxes, to changes 
in the yield on stocks and bonds and in their ownership patterns. 
These changes, in turn, restore the equilibrium and remove the 
incentives to issue more debt •• " 
JJlassumption is made that TpS is zero, that debt is riskless, 
that the market is frictionless apart from taxation, that 
and 
• the equilibrium rate of interest on fully .tax-
exempt bonds ) 
T* - the marginal rate of personal income tax on interest PD 
from debt for the marginal investor. 
Since a rate of interest of r can be achieved after personal 
o 
tax (of zero), 'the marginal investor paying tax would only be 
willing to buy corporate debt of which the gross rate of interest 
is at least 
I 
or r after personal tax. 
o 
2612 
In market equilibrium 
(l-T) (I-TpS) = I 
l-T* PD 
or I-T = 1 for TpS 
-
0, 
l-T* PD 
giving T = T*PD 
Hence the gross rate of interest on corporate debt would be 
.r 
o 
I-T 
, 
in market equilibrium. "Market interest rates have to be 
grossed up to pay the taxes of the marginal bondholder, whose 
tax rate in equilibrium will be equal to the corporate tax 
4-
rate" (p.270· ). Since interest is tax deductible the net 
cost to the company is r • 
o 
Miller states (p.2694 ) that "there will be an equilibrium level 
of aggregate corporate debt and hence an equilibrium debt-equity 
ratio for the corporate sector as a whole. But there would be no 
opti1DUlJl debt ratio for anv individual firm". 
(73) J 
(74) ) 
(75) 
• 
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If we accommodate both dividends and capital gains, 
then following Miller's analysis adapted for the UK 
,situation: 
1 - T 
PS 
where, 
-
d(l-h ) 
S 
l-b + 
(I-d) (I-g) 
d = the pay-out ratio (as in section 3.6) , 
h = the higher rate of income tax on dividends J 
S 
b = the basic rate of income tax (as in section 
3.6) , 
(76) t 
g = the rate of capital gains tax (as in section 
3.6) , 
and 
where 
1 - T 
PD 
1 - h 
D 
(77) , 
h = the higher rate of income tax on interest 
D 
received. 
Hence 
v - V = [1 
L U l 
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[
d(l-h ) (l-T) s 
I-b 
I-h 
D 
~ No~, if~e let h be the value of h for the marginal 
D D 
investor, then Miller's analysis, for the UK, would 
lead to the conclusion that in market equilibrium: 
I - b* 
D [ d(l-h~) = (l-T) s + (I-d) (I-g~ I-b 
Assuming a full retention of dividends (d=o~ this 
gives: 
or 
I - hi' 
D 
= 
= (l-T) (I-g) , 
I - (I-T)(l-g) 
This is consistent with the analysis of section 3.6 
(see equation (64». Where the firm adopts a dividend 
policy that can be described by a full payout rate Cd=l) , 
then from equation (79) 
(78) 
.I 
(79) 
• 
(so) 
h.;F 
D 
= 
-S4-
(l-T) (l-h *) 
1 - s I-b 
From (SO) and (81), 
= 1 - (I-b) (I-g) 
(81) ; 
(82) • 
Again this is consistent with section 3.6 (see equation 
(66»). However in the.preceding section a requirement 
for tax neutrality was that T=b, which is no longer a 
constraint under general equilibrium. 
An extension will now be mane to the CAPM analysis under 
generrLJ. equilibrium by substituting hil( for h, whenever h 
D 
represents the tax rate on debenture interest; and h* 
S 
for h, whenever h represents the marginal tax rate on 
dividends. It follows that (from equation (57)) 
V (I+r ) = V (I+r ) 
L ]!I u F 
+~ 
·11 ~-'\(k - k)J [ X (I-Ii"') + gD + gS 1=1 1m m 1 D L 
(1:10) [d (I-h*' ) (I-d) (l-g~ gsu 1 - X S + i I-b 
+ 
N 
~ 
1=n+l 
() [1 - A (k - k )] [Dk. (I-h*') + eX - Dk) (l-T) 
'i 1m m d D 1 J 
- g (X - Dk ) (l-T) + gD + gS 
1 d L 
rd (l-h'*) - X (l-T) s + 1 I-b 
... 
.0 r ~
+ 1=lf+l"li 1 
. Jr' d (l-h*) ~(k - k) Dk (l-h~)+ D+ S 
im m d D I-b 
x U\ -Dkd) (l-T) - DJ 
+ (l-d)(l-g) [(Xi - Dkd)(l-T) - ~ + gSL 
[
d (l-h:*) ~ 0 
- S X
1 
(l-T) + 
I-b 
The latter part of the expression which deals with 
states of nature, i = N+l toco where obligations to 
debentureholders are met in full, requires further 
explanation. Debentureholders receive(i) the contract.a' 
1nterest Dk 'on which income tax 1s paid at the higher 
d 
rate of h~ for the marginal debentureholder, and (ii) 
D 
a capital repayment of D. The cash flow available to 
shareholders is given by ~Xi - Dkd)(l-T) - ~ being the 
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net operating cash flow X , after interest Dk , after 
i d 
tax at the rate T, and after repayment of debt capital, 
D. A proportion of this is paid in dividends at the 
rate d and is worth, after personal tax, to the ~arginal 
shareholder 
I-b ~x - Dk ) (l-T) - nl l' i d ~ • 
The remainder is a capital gain and worth after tax 
relief on the original value S : 
L 
• 
However, had the firm been unlevered D = 0 and the 
returns in the form of dividends and capital gains 
after all taxes are 
and 
, 
+ gS 
u 
, respectively • 
Hence the sufficient conditions for an irrelevant 
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capital structure are 
(i) I-h*" = 
D [
d(l-lf) 
(I-T) s 
l-b 
(84) ) 
when there are insufficient cash profits to pay interest 
on debentures; 
... 
(ii) l-h * = (l-T) (l~g) 
D 
(iii) (l-T) (I-g) = [
d(l-h*) 
(I-T) s 
I-b 
(85) , 
+ (I-d) (I-g~ (86) , 
when there are insufficient cash profits, after interest, 
to repay debt capital; and 
(I-h-- ) (I-T) [ d(l-h"") (I-d) (I-gj (iv) = S + 
D I-b (87) , 
d(l-h·) 
(v) I-g = S + (I-d) (I-g) l-b 
when there are sufficient cash profits to meet all debt 
obligations. 
(88), 
Equations (ii) and (iv) are determined from the coefficients 
of Dk . and (i) and (1ii) from the coefficients of X • 
d' i 
In the states of nature 1 = ~+I to ~ the terms in D, 
Sand S give a sufficient c~ndition for irrelevancy ot 
L u 
__ D [d (l-h") 
D + gS - gS --.~....;;;,S_ 
L u i-b 
(89) • 
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But with an irrelevant capital structure: 
D + S = S 
L u 
or gD + g S = gS 
L ~ 
or gS 
-
gS = -gD 
'L ~ 
hence from (89) and (92) 
[d(l-h.) (I-d) (l-gJ D - gD = D S + I-b 
d (l_h!lJlt) 
(I-d) (I-g) or l-g = S + I-b 
as in equation (v). The sufficient conditions for an 
irrelevant capital structure are shown in table 4a. 
The conditions may therefore be summarised by 
h* = 1 - (l-T){l-g) 
D 
and h~ = 1 - (I-b) (I-g) 
s 
These results are the same as Miller's analysis 
extended for the UK tax system (see equations (80) 
and (82) ). Hence the marginal debentureholder has a 
* marginal tax rate on investment income of h , as D 
determined b~ equation (95) ; and the marginal 
shareholder has a ~arginal tax rate on investment 
(90 ) ? 
(91) , 
(92), 
(93) , 
(94) I 
(95) , 
(96) 
• 
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income of h* as determined by equation (96). For 
S 
these values equation (83) reduces to 
v = V 
L u 
in a perfect capital market in general equilibrium. 
(97) , 
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Table 4a Conditions for an irrelevqnt capital 
structure (general equilibrium) 
STATE OF NATURE 
Insufficient cash Insufficient cash Sufficient cash 
profitato pay profits, after profits to meet 
interest on interest, to all debt 
debentures repay debt capital obligations 
h*= l-(l-T) (I-g) 
D 
WO DIVIDENDS 
h~= l-(l-T)(l-g) 
D 
FULL DIVIDE~mS 
~ h = l-(l-T) (I-g) 
D 
(l-T) (l-h~) 
h*= 1 - S * • 
(l-T) (l-h*) 
h = 1 - S 
D I-b lJ I-b 
h = l-(l-T) (I-g) 
D 
". h = I-(I-b) (I-g) h·= 1 - (I-b) (I-g) 
s S 
/ 
I 
j 
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3.8 Conc1usions 
Even ignoring the effects of personal taxation under the 
imputation tax system it has been shown how the Modigliani 
and Miller (1963) paper, revised to accommodate the 
capital asset pricing model, may provide solutions where 
the interest on ~ebt capital is not risk-free. This was 
achieved by splitting the covariance factors for different 
states of nature categorised according to the different 
tax effects. It was conclu~ed that in partial equilibrium 
the CAPM supports the view that with tax deductibility of 
interest payments, maximum financial leverage is prenicted 
whether debt capital is risk-free or risky. 
Inclusion of nersonal capital gains taxation enabled us to 
consider c~nital losses as well and the implications fo~ the 
valuation of the firm. Furthermore with the a~dition of 
personal income taxes and imputed tax credits the effects 
of dividend policy on the valuation model could be 
analysed. 
Two conditi~ns were Shown to be sufficient for a neutral 
tax system in partial equilibrium: 
and 
h = 1 - (l-T) (l-g) 
T = b 
(64) I 
(65) • 
It will be recalled from chapter one that for the efficient 
allocation of resources, tax neutrality is required, 
assuming the market to be otherwise efficient. 
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If interest relief were at the basic rate of income tax 
then equation (65) would hold. Aproblem that arises 
unner the present system is that the basic rate of income 
tax, denoted b, does not equal the full rate of Corporation 
Tax, denoted T. Over the past few years the basic rate 
of income tax has varied between 30 per cent and 35 per 
cent, whereas the fu:.l rate of Corporation Tax has 
stayed at 52 per cent. Hence there is still a tax 
preference for debt finance in partial equilibrium. 
Further tax complexities such as different marginal 
rates of Corporation Tax under alternative states of 
nature will be considered in chapter six, together with 
a discussion of tax time lags. Afurther problem arising 
is that not all investors pay capital gains tax or higher 
rates of income tax. Consequently the values of hand g 
are not constant. If however all investors were to pay 
capital gains tax at 30 ~er cent then with a full rate of 
Corporation Tax at 52 pep cent for a neutral tax system 
(i) the value of h would be 66.4 per cent~-(1-O.52)(1-O.30~ 
and (.i1) the basic rate of income tax would be 52 per cent. 
Unfortunately this would mean that there would be full 
imputation which under the draft EEC Directive is not 
allowed. "The draft Directive proposes that there should 
be imputation systems in operation with a single rate of 
tax between 45 and 55 per cent. Also, the imputation 
credit shall be between 45 and 55 per cent of the Corporation 
tax that would have to be paid on a sum equal to the 
taxable income out of which the dividend could be paid" 
(James and Nobes (1978)6). 
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Interestingly, the rate of 30 per cent being 3/7 ~43~) 
of the dividend falls outside the guidelines anyway. 
Moreover, as discussed in chapter 5 the mar~inal rate of 
Corporation Tax can be well in excess of 55 per cent. 
But since the UK has different systems of allowances 
than in other member states, to equalise the rates of 
taxation would be more cosmetic than equitable. 
Furthermore a higher tax rate of 66.4 per cent for all 
investors woul~ cause serious problems of equity. A 
Utilita~ian view might be that the tax on each given 
slice of income should represent an equal loss of 
personal satisfaction or utility. Hence investors with 
more wealth or higher incomes ought to pay higher rates 
of tax progressively. Hence there is a conflict between 
prin~iples of equity and those"of economic efficiency. 
However, this is endemic and requires a tra1e off based 
on social and political judgements outside the scope of 
this thesis. 
The model was extended for the situation of market 
equilibrium in which the marginal investors in stocks 
and shares have marginal tax rates such that, for the 
UK, 
and 
h~ 
S 
= 
= 
1- (1-T) (I-g) , 
1- (I-b) (I-g) 
• 
For these tax rates the valuation of a particular firm is 
inde~endent of its capital structure on an after-tax basis. 
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The importance of Miller's 1977 paper is to illustrate 
the equilibrium process for the market as a whole and to 
reinforce the view that, in the long-run, prices adjust 
to reflect after-tax yields for the marginal investor. 
It may be more useful to financial managers however to 
consider the short-run states of disequilibrium. It 
will be shown in chapter 6 that a firm's financing 
decisions may change over time due to interactivities 
between investment and financing ~ecisions. In particular 
the capital allowance effects from expenditure may alter 
the relative attra~tiveness of new issues, retentions or 
debt finance. The result may be that the firm may now 
attract a different clientele of investors. During the 
period of temporary disequilibrium the value of the firm 
may not be indifferent with regard to capital structure. 
Furthermore, if general equilibrium analysi~ were applied 
to capital project appraisal all projects which would 
not be unattractive would have zero net present values 
since excess returns would already have been reflected 
in share prices7• However, given that the financial 
managers of the firm have access to valuable inside. 
information regarding the firm's prosperity it may still 
be in the best interests of the existing shareholders to 
undertake pr.ojects which have positive net present values 
under partial equilibrium, that is just before the share 
price increases. Economic analyses in states of market 
disequilibrium may not only help provide valuable insights 
into the development of the financial theory of the firm, 
but may also be of greater operational significance to 
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financial managers in a world in which market values may 
be regarded as moving towards a general equilibrium 
position which is continually changing. It can be 
argued th~t microeconomic decisions always take place 
in a state of disequilibrium7 ,8: " •••• it would be a 
betrayal of eco~omic analysis to imagine that the 
equilibrium constructions in the analysis were describing 
precise states of affairs •••• In the matter of investment, 
for example, or in relation to financing decisions •••• the 
firm considers undertaking additional expenditures not 
because it is in some kind of equilibrium smtuation, but 
because it explicitly recognises a disequilibrium 
condition; disequilibrium in the sense that additional 
profit and income opportunities are seen to exist and 
8 investment is contemplated totake advantage of them" (p.375 ) 
The models under consi~eration are based on the assumption 
of capital markets being perfect apart from tax 
complexities. In particular ~ankruptcy costs have been 
ignored. But apart from the differences between asset 
scrap values and values in use it is the author's view 
that there is a loss of soci~l utility resulting from 
the effects of bankru~tcies. !hese include forinstance 
the financial and psychological damage caused by 
redundancies of the employed and self-employed. It was 
stated in the introduction that the measurement of the 
loss of social utility was outside the scope of this 
thesis. Nevertheless its identification is an important 
social issue. If the tax system were designed such that 
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for each particular firm the price ratio of debt to 
equity in the absence of taxation were the same as 
that after tax, then taxation would not interfere with 
the efficient choice between the two. There would be a 
nil excess burden and a reduction in the present loss of 
social welfare. 
9 Schneller has stressed the fact that Miller's 1977 
result depends in particular on the assumptions that 
default considerations are ignored. Where default is a 
possibility, there may also be an interior solution for 
the earnings-retaining firm. Also, where investors have 
different marginal tax rates , financing policies that 
attempt to maximise value after personal tax may not be 
operational. This suggests a clientele effect whereby a 
firm's financing policies attract shareholders and 
debentureholders with appropriate marginal tax rates. 
High income shares and debenture stocks are likely to 
attract a clientele with low or nil marginal rates of 
income tax, and capital growth shares may attract 
investors with low marginal rates of capital gains tax. 
It can also be seen that Miller's result depends on the tax 
deductibility of personal interest payments. Although 
this holds under the UK tax system for interest on loans 
for the purchase or improvement of lann and buildings, it 
is not normally allowable for non-business purposes. An 
investor could increase a home mortgage to provide sufficient 
personal leverage, but by the time the new mortgage 
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arrangements are completed they would probably be 
out of alignment with the individual's financial needs. 
Hence even in the long-run there could be permanent 
disequilibrium. A further discussion of Miller's work 
is presented in section 4.5 of the next chapter, which 
devotes itself to a brief survey of the literature. 
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3.9 Appendix Derivation of oovariances 
Fran equations (49) and (43), we have 
COV (Rd , krn) + cov (Re , krn) 
= E Pi (kim - krn) [Xi (1-'1') (d (I-h) + (l-c1) (1-g) ~ 
i=1 1-b j 
n 
+ t Pi (k~ - krn) {Xi (l-h) + gO - Xi (1-'1') (d (l-h)+ (1-d) (1-g» } 
~1 H 
N 
+ t Pi (kim-krn) { Okd (I-h) + (Xi-Dkd ) (1-'1') + gO - 9 (Xi-Okd ) (1-'1') 1=n+l 
- Xi (1-'1') (d (I-h) + (1-d) (1-g» } 
r-E 
GO 
+ i!N+1 Pi (kim - krn) {Dkd (I-h) + D-(Dkd (1-'1') + D) (d (i:~)+(1-d) (1-g»} (51) 
For an unlevered finn, fran equation (43) 
aD -
cov (R ,k ) = t p. (k. -k ) { X~ (1-'1') (d (I-h) + (l-d) (1-g» } (52) • 
u rn i=1 1. .un rn... r-E. 
But since 
__ ",h 
(53) , 
NJw, equation (31) is rewritten below for convenience, 
(55) • 
Bence equation (56) may be derived fran equations (49),(51),(54) and (55) . 
. 
CHAPI'ER 4 
On the econorrncs of business taxation 
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4.1 Notation (for chapter 4 only) 
a 
a 
b 
B 
c 
e 
E 
h 
I 
k 
m 
3 
Py 
r 
s 
T 
u 
u 
w 
w 
o 
x 
x 
y 
y 
z 
= 
= 
= 
.. 
= 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
-
• 
proportion of wealth invested in a risky asset 
constant. 
basic rate of income tax. 
constant. 
constant. 
stochastic variable , 
stochastic variable representing a pre-tax yield 
on Jl risky asset. 
expected value. 
higher rate of personal income tax. 
investment outlay. 
discount rate • 
the second central moment of the distribution 
tbe third central moment of the distribution. 
meen. 
probabil1 ty of y • 
function of U • 
yield of risk-free asset 
absolute risk aversion 
standard deviation 
corporate tax rate. 
stochastic variable. 
utili ty of ;:) • utility [ucy ) = ) 
variable 
. 
expected utility of wealth. 
initial wealth. 
stochastic variable. 
return (variable) 
end of period wealth. 
random variable 
deviation from mean , 
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4.2. Tax-shifting 
The statutory incidence of company taxation may differ from the 
econanic incidence in that canpanies \\hich are legally liable to 
pay a tax may alter their patterns of spending and investment 
with a rebult that a new distribution of total tax liabilities 
anerges. 
Leakages may occur by passing on a tax increase in the fom of 
increased prices to the consumer, especially to the extent that 
competitors are in a sllnilar tax position; by substituting 
inferior materials to reduce costs; by organising production more 
efficiently, by being more aggressive in wage negotiations; or by 
substituting one form of financing method for another as relative 
tax advantages for alternative financial instruments change. 
However, Musgrave and Musgrave! state that the anpirical evidence 
in the United States on the long-run economic incidence of 
corporate taxation is conflicting and it is uncertain whether 
or not the tax is shifted. They note that tax changes typically 
coincide with changes in government expenditure and it is difficult 
to isolate the effects of the tID variables. In the United Kingdon 
a time-series analysis of short-run shifting of company taxation by 
Davis2 has produced results consistent with zero or little shifting of 
the tax. This is supported by Westlake I s questionnaire 3 which 
indicated that "at the IIDst about 40% of companies have the ability 
to shift tax increases, and only 8% say they have shifted tax increases 
in the past". In this analysis, apart fran changes in financing 
methods, tax shift ing will be ignored. 
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4.3. Tax Neutrality 
4 In 1948 Brown recormnended 0. rorporate tax system based on cash 
flows so that, with a constant tax rate and full offset for losses, 
in present value terms the tax relief on cash outflows bears 
the same proportion to pre-ta~ cash outflows as the tax on cash 
inflows bears to the pre-tax cash inflows, with a result that 
for capital investment decision purposes a shareholder wealth 
maximising firm may ignore corporate taxation altogether and 
the government effectively becomes a business partner. However, 
with a constant time lag between the accounting year-end and 
the tax pa)ment date, since cash flows occur at variable dates 
within the accounting period, there are variable time lags 
between cash flows and tax reliefs or payments thereon. 
5 Mellors seems to understand that this necessarily always 
implies a disincentive - "By increasing the rate at which an 
asset's cost may be written off against taxable profits 
the government is not increasing the incentive to invest so 
much as reducing the disincentive to invest that is built into 
our tax system. This built-in disincentive effect is attributable 
to the time factor a system of free depreciation represents 
the smallest departure from tax neutrality that is possible, given 
the inevitable lags inherent in the tax system." However, it 
will be shown later that the system may provide an incentive 
instead. Additionally, Musgrave and Musgrave 6 have suggested 
that a cash flow tax system would raise no revenue: "An 
interesting question arises: what happens when depreciation is 
permitted to be taken in its entirety at the time the investment 
is made, i.e. when all investment costs may be expensed? Combined 
with perfect loss offset, this would in fact mean that there is no 
tax. With a SO per cent tax rate, investment of $100 would yield 
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an llTUllediate refund of $50 which, if reinvested, would yield 
a refund of $25, and so forth until a total refund of $100 was 
obtained. The investor would combine the initial investment of 
$100 with an additional $100 advanced by the Treasury, and resulting 
earnings on $200 net of the 50 per cent tax would be the same as 
the earnings on $100 without tax". The same view is also supported 
by Swan 7. However, the statement that there is no tax is 
misleading in that it is only true if either, the firm invests 
in projects with zero NPVs so that the discounted tax relief 
on outflows is equated with the discounted tax payments on inflows; 
or if the firm keeps reinvesting its earnings into perpetuity 
and hence never makes a cash return to shareholders in the foresee-
able future. The implication of the statement, however, is that 
such a tax leaves unchanged the rate of return on the investment 
and hence does not distort the decision whether to invest. This 
approach is the one adopted in the Meade 8 report. Since the 
investment decision is not distorted there is by definition no 
excess tax burden, which is different from saying that there 
is no tax. 
A cash flow tax system has also been criticised by Samuelson: 
"Fast-depreciation gimmicks in the Swedish, Japanese, German, 
British, and American tax codes are not a return to just 
recognition of economic obsolescence ••• They are competitive 
bribes and giveaways, designed to undertax money income ••• 
in order to attract investment from other countries and to 
stimulate the total of domestic investment growth. If we 
call spades spades, lets call bribes bribes". His conclusion 
is perhaps distorted by a confusion over equity and efficiency. 
If the purpose of a corporation tax is to expand the ta.x base 
of shareholders, then tndistributed corporate income, not 
effectively taxed under capital gains tax if the shareholder 
9 
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does not sell the share, is distorted under a cash flow tax. 
An equitable corporation tax to be consistent with a personal 
income tax, ought to be based on business income reflecting 
true economic depreciation. It will later be shown 
that a personal tax based on income without tax relief on 
interest distorts investment decisions and is therefore 
inefficient. However, Srunuelson 10 provides an alternative 
neutral corporate tax base: "If, and only if, true loss of 
economic value is permitted as a tax deductible depreciation 
expense will the present discounted value of a cash-receipt 
stream be independent of the tax rate". The rationale for 
this may proceed as follO\vs. With no tax an investment is 
financially attractive if the net receipts (cash inflows 
less outflows) less the capital loss over the period {true 
economic depreciation) exceeds the cost of borrowing. Now, 
if interest is tax deductible and if depreciation for tax 
purposes is based on economic depreciation then, with taxation, 
an investment is worthwhile if one minus the tax rate times 
(net receipts less true economic depreciation) exceeds one 
minus the tax rate times the cost of borrowing. Hence if the 
tax rate is a positive fraction the investment decision is not 
distorted. However, not only does the analysis assume that all 
capital investment is financed by debt capital, but also perfect 
certainty is implicitly implied. A more recent paper by King 11 
presents a very similar analysis to that of Samuelson, although 
he admits that "in the context of tnlcertainty profits taxation 
may playa different role". 
Furthermore, Sumner 12 has argued that "to permit interest 
deductibility as well as free depreciation ~uuld make the corporate 
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tax system a net inducement to invest" He goes on to 
suggest that "free depreciation is already permitted on machinery; 
the only changes needed would be in the regulations concerning 
depreciation of buildings and the withdrawal of interest 
deductibility this \\Ould treat debt and equity on an equal 
basis" • This is incorrect since as we have shown in chapter 3, under 
the ~putation system interest relief would have to be at 
the basic rate of income tax to avoid tax distortions in 
financing decisions. The capital market inefficiency of free 
depreciation together wit}1 interest deductibility is reiterated 
by King 13 "if the tax system allows both interest payments and 
investment expenditure to be tax deductible, which is the current 
position in the United Kingdom, the introduction of a corporate 
profits tax would lead to a flow of capital into the corporate 
sector. In this case the higher the corporate profits tax rate, 
the higher the level of investment in the corporate sector!" 
The rationale of his analysis may be explained by use of an 
arithmetical example, on similar lines to those in the Mea.de 14 
report. Consider an investJllent in a machine priced at Urn 
and financed by debt capital requiring a 10% gross rate of 
interest each year into perpetuity. The pre-tax 
rate of return on the machine of £lm required to finance the 
debt capital is 4.8%, with a corporate tax rate of 52%, and 
4\ with a corporate tax rate of 60%, assuming interest deductibility. 
Since more investments now become financially attractive, a 
higher level of investment is predicted. In the table below, 
this result is contrasted with a system of free depreciation 
but no interest deductibility, which requires a pre-tax rate 
of return on the machine of 10%, regardless of the corporate 
tax rate, and is equated with the rate of interest on debt. 
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The flaw in the argument, of course, rests on the assumption 
of full offset for losses after capital allowances, where 
allowances turn profits into losses. In examples Ci) and Cii) 
since the intercst relief fully cancels the annual return, 
providing nil net taxable income, the capital allowance 
on the machine is deferred forever. Hence, although the tax 
statutes may provide for both intcrest deductibility and free 
depreciation, the pre-tax rate of return on the machine costing 
Um required to finance sufficient debt capital to purchase the machine 
is still 10%, resulting in a neutral tax system. 
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Table 5 
Free Depreciation and Interest deductibility 
Interest deductible Interest not deductible 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
Corporate Corporate Corporate Corporate 
tax rate tax rate tax rate tax rate 
=52% =60% =52% = 60% 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Rate of interest on debt 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Price of Machine (capital 
outlay) £1m £1m £1m £lrn 
Cost after 100% instantaneous 
capital allowance £480,000 £400,000 £480,000 £400,000 
Raise debt capital £480,000 £400,000 £480,000 £400,000 
Required pre-tax rate of 
return on capital outlay 
to finance debt capital 4.8% 4% 10% 10% 
Required annual pre-tax 
incane £48,000 £40,000 £100,000 £100,000 
less interest relief ( 48,000) (40,000) NIL NIL 
---
Net taxable incane NIL NIL 100,000 100,000 
Corp::>ration Tax NIL NIL 52,000 60,000 
Mter tax incane NIL NIL 48,000 40,000 
Debt interest (=Annual pre 
tax incane less Corp. Tax) £48,000 £40,000 £48,000 £40,000 
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Moreover, the alternative tax system providing free depreciation 
but no interest dc~uctibility can be shown to be no longer 
fiscally neutral when the capital allowance carry-forward 
provisions are reflected in the analysis. If the company earns 
a pre-tax return of, say, 10% on the original price of the machine, 
of outlay I (£s), for the first ten years the capital allowances 
detennine zero corporate tax payments. Consequently, the 
debt capital required to finance the project is given by I 
and not I(1-T) where T is the corporate tax rate. If we 
assume that all net cash flows are paid to debtholders, then 
the annual return is 10% x I for ten years and 10% x I(1-T) 
thereafter. From this we may derive an internal rate of 
return, denoted k, being the effective interest on debt 
capital: 
. 1 1 
I = 10% I (1+k + (1+k)2 
+ 10% I (l-T) [I + 
[(1+k) 11 
+ 
1 
.•.... + (1+k)10) 
....... .] 
With a corp:>rate tax rate at 52 per cent the internal rate of 
return is approximately n%, which is significantly less than 
that of 10% before tax. 'Ibis results in econanic inefficiency since 
the marginal rate of substitution of present into future inoame before 
tax does not equal that after tax. 
Hence, with nore realistic modelling of the tax provisions the 
conclusions by King, 1 5 Sumner, 16 St igli tz, 17 Swan 18 and 
Hartman 19 that free depreciation without interest deductibility 
is equivalent to true econanic depreciation with interest deductibility, 
as far as productive investment decisions are concerned, is 
misleading. However, even with a negative tax systan the t\\O 
alternatives are not equivalent under inflation; as Sumner20 points 
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out "whereas with stable prices the calculation of economic 
depreciation is merely extremely difficult, in the presence of 
inflation it becomes impossible. Since a costless alternative 
route to the same end is available, there seems little point in 
further consideration of the practical problems involved". 
S~ilarly, Bierman 21 states that the primary argument in 
favour of allowing lirnnediate expensing of capital equipment 
with instantaneous relief is its simplicity. 
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4.4. Tax allmvanc8s as a source of funds 
Carsberg and Hope22 have recognised that firms do not always base 
investment decisions on discounted cash flow analysis. Also 
in a survey by Schofield23 of the equiprent replacEment decisions of 
20 ccrnpanies between March 1970 and March 1971 it was found that 
"Payback. and Accounting Rate of Return are used except on large 
projects \\bere Discounted Cash Flow is used ..... Taxation and 
Investment Incentives are seldom considered except on large projects 
(i.e. DCF evaluations). Therefore the effect on Government 
Investment Incentives depends on the ratio of total capital ~xpenditure 
on snaIl projects to that on large projects". Investment decisions 
based on accounting rate of return calculations would ignore 
normally in particular the benefits of accelerated depreciation 
f:or tax pUl'}X)ses through the time value of rroney. The equalisation 
of profits for accounting purposes and the comparison with actual 
tax due is shown in the following table. 
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Table 6 
Deferred Taxation (£s) 
Year 1 ? ... 3 1-10 
Profit, after depreciation, 1,000,000 1,000,0J0 1,000,000 10,000,000 
before tax 
Depreciation(added back)* lOzCXX) 10/XX) 1°2000 ... 100 zooo 1,010,000 I,OlO,txX5 1,010,000 10,100,000 
Less capital allowance (100,000) NIL NIL (100,000) 
910,000 1,0IO,CXX) 1,010,000 10,000,000 
(a) Actual tax @ 50% 455,000 505,000 505,000 5,000,000 
Capital allowance 100,000 NIL NIL 100,000 
less depreciation (1°2000) (10,000) (1° 2000) ••• (100,000) 90,(XX) (l0,<XX)) 110,000) NIL 
(b) Deferred tax @ 50% 45,000 (5 2000) (5,000) ••• NIL 
(a)+(b) Tax charge to Profit 500,000 500,000 500,000 5,000,000 
and Loss Account 
* Note that since depreciation is disallowed for tax purposes it 
is added back in order to reverse the original deduction in 
determdning profit after depreciation. 
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Equally important, however, is the capital allowance as 
a source of funds, as evidenced by Deferred Tax Accounts in 
company Balance Sheets. This may be demonstrated by considering 
tID projects, A and B, with cash inflows of £1,564-10 at the end 
of year 4 and £765-50 at the end of year 3, respectively. 
Asswning indivisibility of outlays, then if project A requires 
an outlay of £1,000 and B requires £500, then with £1,000 capital 
rationing and no tax ooth A and B cannot be undertaken and B \\QuId 
be preferred since it has a higher net tenninal value using a 10% 
reinvestment rate. The net tenninal value of project A at time 
4 is £1564-10 less £1,000 (1 + 10%)~ which equals £100. By 
contrast the net termdnal value of project B at t~ 3 is 
£765-50 less £500 (1 + 10%)3 which equals £100, deterrraning 
a net tenninal value at time 4, with £10 interest on reinvestment 
for a further year, of £110. However, with a cash flow tax at 
50% and a one year tax time lag, both proj ects may be undertaken 
(see table below), project A now and project B in one year's 
time, assuming that there are profits from other projects against 
which to offset the capital allowances. 
Table 7 CaEital rationing and ta~ation (bracketed variables are cash 
outflows) 
Time 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Project A: 
Pre-tax cash flows (1000) 1564-10 
(Taxes) capital 
allowance 500 (782-05) 
Project B: 
Pre-Tax cash flows (500) 765-50 
(Taxes) capital 
allowance 250 (382-75) 
Net cash flows (1000) NIL 250 NIL 2329-60 (1164-80) 
- -
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When both projects are undertru(en the net terminal value at t~e 
5 is now £110 after tax, £55 of which relates to A's pre-tax cash 
flows, taxes and allowances and £55 of which relates to those for 
B. Since both have positive net terminal values after tax the acceptance 
of both is preferable to the acceptance of either. By contrast 
without tax only one project would have been undertaken during the 
first 3 years. It would have been possible to invest in project A 
at time 0 and project B at tllne 4. However, because of the capital 
allowance project A can be used to finance project B at an earlier 
date. 
Interactivities between projects and the Unportance of both 
profitability and liquidity effects have been highlighted by 
Adelson24 and Fawthrop25. and suggest the use of a programning 
m:xlel. On the question of taxation Fawthrop25 has stated 
" little attention is paid in project appraisal literature to 
the wide variety of ta~ situations ~lich potentially face the 
analyst. The universal assumption seems to be that either the 
project itself will generate a sufficient taxable surplus, or 
that adequate taxable profits already exist elsewhere in the company's 
operations, to mop up those generous initial or other capital 
allowances which authors and lecturers alike seem almost to llnply 
are the sole prerogative of discounting techniques. The problems 
of tline-plotting such allo,vances as carry-forwards in loss situations; 
the programming intricacies of selection and tlining which arise in 
such situations as ~len several subsidiaries of a group are 
submitting tax-adjusted evaluations, yet group taxable profits are 
inadequate to sustain all the potential allowances; the potential 
inter-dependencies of projects \vhere the realisation of one 
project's capital allowances is a function of the acceptance or 
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rejection of some other project or projects; the realistic 
treatment of disposal gains or losses accruing subsequent to 
the end of the appraisal study-period - such issues as these 
are left to the initiative of the analyst, who (one suspects) 
too often accepts a convention of '12~nths staggering' for 
want of inspiration to the contrary'. 
Aloo Thcxnas26 argued that "both the liquidity and profitability 
effects of incentives are ~rtant, but that the former is more 
important than the latter". The liquidity position of canpanies 
was also found to be a major determinant of investment behaviour 
in the British Economy according to an econometric study by 
Agarwala and Goodson27. Hence the use of payback as an appraisal 
technique. 
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4.5. Taxation, Capital Structure and Dividend Policy 
In their famous paper, Modigliani and M1ller28 showed that, 
assuming firms can be divided into 'equivalent return' classes 
and that shares are traded in perfect markets under conditions 
of perfect competition, then the market value of any firm is 
independent of its capital structure and is given by capitalising 
its expected return at the rate appropriate to its class, since 
levered companies cannot command a premium over unlevered 
companies because investors have the opportunity of putting 
the equivalent leverage into their portfolio directly by 
borrowing on personal account. However, Stiglitz29a'29blater 
proved that it is not necessary to assume that there are two 
or more firms which are otherwise identical, that the argument 
does not require the existence of risk classes, and that tIle 
competitiveness of the capital market is of no importance 
provided the price paid by one individual (or firm) for a 
bond or share is the same for all other individuals. He 
has also noted that the theorem is limited if expectations 
are a function of financial policy or if individual borrowing 
is an imperfect substitute for firm borrowing~9C Moreover 
he shows that if there is a chance of bankruptcy, bonds become 
risky assets and there is no reason to suppose that the 
nominal rate of interest should be the same function of the 
debt-equity ratio for all firms or individuals, and that since 
for a firm with a given market value, a takeover bid is much 
easier if there is a large debt-equity ratio, the possibility 
of takeovers probably increases the rate of interest which a 
firm must pay on its bonds. 30 
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Now, even in the absence of these other imperfections, Modigliani 
and Miller 31 demonstrate that the tax advantage of debt results 
in a higher level of after-tax income for any given level of 
before-tax earnings with the result that the value of the 
levered firm exceeds that of the unlevered finn by the capitalised 
value of the tax relief on the interest payments, although to 
capitalise !he relief at the rate for a certain income stream 
as they suggest is in practice unrealistic at high levels of 
leverage. 
32 Farrar and Selwyn have shown that for the US tax system, 
personal and corporate, "for any positive operating income, 
rate of interest, return of equity, shareholding period, level 
of debt, marginal tax liability (personal or corporate), 
whatever, the existence of preferential tax treatment for capital 
gains, guarantees both gross and net personal income can be 
improved by shifting returns to investors, to the extent 
possible, from dividends to capital gains". AI though the 
operating income of the firm is treated as an lID.certain 
quantity, the returns to debt capital are treated as constant 
regardless of the state of the world and hence the analysis is 
essentially a model under certainty. The equivalent results 
for the UK imputation system are derived by King 33 although 
a world of certainty is assumed. Elton and Gruber 34 derived 
marginal stockholder tax brackets by studying the ex-dividend 
behavour of conuncn stocks and showed that these tax brackets 
are related to a firm's dividend policy. Hence they provided 
"evidence in support of Modigliani 's and Miller' s 35 clientele 
effect, suggesting that a change in dividend policy could 
cause a costly change in shareholder wealth", and illustrated 
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"one fornl of market rationality in that stockholders in higher 
tax brackets show a preference for capital gains over dividend 
income relative to these on lower tax brackets". 
Also, using two variables to represent relative time preferences, 
and an estimate of the individual's differential tax rate on 
d · . d d d . 1 . P . 36 1V1 en s an cap1ta ga1ns, ett1t was able to explain a 
significant portion of the observed cross-sectional variation 
in individual portfolio dividend yields. This US empirical 
investigation suggested a significant dividend clientele effect. 
Further US empirical evidence by Galpoor and Zinmerman 37 have 
shown that investors in higher pre-investment marginal tax 
rates tend to acquire disproportionate shares of losses in 
those industries such as Real Estate and Oil and Gas Extraction 
which receive relatively favourable tax treatment. In contrast, 
investors with lower pre-investment marginal tax rates tend to 
acquire disproportionate shares of losses in those industries 
such as ~holesale and Retail Trade which have relatively less 
access to favourable tax treatment. They note that this is 
consistent with economic theory which suggests that assets 
which receive preferential income tax treatment should be 
held predominantly by taxpayers in higher marginal tax 
brackets. 
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Litzenberger and Van Horne38 consider a multi-period 
model based on time-state preference theory and 
/include personal taxes as well as corporate taxes. 
They assert that in the absence of bankruptcy costs 
there would be a net advantage associated with debt 
financing and that the elimination of the double 
taxation of dividends would reduce the occurrence of 
bankruptcy and therefore reduce also the social costs 
associated with bankruptcy. Litzenberger and 
39 Ramaswamy present empirical evidence to support a 
'tax clientele CAPM'. This is consistent with Elton 
34 40 
and Gruber and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy • 
In chapter 3 Miller's 1977 paper41 was reviewed and 
the implications for capital structure under general 
equilibrium were discussed for the UK tax system. It 
was shovm that after personal and corporate taxation, 
ignoring bankruptcy costs, capital structure for the 
firm is irrelevant in market equilibrium. This is 
oonsistent with Miller's analysis even though his 
model was not based on CAPM and even though he assumed 
a risk-free rate of interest on debt and implied a nil 
dividend payout rate. Miller's result reveals an 
equilibrium level of aggregate corporate debt and 
hence an equilibrium debt-equity ratio for the corporate 
sector as a whole. For the UK it was determined that 
with heterogeneous tax rates there is a clientele 
effect of dividend policy and an irrelevant capital 
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structure for the individual firm. By contrast it 
was shown that in partial equilibrium the requirements 
... of a neutral tax system were violated in the UK 
situation. The partial equilibrium model used, however, 
assumed homogeneous tax rates. In particular the 
higher rate of income tax on debenture interest was 
assume~ to be the same as the higher rate of income 
tax on dividends in all .cases. 
Sa.~ller's work42 showed that Miller's result depends 
on the assumption that default considerations are 
ignored. He suggested a clientele effect whereby a 
firm's financing policies attract shareholders and 
debentureholders with appropriate marginal tax rates. 
De Angelo and Masulis43 generalise Miller's work using 
a two-date state-preference model. It 1s assu~ed that 
utility maximising investors are taxed at rates which 
differ across investors and security classes. They 
consider the aggregate behaviour of firms supplying 
securities and the investors' aggregate demand induced 
by taxation. 
"On the supply side, all firms obtain the same constant 
marginal value of debt for all levels of leverage so 
that all respond identically by supplying only the 
debt or equity claim priced at a premium. Debt and 
equity can be in positive aggregate supply simultaneously 
only in the absence of a price premium, which implies 
that each firm is indifferent to leverage. On the 
-120-
demand side, the heterogeneous ~ersonal tax treatment 
of different investors' debt and equity income ensures 
!that some investors will demand the debt or equity 
claim priced at a discount. Given no price premium, 
there will be positive aggregate demand for both 
debt and equity claims. Together ASR (Aggregate Supply 
iesponse) and TIPAD (Tax-Induced Positive Aggregate 
Demand) preclude debt or equity from being a totally 
dominant form of financing and yield the equilibrium 
pricing condition •••• which implies leverage irrelevancy 
for the individual firm" (P.45S43 ). 
They also show that the irrelev~nce of the firm's 
capital structure holds under alternative personal 
tax codes. 
44 Taggart examines Miller's model under incomplete 
capital market conditions, and introduces costs 
assooiated with debt. He observes that as the capital 
structure of one firm changes there must be offsetting 
changes by other firms. "Value-invariance holds in an 
. 45 
'intra-equilibrium' sense here since we are dealing 
with the relative values of firms, keeping security 
supplies and market prices constant. Value-invariance 
would not hold in an 'inter-equilibrium' sense, by 
contrast, since a change in capital structure by just 
onefirm will alter security supplies, thus bringing 
about a whole new equilibrium with different relative 
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interest rates and firm market values" (p.65044 ). He 
notes that similar points are made by other authors46 ,47. 
Taggart considers special costs associated with corporate 
debt, such as costs to avoid bankruptcy and costs 
I 
incurred in the negotiation an~nforcement of debt 
contracts. He pOints out that to the extent that debt 
costs a~ associated with the notion of business risk 
classes, firms within a given risk class would tend ~o 
have relatively similar capital structures. He notes 
that this is broadly consistent with empirical 
48 49 
observations by Schwartz and Aronson ,Scott and 
Scott and !.~artin50. Furthermore he argues that under 
incomplete capital market conditions, where all 
portfolio combinations are not possible, sharehOlders' 
preferences for capital structure policy will not be 
unanimous. 
51 52 Chen and Kim and Jensen and Meckling have pointed 
out that owner-managers will expropriate the wealth of 
suppliers of outside capital. Where the outside capital 
is equity, there will be excessive corporate fringe 
benefits. As to corporate bondholders, Chen and Kim 
have asserted that an increase in non-pecuniary benefits 
reduces the coverage in the case of bankruptcy and thus 
decreases the market value of the bonds. In addition, 
wealth transfers from outsi1e debtholders may occur 
through investment decisions, some of which are suboptional. 
In a well-functioning market for managers, it is argued 
- l2Z -
however that a~justments to their wages cancel out 
the fringe benefits. 
, 
A separate line of thought has been based on asymmetric 
information between managers and investors. Since 
managers have inside information then investors require 
a financial signalling device Sl ,S3,S4. Managers search 
, 
for an optimal capital structure to maximise their own 
wealthSl ,S3. However, there is a problem that managers 
may make false signalsSl • 
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4.6. Taxation and Risk-taking 
An original paper by Demar and Musgrave 55 in 1944 showed that a 
proportional tax with full offset for losses increases total 
risktaking. Since the rate of return is reduced through taxation by the 
same proportion as the reduction in risk, private risktaking remains 
the same, but the Govenunent becomes a business partner sharing 
. both risk and return. In this way total risktaking, private and 
public, is increased. Their analysis however, is based on a choice 
of investments limited to cash and one risky asset. Later, 
Tobin 56 specified the l)ature of utility curves which \\Culd be 
consistent with loci of constant expected utility of wealth, which prove 
the Domar-~~sgrave result. He fotmd that nomal curves and 
quadratic curves for the relevant range satisfied the requirements. 
Feldstein 57 fOlDld that "in the general case in which the investor 
divides his portfolio between two risky assets, it is ~possible 
to predict the effect of a proportional taxation without further 
knowledge of the properties of the indifference curves". 
An example of a quadratic utility function is given on page 29 of 
58 Van Horne 
lL .. 2¥ - 0.05 x. 2 • 
By differentiating utility we derive marginal utility 
2 - 0.10l' I 
which is positive for x. <~ i.e. showing positive marginal 
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utility for the relevant range, and which decreases as:1:. increases -
the concept of diminishing marginal utility. If we differentiate 
again we derive the rate of change of marginal utility: 
U:' = .. 0.10 • 
Now, for a wealthy person we would expect the modulus of the rate 
of change of marginal utility as a proportion of marginal utility 
to decline with an increase in wealth since wealthy people can 
'afford' to risk more. This is Arrow' s 59 property of decreasing 
absolute risk aversion. However, risk aversion denoted RAJ is 
given by 
= 
Hence: 
= 
_1 
0.10 (2-.lOx) 
_2 
0.10 (-1) (2-.1Ch) C:-.lO) 
• 0'°1 
(2-. lOx.) 2 , 
• 
Which is positive for a quadratic utility function. Feldstein 
noted this result and concluded that the quadratic utility function 
is an inappropriate basis for analysing the effects of taxation on 
risktaking. Feldstein went on to show that using a utility function 
of the fonn 
u(c) ~ = Be + u 
o , 
with -< = S + 1, II(B > 0 , 
the preference ordering of a probability distribution is unchanged 
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by the introduction of a proportional tax. However, although this 
fUnction satisfies positive marginal utility, diminishing marginal 
utility and decreasing risk aversion, it assumes a constant elasticity 
of the marginal utility function, denoted B. A further drawback of 
these models is that there exists a riskless yieldless asset, namely 
cash. Although such models have been extended by Stiglitz 60 to 
deal ,.nth cases where the return to the safe asset is greater than 
zero, he specities whether absolute risk aversion is constant, 
&1 increasing or decreasing. However, Hartman has shown that the effect 
of some taxes are "unambiguous even when none of the assets available 
to investors is riskless and yieldless and neither the utility 
fUnction nor the distribution of returns is specified". Similarly, 
Stiglit~ 62 has recently examined the effects of taxation on risktaking 
without making specifications as to the utility function, although 
he assumes that 99.999'\ of wealth invested is debt capital. With 
initial wealth of ~ , Stiglitz assumes a proportion (I-a) is invested 
o . 
in a risk-free asset with a pre-tax yield at the rate of r. Hence after 
tax and interest relief the yield is 
CAl (l-a.)r 
o 
, 
With a pre-tax yield on the risky asset at the rate of e(a stochastic 
variable), the return on the risky asset after tax and interest relief is 
(d a.e (1-T) + T. r. II.) • Q.. • 
o 0 
Hence total wealth (capital plus yield) is 
"'0 (1 + (l-a.)r + o..e(l-T) + T.r.o.) 
=t: (j) 0 (1 + r + a.(e-r) (1-T] I 
as derived by Stiglitz. 
-126-
Note that we are effectively considering a one period model . 
... 
Now. the end of period wealth is 
v = we [1 + r + a Ce-rH1-TU 
E lUCY)] = E ~ {we [1 + r + a(e-r)(1-Tl] 8 = W 
dW 
de 
dW 
de 
= 
= 
... 3E[UCV1] 
aa 
da 
de 
E [U'CVl ~~ da 
de 
+ 
+ 
3E [UCVjJ dT 
aT de 
E [U' CV1!YJ 
aT 
dT 
de 
dW 
de = 
w E(U'(Vl (e-rH1-Tl]da + 
e de we E [U' (Vl (-a(e-rl] dT 
de 
For a maximum. dW .. e de 
o = (1-Tl ElY' (Vl (e-rJ] da 
de 
; 
a E[U'CVl (e-rl]dT 
de 
Therefore da 
dT = 
a E U'(Vl (e-r) 
(1-Tl[E U' (V)(e-r 
a 
= 1-T 
", 
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With -: tax rates between zero and 100 per cent 
then da/dT is positive. Hence Stiglitz concludes 
that an increase in tax leads to an increase in the 
nemand for the risky asset. 
Let us now extend 9ttglitz' analysis to consider 
(i) borrovring by a firm at a fixed l"ate of interest 
to match fully the investment in a risk free 
investment. 
" (ii) equity finance as the sole source of funds for the 
risky investment, the returns to which are wholly 
in dividends. 
" (iii)the interactions of an imputation tax syste~. At 
first the tax rates other than T will be constant, 
but then the analysis will deal with the effects of 
stochastic personal tax rates and stochastic rates 
of imputed credits. 
The yields on the safe investment, with interest 
deductibility, is 
w (I-a) r (l-T) + Tw (l-a)r = w (l-a)r " as before. 
000 
The profit after Corporation Tax on the risky investment is 
w ae (l-T) • 
o 
Since a full dividend payment rate is assumed, this 
amount, becomes the net dividend, the gross equivalent 
of which is 
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w a.e. (l-T) 
o 
I-b 
, 
where b = the basic rate of income tax • 
After all personal taxes, the dividend is worth 
w a.e. (l-T) (I-h) 
o , 
I-b 
where h = the higher rate of personal income tax. 
Total wealth now becomes 
w [1+ (I-a) (l-h)r + a(l-h) (l-T).:l 
o I-b:J 
------_._-
E [U(Y1J = Cl-a)(1-hlr + a(1-h)(1-Tl eJl] = W 
l-b J 
dW = 3E [U (YlJ da + aE [U(YJ] dT 
de aa de aT de 
For dW = 0 
de 1 
o • E [U· (Yle](Cl-h) Cl-Tl) da 
. l-b de 
- E [U· (y) e] a ( 1 - h) 
1-b 
dT 
de 
.. 
• 
E[U' (Yl] (1-hlr da 
de 
da , E [U' (Y 1 eJ ( 1 - h )( 1 - T) 
de t 1-b 
E[U'(Yl](1-hlrj = E[U'(Vle]a(1-hl dT 
1-b de .. 
da • 
dT E (U'(YJe] (1-h)(1-T) 
(1-b 1 
, 
E (U· (Y 1] ( 1 - h ) r 
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But E ~ I (Yl] o 
" 
Therefore 
da 
dT 
= [a (1-h)/( 1-bJ] E[U I (Yl e] t LC 1 - h)( 1 - Tl / ( 1 - b) J E [.U I (Y) e] 
or da ~ a as before. 
dT 1-T 
} 
With a variable rate of income tax and both T and h constant. 
dW = aE[iJCyj] da + a E [U C Y 1] db 
de aa de ab de 
For dW· 0 
de ) 
o • e[U'CY1\-(1-hlr + (1-hl(1-Tle1 
I-b J 
+ e[U'(Yl( - a(1-h)(1-T)(-1l)e] db 
t (1-b) 2 ...s de 
For dW • 0 
de J 
da .. -E(U'CYl (a C1-h)(1-Tl/(1-bJ2} e1 
Wo] da de 
db -e[U'(Yll (1-hlr - (1-h)(1-T)e/(1-b~ 
• 
da = 
db 
-1'5,-
(1-Tl E U'(Yl~] 
Provided E[U' (Vl] (1-blr <: (1-Tl E[U' (Vle] , and 
E[U'CYle] is positive, then da/db is negative and an 
, 
increase in the basic rate of income tax leads to a decrease 
in the demand for the risky asset. 
Finally with the higher rate of income tax variable and both 
T and b constant 
dW = 3 E [U C V 1] 
de 3a 
da + 3E (UCY1J dh 
de 3h de 
Far dW 
de 
~ 0 , 
o • E [u' C Y) (- C 1 - h) r + 
+ E Cu' (Y)( - (1-a)r 
\ 
Therefore 
C1-h)(1-Tle 1 wJ da 
1-b $ 0 de 
- a (1 ;;'Tlel w ] dh 
1-b 0 de 
da = E[U'(Yl t(1-al(1-blr + a(1-Tle ] 
dh E U'(Yl (C1-h)(1-Tle (1-hl (1-blrJl , 
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The relationship depends on the basic rate of income tax, 
the risk-free rate of interest, the probability 
distribution of e, and the corporate tax rate. 
The effect of taxation on both business and financial 
63 
risktaking has been discussed in terms of Markowitz 
64 65 
mean-variance anproach extended to the Sharpe Lintner 
, 
Capital AssetPricing Mo~el. We shall now snecify the 
justification for such an approach. ~rlier it had been 
stated that the mean-variance analysis is appropriate 
where utility curves are quadratic or returns are 
normally 1istributed. Unfortunately, not only does the 
quadratic utility curve possess the property of increasing 
absolute risk aversion, but it has a limited range of 
66 positive mar~inal utility and as Hirshleifer notes "We 
cannot accept the quadratic even as an approximation, 
however well it may fit in the neighbour~o~d of the mean 
return ,(X), because we are dealing with risky portfolios 
that require us to evaluate t~e utility of values for 
the rqndom variable X 1iver~ing conside~ably from the 
mean". Moreover, tax systems with either progressive 
rates, or proportional rates but with ca!'ry-foI"Nard 
provisions of allowances, '!'ould turn normal probability 
distribution"sinto skewed ones and hence prima facie limit 
the usefulnessof the mean-variance a"Onro8ch. Hovlever, 
TSiang" 67 has argued that the approach is justified 
provided the "aggregate risk taken by the individual 
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concerned is small compared with his total wealth, 
including his physical, financial, as well as human 
wealth". He expandf3 a utility function into a Taylor 
series, of the g~r.eral form, for a convergent series, 
f(v+x) = f ( v ) + f' (v) x + f" (v) x 2 + f" , (v) x" 
IT 'IT 
+ ••• 
If Y is a random variable and z is the deviation from 
the mean, then 
U(y) = U(y+z) 
= U(y) + U' Cy)z + U" (y)z2 + U'" (Y~73 + ••• 
2T • 
He noted that the expected utility is 
.eI 
E(U(y») = fU(Y+Z) f(z)dz 
- etIII 
wbere fez) is the density function of z , 
z is the deviation of y from y 
• 
... ~ 
EeU(y») = U(y) ff(Z)dZ + U,(y)S Z f(z)dz 
_<II _W) 
to 
+ U" (i) 2: f(z)dz + U'" (y) 3J J z3 fez )dz+ ... 
-fA 
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~ 
However, Sf(Z)dZ = ~p = 1 
-.p Y Y 
, 
where p is the probability of y • 
y 
Therefore, 
~ S zf(z)dz = l(y-y)p = Lyp -- y = y - y = 0 , 
-tI> Y Y Y 
0() 
~ z2 f (z)dz = L(y.y)2p = the variance , 
-~ y y 
"" S z3f (z)dz = the third central moment • 
-all 
Hence 
where m2 = the second central moment of the distribution , 
m3 = the third central moment of the distribution • 
Tsiang notes that if risk (variance) is assuned to be 
infinitesimally small, higher order central moments are 
assumed to be of even saaller orders. Hence utility may 
be approximated by 
I 
where s is the standard deviation 
• 
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In this way expected utility curves may be described by the mean 
~ and variance 52 Where the latter is very small in absolute 
magnitude. However, Tsiang shows that a fair approximation of 
the expected utility function is obtained if the risk remains small 
relative to the total wealth of the individual concerned, and 
gives examples Where the standard deviation ranges only from zero 
up to 10 per cent of the individual's expected value of total 
Wealth. 
As to financial risktaking, Stiglitz68 has shown that following the 
mean-variance analysis the value of the firm is independent of the 
debt-equity ratio in the absence of taxation. 
In chapter 3 this WclS re-examined under an imputation tax systen, 
although we ignored the Magill and Constantinides' result 69 
that when trading opporttmities on the capital market are no longer 
available costlessly, the investor substantially modifies his 
concept of an optimal portfolio Which now consists of a whole region 
in the portfolio space. The analysis followed the principle of 
70 Bar-Yosef and Kolodny that, under the CAPM, a separation of the 
covariance into the systematic risk associated with the dividend 
return and that associated with the capital gain return can provide 
a basis for showing that investors have a net preference for receiving 
their return in the fonn of capital gains. 
A difficulty is that, as noted by Elton and Gruber,71 
"given the predominance of income tax rates above capital gains tax 
rates most investors will tilt their portfolio in favour of stocks 
with low dividends and it is unlikely that markets will clear at prices 
detennined by the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin form of the CAPM" 
They consider the situation of the dnvestor subject 
+0 a hj gher tax rate than the effecti're t;u rate jp 'the wgrker 
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For positive Beta stocks, the lower the dividend yield, all other 
things being equal, the more likely the stock is to be held in more 
than market proportions. Also, ':.. if two stocks have identical 
Betas, residual risk and dividend yields/an investor who pays a tax 
rate higher than the effective average in the market is more likely 
to hold more than market proportions of the stock which represents 
a larger share of the market M investor with a tax rate lower 
.than the effective rate in the market will act in the opposite manner." 
72 
Stapleton and Burke have considered an nnputation tax system under 
73 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model based on Brennan's model which assumes 
that the dividend component of the company's total expected end of 
period total return is known with certainty i.e. the whole of the 
uncertainty regarding end of period return attaches to the capital 
gains component. By contrast the model \IDich we used in chapter 3 was 
more general and encompassed risky dividends as well as risky capital 
gains. 
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4.7. Conclusions 
It was asserted (chapter one )that tax neutrality was a desirable 
requiranent jn a tax systan. In this brief survey of the literature 
we have seen that a mnnber of authors have suggested that a cash 
flow tax systan would fulf il this aim although there has been sane 
debate concerning (i) disincentive effects caused by the arbitrariness 
of the dates of accounting periods, (ii) the revenue raiSing capacity 
of the tax systan and (iii) &:me confusion has arisen between issues 
of equity and efficiency. 
It was shown that to have both instantaneous free depreciat ion and 
interest deductibility resulted in a pre-tax rate of return on a 
capital outlay required to finance debt capital, at a lower figure 
than the rate of interest on debt. This violates the principle 
established in chapter one that the marginal rate of substitution of 
future for present consumpt ion, as valued by conSl.JDers or savers. 
should be equal to the marginal rate of transfonnation of present 
into future goods in production. Authors have suggested that if 
interest deductibility were abolished then with free depreciation 
the rate of interest on debt would be equal to the pre-tax rate of 
return on the capital outlay required to finance the debt capital. 
However with the capital allowance carry forward provisions this 
was soown to be no longer true. 
A number of authors had shown that for the US situation the danand 
for risky assets is inversely proportional to one minus the corporate 
tax rate. Not only was this result shown to be inappropriate for the 
UK :1npltation tax systan but the relationship between taxation and 
risktaking was IOOre canplex than previous models would suggest. In 
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contrast to other models restrictive assumptions were not placed 
on the form of the utility function. 
The Mcx:ligliani and Miller papers were briefly reviewed. It was 
stated that to capitalise the relief at the rate for a certain income 
stream is in practice unrealistic at high levels of leverage. Other 
roodels, which were based on CAPM, have asSLUned risk-free dividends. 
The extensions deal ing with risky debt , dividends and capital gains 
have already been dealt with in chapter three under the CAPM. In the 
present chapter an attempt was made to justify the CAPM approach by 
assuming wide diversification of shareholder portfolios such that the 
risk on a shareholder's stake in a firm's investment is very snall 
in relation to the total wealth of the individual concerned. The 
implication is that an individual firm's bankruptcy, ceteris paribus, 
may have no material effect on shareholder utility. However the 
disutilities of society caused by the social and psychological effects 
of bankruptcies are ignored by such a model. 
The lack of consideration of the canplexities of tax effects on 
capital project appraisal procedures both in practice and in the 
finance literature has been highlighted. In particular (i) to 
deal with interdependencies of projects through capital allowances 
and (ii) to reflect the practical importance of both liquidity 
(capital rationing) as well as profitability effects, a programming 
model is required to solve capital budgeting problems in nontrivial 
cases. Such a model is presented in chapter seven. But because of the 
canplexities of the tax system, before incorporating the tax frameoork 
into a financial programning model, it is instructive to isolate the 
effects on investment decisions (ch..'1pter 5) and financing decisions 
(chapter 6) of each major tax rule using numerous simple numerical 
and algebraiC e~amples. 
CHAPTER 5 
The impact of taxation on capital project appraisal 
under certainty 
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5.1. Notation (for chapter 5 only) 
= ACT payable for the accounting period ending at tllne q 
= present value of capital allowances under current cost 
accounting principles with an asset replacement period 
of N years , 
b = the basic rate of income tax 
cf j = capi tal allowance in period j • 
Dj = dividend paid at time j • 
AFj = the change in accounting depreciation in period j of those 
fixed assets relating to production overheads, resulting 
from project acceptance • 
J j = outlay J in period j • 
k = discount rate 
k i = the rate of asset price inflation 
k
n 
= a ncxninal required rate of return (constant), 
kr = a real rate of interest , 
K = the later of the fiscal periods involved in the accounting 
period , 
m = the last accounting period in which a capital allowance 
1s claimed , 
N = asset replacement period 
• 
n = the last time period in \\bich an allowance is claimed " 
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= the change in net taxable income in period j 
resulting from project acceptance , 
P = proportion of total taxable income to be taxed at the 
q, = the delay between the date of capital expenditure 
ahd the end of the accounting year in \\-hich each 
allowance is cla:imed 
R. = dividend received at time j 
J 
sC. = the change in the closing balance of inventory in 
J 
period j resulting from project acceptance . 
ff . = the change in the opening balance of inventory 
J 
in period j resulting from project acceptance. 
T = the corp::>rate tax rate 
• 
Uj = the proportion of the volune of unoold goods to the 
volume of production during the period. 
v = present value of net operating cash flows before tax. 
Wj = the change in net \\Qrking capital in period j resulting 
from project acceptance 
• 
Xj = net cash inflow at time j 
y = the time gap between the end of the accounting period on 
which the allowance is based and the tax payment date 
z = stock relief percentage (currently z = 0.15) • 
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5.2. Introduction 
It needs to be stated at the outset that much of the first half 
of this chapter is primarily concerned with the mechanics of basic 
corporation tax canputations ooich are already well established 
in the professional tax literature. To add salt to the \\Ounds I 
shall resort to symoolic representation of the tax rules and the 
reader: may indeed now query the rationale for such material being 
included in a doctoral thesis in this way. It has been stated earlier 
that one of the criticisms against finance authors,lecturers and 
financial analysts is that tax canplexi ties are frequently ignored 
and if such material were now ani tted there \\QuId be a serious 
loss in the usefulness of the thesis. Furthermore, the numerous 
algebraic and arithmetical examples in this chapter should 
provide the ground\\Ork for the full mcx:lel to be presented in chapter 
seven, and without painstakingly progressing through the ABC 
of the tax system we might ooon become lost in a sea of algebra. 
The symbolic representation of the tax rules in the present 
chapter should therefore help to provide the ground~Drk for 
chapter seven. I really do aIX>logise to the reader for the 
tediousness of this chapter but believe that its contents 
nevertheless do serve a useful role. 
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5.3 A cash flow tax system 
It has been well established ((Brown, 1948), (Lawson and 
Stark, 1975), (Meade, 1978) and in chapter two of this thesis), 
that a corporate tax system based on cash flows may offer a 
neutral solution to the capital investment decisioIl. For 
instance, consider a firm spending £lm in return for £100,000 
at the end of each year into perpetuity. l~ith 100 per cent 
capital allowances and full offset for losses (ignoring the tax 
lag between the pre-tax cash flows and the incremental tax cash 
flows thereon) then the firm spends only £480,000 after tax 
relief at 52 per cent, but receives £48,000 p.a. after tax, 
thus maintaining the pre-tax rate of return at 10 per cent p.a. 
With such a system the investment decision is not changed by 
the imposition of taxation. In present value terms the tax 
relief on cash outflows bears the same proportion to pre-tax 
cash outflows as the tax on cash in£+ows bears to the pre-tax 
cash inflows. The plus or minus sign of the NPV of a project 
before tax will be the same as that after tax. The result is 
that, assuming a discOlmted dividends share valuation model, 
for capital invesment decision purposes, a shareholder wealth 
maximising firm may ignore corporation tax altogether and the 
government effectively becomes a business partner. 
Provided the time lags between pre-tax cash flows and taxes/ 
allowances thereon are constant, then given the tax system as 
outlined above, a neutral solution exists if the present value 
of the capital allowances, ignoring these inherent tax lags, 
equals the invesment outlay (J). This is the principle 
of the cash flow tax system. 
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Consider the ntnnerical illustration in table 8 
Table 8 Present value of pre-tax cash flows 
End of Year Cash Flow (£) Discount Factor @ 15% NPV 
0 -3000 1. -3000 
1 1000 0.8696 869.6 
2 2000 0.7561 1512.2 
3 1000 0.6575 657.5 
NPV = £ 39.3 
The outlay at the end of year 0 reduces the net cash inflows from 
the portfolio of projects undertaken by the finn of which the above 
project is one. Hence if inflows are taxed at say, 52% the tax 
bill based on net cash inflows at the end of year 0 will be reduced 
by 52% x £3,000 = n, 560. Sjmilarly, the £1,000 cash flow at the 
end of year one will bear tax of £520, the £2,000 will bear tax 
of £1,040, and the £1,000 inflow at the end of year 3 will bear 
tax of £520 also. With a time delay in settling tax bills of 
say 1 year we show in table 9 the changes in tax payments resulting 
from project acceptance, and the present value of the tax effects 
are given in table 10. 
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Table 9 Tax effects 
End of Year 0 1 2 3 4 
Reduction in tax 52%.3000 through allowance 
= 1,560 on capital 
expenditure (£) 
Taxes on inflows 52%.1000 52%.2000 52%.1000 
(£) = 520 = 1,040 = 520 
Table 10 Present value of tax effects 
End of Year Cash Flow Discount Factor NPV 
0 
- 1.0 -
1 1560 0.8696 1356.5 
2 -520 0.7561 -393.2 
3 -1040 0.6575 -683.8 
4 -520 0.5718 -297.3 
Present value of the tax effects (£) -17.8 
Hence the Net present value of the project is £39.3 - 17.8 = £21.5 
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Because of the time value of money the effective tax 
rate of 52% is reduced. With a I year tax time lag and 
a 15% discount rate the marginal tax rate is effectively 
reduced to 52% x I = 0.52 x 0.87 = 45.22%. Hence 
1+15% 
the £39.3 NPV is reduced by 45.22% x £39.3 = £17.8 to 
£21.5 as above. The effect of a cash flow tax may be shown 
algebraically as follows: 
NPV (before tax) = -J + XI + X2 
I + k -(-I-+-k-) 2 
where J = out lay , 
Xj = net cash i nf low at the end of time j , 
k = discount rate 
• 
NPV(of tax effects) = T.J 
T+k 
• - T (-J + X I + X2 T+k --- -----I +k (I +k)2 + X 3 t .•. J 
.... 
However, the contents of The square brackets are equal to 
NPV(before tax). 
Hence NPV(of tax effects) :: T x NPV(before tax) 
i+k 
(I) 
(2 ) , 
Since NPV(after tax) = NPV(before tax) + NPV(of tax effects) , 
then NPV(after tax) = NPV(before tax) -[~ x NPV(before tax}, 
I+k 
NPV(after tax) :: NPV(before tax) x [I - T) 
T+k 
(3) 
Where O<T<I and k>O then [I -~l is always positive. 
I+kj 
Hence the tax effects do not change the sign of the NPV. 
If the NPV(before tax) is positive, the NPV(after tax) 
wi I I also be positive; and if the NPV(before tax) Is neg-
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atlve, then the NPV(after tax) wi I I also be negative. Finally 
with a NPV(before tax) equal to zero, the NPV(after tax) wi I I 
also be zero. This latter case may be demonstrated by consider-
ing an Investment project which offers an immediate cash outflow 
of £2,486 In return for cash inflows of £1,000 p.a. at the 
'end of each of the next 3 years. 
If we assume a money discount rate of 10% , we note from table 11 
that the investment is marginal since it has a net present value 
of zero (to the nearest pound). 
Table 11: Non-tax cash flows 
Year Cash Flow Discount Factor Net Present Val ue 
-
Now (2,486) 1.000 £(2,486) 
., 
I 1,000 0.909 909 
2 1,000 0.826 826 
3 1,000 0.751 751 
-
NIL 
Now,under our simplified model a tax system is considered neutral 
If It al lows at the margin a NPV of taxes on inflows to be equated 
with a NPV of tax relief on outflows. Let us assume that the time 
lag between cash outlays and tax allowances is the same as that 
between cash inflows and taxes thereon. In the extreme theoretical 
case where this time lag is zero and the rate of tax T is constant, 
the NPV of the change in the tax bil I resulting from acceptance of 
the marginal project Is zero, as demonstrated by table 12. 
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Table 12: Tax cash flows 
Year Cash Flow O.F. NPV 
Capital allowance Now £2,486 X T 1.000 £2,486 X T 
Tax on inflow (I,OOo)X T 0.909 (909)X T 
Tax on Inflow 2 CI,OOO)X T 0.826 (826)X T 
Tax on inflow 3 CI ,OOO)X T 0.751 (751)X T 
NIL 
With a one year tax time-lag the cash flows in table 12need to be 
discounted for a further year. Hence each figure in the final 
column of table 9 would need to be multiplied by the factor 1/(1+10%) 
resulting in the same total NPV of zero. In this way with constant 
tax time lags and constant tax rates, a neutral effect on the Invest-
ment decision Is obtained since the discounted relief on the capital 
expenditure of the marginal investment fully compensates for the 
discounted tax on future cash Inflows. Provided the cash outlay 
occurs at the same time during the accounting period as future cash 
Inflows during future periods, then neutrality would stll I be obtained. 
5.4. Tax time lags and the accounting period 
For companies that began trading before 1965 the accounting year 
preceding Apri I of year (x) forms the basis for the tax payable on 
I January of year (x+I). For instance, the accounting year ended 
31 December 1977 which precedes April 1978/Apri I 1979 forms the basis 
for the tax payable on I January 1979. Otherwise, for companies 
that began trading after 1965, the tax Is payable nine months after 
the end of the accounting period. The importance of the accounting 
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period can be demonstrated by considering the same project which 
is marginal before tax. Assume that the investment is made on 
I January 1978 with cash generated on 31st December 1978, 31 
December 1979 1 and 31 December 1980. With an accounting year 
end also at 31 December, both the expenditure and the first 
inflow are assessed in the same period. For long establ ished 
companies tax on the net taxable income for the accounting period 
ended 31 December 1978 is payable on I January 1980. Thus, with 
a one year time lag from the end of the accounting period the 
project obtains a value of minus £249 X T when discounted to I 
January 1980 (Table~. Alternatively, if the investment were made 
on 31 December 1978 with inflows on I January 1980, 1981 and 
1982, there wou I d be a pos i t I ve NPV <Tab I e 14) • 
Tab I e 13 : Tax cash flows 
Timing of Cash Discount NPVat 
tax bi II Flow Factor 1.1.80 
Capital allowance 1.1.80 £2,486 X T 1.000 £2,486 X T 
Tax on i nf low 1.1.80 ( I, OOO)X T : .OGO (I ,OOO)X T 
Tax on inflow I • I .81 <I,OOO)X T 0.909 (909)X T 
Tax on i nf low I. I .82 (I,OOO)X T 0.826 (826)X T 
--
£(249)X T 
Tab Ie 14: Tax cash flows 
Timl ng of Cash Discount NPV at 
tax bi II Flow Factor I. I .80 
Capital allowance I. I .80 £2,486 X T 1.000 £2,486 X T 
Tax on inflow I. I .81 (I,OOO)X T 0.826 (826)X T 
Tax on inflow I. I .83 (I,OOO)X T 0.751 (751)X T 
Tax on inf low I. I .84 (I,OOO)X T 0.683 (683)X T 
-
£226 X T 
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In this way the timdng of expenditure in relation to the 
accounting period can be important in the marginal case. Under 
conditions of certainty the tax relief on capital expenditure may 
be fonnally valued as follows, asstnning no delays between the end 
of the accounting period and the date when the tax for the period 
is due: 
NPV = 
n 
T ( E 
.j=o 
) 
\\here cf1. = the capital allowance in period j 
J 1 
k = the rate of interest 
T = the corporate tax rate, 
(4) 
/' 
n = the last time period in which an allowance is claimed 
Capital allowances are detennined by the date men the asset is 
brought into use and though the Inland Revenue penni ts the date 
of the capital expenditure as a proxy, it is discretionary. In 
the analysis we shall assune that the t\\O dates are the same. Hence 
the present value of the capital allowance is given by: 
NPV = T ~ ~ cAq J 
q=o (l+k)Q+Y 
(5) I 
\\here 
Q = the delay between the date of capital expenditure and 
the end of the accounting year in which each all~v.ance 
is claimed 
y = the time gap between the end of the accounting 
period on which the allowance is based and the ta.x 
payment date, 
m = the last accounting period in which a capital 
allowance is claimed. 
With variable rates of corporation tax, we need to take account 
of the retrospective nature of the legislation in that the Corporation 
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tax rate for the financial year 1976 is not detennined until the 
Finance Act 1977 is passed at the end of July. Therefore in 
applying the rates of Corporation Tax to taxable income for a 
canpany whose year end is 31 Decanber, for instance, any capital 
expenditure between 1 January and 31 December 1976 reduces the 
taxable income for that accounting period which in turn is 
apportioned as to one quarter taxable at the rate for the 
Financial Year 1975 and three quarters at the rate for the 
Financial Year 1976. During the early part of 1977 benefits 
of Capital allowances for the preceding year \IDuld still be 
unknown in relation to three quarters of the allowable capital 
expendi ture. Hence, since accounting periods ending at dates 
other than 31 March cover IIDre than one Financial Year, taxable 
profits after capital allowances need to be apportioned over the 
respective ttme periods to reflect the different rates of tax for 
each Financial Year. Since accounting periods for tax purposes 
are limited to 12 nonths' duration, each accounting period cannot 
extend into nore than too Financial Years. 
Therefore 
NPV = ~ [PrK + (l-P) TK_1J d\ 
q=o (l+k)Q+y 
v.here P = prop::>rtion of total taxable incane to be taxed 
at the rate TK, where~ 
K = the later of the fiscal periods involved in the 
accounting period 
~ 
K-1 = the earlier of the fiscal periods involved in the 
accounting pericx:l 
~ 
(6) " 
(l-P) = prop::>rtion of total taxable incane to be taxed at TCK-1 ) , 
As an example let us assume the following for illustrative purposes 
only ~ 
-152-
Financial Year 1974 (Apri I 1974 to fJ1arch 1975) 
Financial Year 1975 (April 1975 to March 1976) 
Rate 
60% 
48% 
The accounting year ended December 1975 straddles two tax years: 
t-I -- ---~-- -- .--- -- - t-- ------ - ---- ~-- - -- -- .../ Time 
I Apri I I Jan 31 March 31 Dec 31 March 
1974 1975 1975 1975 1976 
I 
Total expenditure 
with~the accounting 
year 
Tax years 
I 
RaI-l t_e ___ ~_o_O_/o_ -l----.. ~ % ______ _ 
Since the accounting year straddles two tax years the expenditure is 
apportioned for tax purposes over 3 months (I Jan to 31 March) and 9 
months (I Apri I to 31 December): 
£7,000 x 3/12 @ 60% : 
£7,000 x 3/12 @48% = 
Reduction in tax bi I! 
£1,050 
£2,520 
£3,570 
Note that cAq = £7,000, Tk = 0.48, Tk_1 = 0.60, P = 9/12. 
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5.5. Imperfect relief for capital expenditure 
The principle was established in chapter two that, even where taxes 
are paid on net operating cash flows, when the present value of 
capital allowances from a project is less than the capital outlay 
then there is a disincentive to invest in a project, of which the NPV befo~ 
tax is zero. The symbol to represent the present value of capital 
allowances as a proportion of cost was denoted ex . Where ex < 1 there 
is a potential tax disincentive, where ex > 1 there is a potential 
incentive to invest, and a neutral systen operates if ex = 1. For 
an investment in a new industrial building, then with a discount 
rate of 10 per cent per anm.nn ex ~ 0.81, ignoring (i) time lags 
between the end of each accounting period and the annual tax 
payment date and (ii) the timing of the expenditure in relation 
to the date of the accounting year-end. For second hand industrial 
buildings values of ex were also less ~han one. 
Hence, if we accept the assumptions of the NPV nndel then we must 
conclude that the tax systen offers no incentive to expand factory 
prenises and other buildings. MJreover, with inflation the present 
value of the tax relief is even further reduced. Consequently, 
\\here capital allowances are less than 10(1% at the time of expenditure, 
a project which is marginal before taxation becomes financially 
unattractive. This may be dan:mstrated by the following example. 
Assune a long established canpany with a Decenber 31 year .. end is 
considering spending on 1 July 1978 the sum of £25,000 on a new 
industrial building, with a nil scrap value at the end of the project's 
life, in return for 12 annual inflows from 1st July 1979 of 
£3,668-92. It can be shown fran Table 15 that the project is 
marginal before tax since the present value of the outflow of 
£25,000 is equated with the present value of inflows. 
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Tax considerations alone would therefore determine 
the financial attractiveness of the proposition under our slmpl ified 
dec lsi on mode I • 
Table 15 Non-tax cash flows 
Expenditure 
I nf lows 
Date Cash Flow 
1.7.78 £(25,000) 
1.7.79- 3,668-92 p.a. 
1.7.90 
D.F. 
1.000 
6.814 
N.P.V. at 
I .7.78 -
£(25,000) 
25,000 
NIL 
Since the expenditure on I July 1978 fal Is in the accounting period 
ended 31.12.78 the initial allowance of £12,500 and the writing-down 
allowance of £1,000 In the first year reduces the value of the tax 
bl I I due on I January 1980. The writing down allowance of £500 for 
the year ended 31.12.90 Is equal to the balance of allowances not yet claimed 
by that date. From table 16 we observe 1-he disastrous tax consequences 
of the Investment in this particular example. 
Table 16 : Tax cash flows (discounted to 1.1.80 for convenience) 
Accounting 
period ended 
ellowanc.e.s. 
j .12.78 
31.12.79-31.12.89 
31.12.90 
Taxes on inflows 
Tax date 
I. I .80 
1.1.81-1.1.91 
I. I .92 
Cash Flow 
£13,500 X T 
£ 1,000 X T p.a. 
£ 500 X T 
31.12.79-31.12.90 1.1.81-1.1.92 £ 3,668-92 X T 
D.F. NPV at 
I. I .80 
I .000 £ I 3, 500 X T 
6.495 6,495 X T 
0.319 160 X T 
20,155 X T 
6.814 (25,000) X T 
£(4,845) X T 
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Let us ignore (i) time lags between the end of each accounting 
period and the annual tax payment date and (ii) the timing of 
the expenditure in relation to the date of the accounting year 
end. 
The NPV (before tax) is given by (V-J) 
co 
\\here V = r 
j=o 
After tax we have 
NPV (after tax) = V (1-T) - J(l-aT) (8) 
Where the NPV (after tax) is negative 
or 
V (l-T) - J + a.IT < 0 
a < 
V 1- (l-T)J 
T 
"'ben we have a net present value before tax of zero, i.e. V = J, then 
V 1 - (l-T>j = 1 
T 
Hence with 100 per cent capital allowances a = 1 and there is a neutral 
effect on the decision to invest. 
By contrast \\here a is less than one there canes a point where a 
is sufficiently low that a project which is attractive before tax is 
no longer attractive after tax. Consider the present value of net 
cash inflows before tax equal to 20 per cent IlDre than the present 
value of the outlay, i.e. V = 1.2 J. Where the corporate ta.'X rate 
is 52 per cent then the NPV (after tax) is negative if 
a < 1 - (1-0.52) 1.2 0.52 , 
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that is (approximately) 
CI. < 0.8154 , 
Where the discount rate is 10 per cent per annum, then for a 
new industrial building is has already been established that 
CI. ~ O.Bl. Hence, in this instance. even 
though the present value of net cash inflows before tax is 20% 
greater than the present value of the capital outlay. the tax 
rules for capital allowances result in a disincentive to invest. 
The general solution is described by inequality (9). 
In chapter three the absence of capital allowances for premises 
in the retail industry was highlighted. Hence. where the NPV 
(after tax) is negative 
VO - T) J < 0 for CI. = a J. 
giving V < 1 DOl 
I 1 - T , 
or V 25 for T 52% J < 12 = 
Hence. even if the present value of the net operating cash 
inflows before tax are as high as twice the present value of the 
capital expenditure on retail buildings. the tax effects make the 
project financially unattractive. For every £12,000 of capital 
expenditure now on retail buildings, the present value of the net 
operating cash flows before tax need to be at least £25,000 for 
the project to be acceptable. 
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S.B. Current cost capital allowances 
The present value of the total depreciation charged to the 
profit and loss account, for every pound of outlay incurred 
at the beginning of the accounting period, will be 
a 
where 
m 
'\ 
k 
n 
y 
When ki 
= 
m 
E 
q=1 
1 
m 
= asset Ii fe 
(1 + k ) q+ Y 
i 
(1 + k ) q+ y 
n 
rate of asset price inflation, 
= nominal discount rate, 
= lag between end of accounting period and tax date 
k , a 
n 
1, which indicates neutrality. 
When ki < kn' a < 1, which represents a potential disincentive 
to invest. 
Finally, for ki>kn' a>1 and there is a potential incentive to invest. 
A more interesting question is to examine tax incentives if backlog 
depreciation is included in which case total tax allowances 
represent the future replacement cost of the asset. 
In the remainder of this section, CCA depreciation will refer to 
the depreciation in the balance sheet, which includes backlog 
depreciation, and not in the profit and loss account. 
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Table 17 Current Cost Depreciation 
End Price Accumulated Accumulated CCA depreciation for year 
of of CCA CCA plus backlog depreciaticn 
year new depreciation depreciation 
asset(£) to date to previous 
(i) (ii ) ( iii) year (v) = (iii) - (iv) 
(iv) 
a J - - -
1 J(1+k.) !J (1 + k . ) nil tJ (I+k1 ) 1 1 
2 J(1+k )2 i tJ (1+k i )2 SJ(1+k1 ) !J[2(1+k i )2 - (1+k i ] 
3 J(1+k )3 1 t J (1+k1 )3 tJ 0+k1 ) 2 !J [3 ( 1 + k1 ) 3 - 2 ( 1 + k1 ) ~ 
4 J(1+k )4 1 ..!l.J (1 +k ) 4 5 i tJ (1 +k1 ) 3 i J [4 ( 1 + k 1 ) 1I - 3 ( 1 + k. 1 ) ~ 
5 J(1+k )5 1 J(1+1<, )5 i !J (1 +1<.1) 1+ -!J [5 (1 + k1 ) 5 - 4 (1 + k1 ) j 
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In table 17CCA depreciation figures are evaluated for a 
five year project assuming ki = the rate of asset price inflation. 
~his will later be contrasted with k a nominal rate, and k a 
n r 
real rate, yet to be defined more precisely.) By summing the 
entries in column (v) we note that ignoring the time value of 
money the total CCA depreciation over 5 years is J(1+k i )5, being 
the future replacement cost of the asset. Since this exceeds the 
outlay J. then with inflation on asset prices there is an incentive 
to invest. But since this assumes that the required nominal 
rate of return, denoted k , is zero let us now introduce the 
n 
time value of money and discount the CCA capital allowances in 
column (v). 
The present value of the allowances for the five year project 
is given by: 
AS = J [G::~) · 2G.ki) 2 (1 + ki) "5 l+k p+k
n
} 2 
n 
3c·kir 2 (1+k )2 4Cki )4 + i + 1+k (1+k )3 1 +k 
·n n n 
3 
(1+k.)3 SC·ki Y (1.ki)4] ~ 4 (1+k )4 + 
n 1+k (1+k )5 
n n 
= ~(1 -_1 ) [1.ki 2C· kiY C'k )' + + 3 i 5 1+k 1+k 1+k l+k 
n n n 
4(~::~ )4J (1.k r + + J i 1+k • n 
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Hence in general when the asset is replaced in N years' time: 
+ 3(1+k.i )3 
\ 1 +kn 
+ 
+ 
+ 
( 
1 +k i )2 
2 1 +k 
n 
It is instructive to consider whether there is an investment 
incentive if the rate of price inflation (k i ) on the asset 
happens to be the same as the nominal discount rate of k • 
n 
Hence for k. 
1 
Al = J 
A2 = J + 
A3 J + 
A4 = J + 
AS = J + 
k , from equation (11) 
n 
I 
J~kn ) 
'2 1+k
n 
, 
J~ kn ) (1+ 2) 3 1 +k
n 
I 
J~ kn ) (1+2+3) 
"4 1+k
n 
, 
(kn) (1+2+3+4) 5 1 +k
n 
. 
From this progression we see that the general rule is 
J + J~) (N;7 k n 
(1lJ 
(12) 
• 
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With positive rates of interest k >0 and K 1(1+K »0, and 
n n n 
with asset life spans exceeding one year N>1 and (N-1)/2 >0, 
hence A >J for k = k. Therefore, there exists a tax N i n 
incentive to invest when the rate of price inflation on the 
asset equals the discount rate for appraisal purposes. 
For instance, consider an investment outlay of £1m, a discount 
rate of 10 per cent, price inflation on the asset of 10 per 
cent, and a 5 year life: 
= J + ~)C;1) J 
.. 1,181,818. 
This is equivalent to a capital allowance of 118.18 per cent 
in present value terms, and since only a 100 per cent allowance 
is required to provide a neutral effect on the capital investment 
decision. then there is a tax incentive to invest with CCA capital 
allowances (for ki = knJ. 
Furthermore. if the rate of asset price inflation exceeds the 
discount rate ihen (1+ki )/(1+kn J is greater than unity. 
The first term alone on the right hand side of 
eq uat I on (11) exceeds J. and since the other terms are 
positive then AN>] for Ki>k
n
• Once again this suggests a 
tax incentive to invest. 
tat us now move to the more interesting part of the analysis 
which is to consider Ki < Kn. For this purpose it is useful 
to introduce a real rate of interest, denoted k , s·uch that 
r 
(1 + k ) 
n 
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Note however that although k is the required nominal rate of 
n 
interest for accepting or rejecting the project. k is not 
r 
necessarily the real rate of interest required by shareholders 
to justify project acceptance. This would only be the case if 
the rate of asset price inflation were the same as the genEral 
rate of inflation on the basket of goods bought by shareholders 
03 ) 
from cash generated by dividends. assuming a discounted dividends 
share valuation model. Hence from equations (ll)and (13) 
= 
+ 
J 
3 
(1+k )3 
r 
+ 
+ + 
2 
+ """C"""1"';;'+-k-'-) 2 
r 
For instance for N=3. k = 0.03. k = 0.10 
r n 
::: J J (0.10\ [ 1 2 l 
+ 3 1:10) 1.03 + (1.03)2 J (1.03)3 
= J x 1.0017 
Under these parameters. in DCF terms the CCA tax system is 
equivalent to a 100.17 per cent capital allowance which is 
approximately neutral but offers a slight incentive to 
invest. However as the asset replacement period extends the 
incentive is increased. For example with N = 4 and k = 0.03. 
r 
k = 0.10 
n 
::: J 
(1.03) 1+ + 
J x 1.0158 > , 
(14 ) 
I 
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Moreover, the larger the nominal discount 
greater the incentive. Since k /(1+k ) > 
x x 
rate, k , 
n 
k /(1+k ) 
z z 
the 
for 
k > k • then 
x z 
AN (n=x) > AN (n= z) from equation [)4). 
For instance for N = 4, k = 0.03 and k = 0.20, 
r n 
A4 (k
n 
= 0.20) = J x 1.1219 > 
The question which now poses itself is whether there are 
circumstances in which a current cost capital allowance 
would provide a disincentive to invest. By inspection of 
equation (14) we observe that the greater the real rate of 
interest, denoted k , the lower the present value of the 
r 
capital allowances. 
kr • 0.10 then 
For instance for N = 7, k = 0.20, 
n 
A7 • (1:1)7 + f t [1~1 + (;.1)2 + 3 + 
+ 5 + (1.1)5 
• J x 0.8475 , 
4 
Hence under these circumstances in OCF terms the current cost 
capital allowances are equivalent to an immediate capital allowance 
of 84.75 per cent. Since a 100 per cent allowance would provide 
a neutral solution, the CCA tax base would create tax disincentives 
for high values of k. These circumstances exist when the 
r 
required discount rate for project appraisal purposes exceeds 
the rate of asset price inflation by a large amount. 
5.7 An accrual account ing tax system 
Although investment decisions under the NPV model are based on cash 
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flows, the payments of tax are determined according to an accrual 
accounting system. Let us compare the tax based in table 18, with 
the net cash flows from the project for a particular year, as shown 
by table 19. 
Table 18 : The tax base 
Sales based on accrual accounting principles £200,000 
Opening Stock £13,000 
Purchases based on accrual accounting 
principles 130,000 
less closing stock 
Cost of goods sold 
The tax base before capital allowances 
Table 19 : Net Cash flow before tax 
Opening balance of debtors 
Sales based on accrual accounting principles 
Less closing balance of debtors 
Opening balance of creditors and expenses 
(excluding depreciation) 
Purchases based on accrual accounting 
principles 
~ closing balance 
less cash expenditure on materials and other 
expenses 
Net cash flow from trading 
143,000 
(43,000) 
10,000 
130,000 
140,000 
(14,000) 
(100,000) 
£100,000 
£15,000 
200,000 
215,000 
(25,000) 
190,000 
(126,000) 
£64,000 
Continuing the I I lustration, before stock relief the tax base of 
£100,000 differs from net cash Income from trading of £64,000 by the 
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periodic investment in working capital of £36,000 (Table 20) 
Tab Ie 20 Period;.c ;nves tment in net worki n9 cap; ta 1 
Increase in stocks: 
Closing balances 
Raw materi a Is 
Work in progress 
.. 
Finished goods 
less Opening balances 
Raw mate r I a I s 
Work in progress 
Finished goods 
Increase in debtors: 
less 
-
Closing balance 
Open I ng balance 
Increase in creditors and 
expenses(excluding 
depreciation) 
ClOSing balance 
Opening balance 
£25,000 
(£15,000) 
£14,000 
(£10,000) 
Periodic investment in net working capital 
£43,000 
(£13,000) 
£30,000 
£10,000 
£40,000 
( £4,000) 
£36,000 
Although the firm is generating £64,000 of cash from trading the tax 
bill is based on £100,000. With a tax rate of 52% the company is 
paying £52,000 on £64,000 of net cash flow. 
The adverse effects however are partly mitigated through stock appreciation 
rei lef which gives a tax allowance on the periodic Increase in stocks 
In excess of a proportion, which we shall denote z, currently at 15%, 
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of trading profits after capital allowances. In the above example, 
If there are no capital allowances in the period then the tax base 
is reduced (tab Ie 21 ) • 
Tab Ie 21 Tax after stock relief 
Tax base before stock rei ief £100,000 
Closing stock 
Opening stock 
Increase 
less 15% of £100,000 
£43,000 
13,000 
30,000 
(15,000) 
less stock appreciation relief 
Tax base after stock rei lef 
15,000 
£85,000 
Tax thereon @ 52% £44,200 
Hence, In this illustration the effective tax rate is 44200/64000 = 
69%, ignoring the tax payment time gap and the time value of money. 
A numerical illustration of the effect of a £100 capital allowance, 
wilen stock rei ief is claimed, Is shown below in table 22. The £100 
capital allowance has decreased the tax base by £100 x (I + 0.15) = £115. 
A 
A I geb ra i ca I I Y Cq = £100 , 
z .. 0.15 
Hence, al lowing for stock rei lef, the present value of the capital 
allowance is m 
~ ~Tk + - P) Tk- l ] (1 + z) A NPV "' (1 C q (15 ) 
q=O 
(1 + k) q + Y 
• 
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Table 22 Tax base after stock relief and capital allowances 
Schedule 0 case I 
trading profit after 
capital allowances, 
but before stock 
re lief: 
Opening stock £13,000 
Closing stock £43,000 
Increase 
less 15% of 
ITOO,IOO: 
15% of 
£100,000 
Stock re lief 
Tax base 
£30,000 
(£15,015> 
Tax computation 
before accepting 
project 
£100,100 
(£14,985) 
£85,115 
Effect of £100 capital 
allowance arising from 
the project 
£100,000 
£13,000 
£43,000 
£30,000 
(£15,000 
(£15,000) 
£85,000 
We note that the stock rei ief decreases the tax base by the appreciation 
of stock less 15% of the base before stock re lief. Hence the change in 
net taxable income in period j resulting from project acceptance is 
given by 
ANT! J = ( Xj . + W j - C~) (1 + z) 
where X. 
J 
= the change in cash flows 
from project acceptance, 
from trading 
s ~ ) 
J 
in perio~ 
(16 ) 
resulting 
, 
W. = the change in net working capital In period j resulting from J 
project acceptance 
I 
Sc. = the change in the closing balance of inventory in period, 
J oJ 
resulting from project acceptance 
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50 J = the change in the corresponding opening balance 
Although depreciation is replaced by capital allowances as the measure 
of capital consumption for tax purposes, it is stll I relevant to the 
tax calculation since It is Included In the valuation of stock. Further-
more, the stock rei ief provisions do not fully cover the periodic increase 
in the closing stock. Where stock rei lef is claimed the effect of 
... 
depreciation, via its inclusion in W. , 
J 
net taxable income In period j by 
c 
5 J' and 
( u J A F J - u J _ I llF J _ I) (I + z) - ( u J A F J - u J _ I A F j - I ) 
• z ( u JA F J - u J _ I A F j _ I ) 
o 5 J' Is to change 
WhereAFJ = the change In accounting depreciation In period J of those 
fixed assets relating to production overheads, resulting 
from project acceptance. 
~ 
and uJ • the proportion of the volume of unsold goods to the volume 
of production during the period. 
Hence, In the first period J In which depreciation Is chargedAF. I Is J-
zero but ~F. Is positive. We note that depreciation arising from the 
J 
project increases net taxable income In period j II I by (z x Uj)~ Fj" By 
contrast where n represents the last period containing depreciation 
from the Investment, ~ F is pos I tl v9but A F I I s zero. Hence in period 
. n n+ 
n+1 the effect of depreciation from the proJect Is to decrease net 
taxable Income by (z x u )!J,.F if stock relief is claimed; and by u xAFn 
n n n 
If stock relief is not claimed. However, in practice these niceties 
may not be significant. For Instance, if we assume that z·15%Ju.2~,and the 
asset Is depreciated over ten years on a straight-line basis, then 
(Z x un)AF n equals 0.3% of the asset cost. With a marginal tax rate of 
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50 per cent this is worth only 0.15 per cent of the asset cost even 
Ignoring the time value of money. On the other hand, let us take the 
example of a firm with a very high opening inventory in the initial 
year of a new project, sufficient to match heavy sales from other 
projects such that despite the fact that al I production of this first 
year is held in stock, there is insufficient stock appreciation via-
~-vis taxable trading profit to claim stock rei ief. With a four-year 
project ul x AFI = 25% of the asset cost. Hence, with short-term projects 
and heavy stockbui Iding such complexities may be Important in the 
marginal case. 
Let us consider our model so far. Excluding Advance Corporation Tax, 
the Net Present Value Model shows that a capital investment project 
should be accepted if: 
n ·m 
~ x. - .J. l CPT K + C1 -P)'K-l1 AN TI -J J q j=O (I +k)j q=O > 0 
(1 + k) q + y (17) , 
where Xj = the Increase in cash income in period j resulting from 
project acceptance 
, 
J 
= capital investment outlay in period j , J 
n = the project horizon date I 
AN TI = the change in net taxable income in period q resulting q from project acceptance. 
5.8 Net taxable income and the marginal tax rate 
For the Financial Year 1978 which accrues from I Apri I 1978 to 31 March 
1979 the ful I rate of 52% appl ies to companies with net taxable Income 
over £100,000 and the smal I companies rate of 42% appl ies to net taxable 
Income under £60,000. These rates and limits were legal ised by the 
I, 
, I 
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Table 23 Marginal tax rates :( ;r ?] I (") 
-< ~ Financial Year Finance Act Ful I rate Small Marginal Margl na I MargInal MargInal tax ;r 01 ~ 
which sets of Corp- Companies relief rei lef rei i ef rate when ::r 0 OJ 01 I the rates oration rate lower upper . fractIon margt na I < (/I <D (II 
for the Tax limit limit small (1) 0- :OJ 
financial (£ > (£> companies (!) -+ (1) 
Year under rei ief :J -@- :::J conslder- app lies 
-+ -+ 
ation (1) ::r ~ <D 
·42% 
(/I 
1974 (I April 74 1975 52% 25000 40000 ·1/6 .. 68.67% :::J c (1) 3 
31 March 75) .1667 0- 3 (1) 
0- ., 
-< 1975 (I April 75 1976 52%· 42% 30000 50000 3/20 .. 67% 0 
"0 -t-
31 March 76) .15 ., (!) 
< \0 
-. -..J 
1976 (t April 76 1977 52% 42% 40000 65000 4/25 .. 68% 0 \{) c . 
31 March 77) .16 (II 
." -l 
OJ 
1977 (I Aprl I 77. 1978 52% 42% 50000 85000 1/7 = 66.29% :::J 0-01 
-31 March 78) .1429 :J (1) () 
(1) 
1978 <t Apr i 1 78 1979 52% 42% 60000' 100000 3/20 .. 67% » () 
3' r~arch 79 > .15 -+ L'l 
. 
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The marginal fraction of 3/20 for the Financial Year 1978 appl ies 
where net taxable income I ies between £60,000 and £100,000. For 
instance, if NTI were £80,000 the tax payable would be calculated 
as follows: 
£80,000 @ 52% 
less marginal sma I I companies relief 
3/20 (100,000 - 80,000) 
Tax payable on £80,000 
£41,600 
<3,000) 
f 38,600 
However, If NTI were increased to £80,100 then tax payable would 
Increase by £67 determining a marginal tax rate of 67%: 
£80,100 @ 52% 
less marginal small companies rei lef 
3/20 (100,000 - 80,100) 
Tax payable on £80,100 
41,652 
(2,985) 
! 38,667 
Marginal tax rates under marginal smal I companies rei ief are shown 
In Table 23 for other Financial Years as wei I. 
Note that these rates only apply within the relief I imits, the first 
slice being taxed at 42%. For instance the tax on £10,000 would be 
£4,200 and the tax on £70,000 would be £60,000 @ 42% plus £10,000 @ 67%, 
which equals £31,900. At the lower I imit the tax may be calculated as 
follows :-
£60,000 @ 52% 
~ marginal sma I I companies rei lef 
3/20 (100,000 - 60,000) 
Tax on £60,000 @ 42% 
f 31,200 
(6,000) 
I 25,200 
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Hence the marginal fractions are determined by the I imits in the 
fo I low i ng way: 
Margi na I f racti on = Lower Limit x (ful I rate less smal I 
(Upper less lower I imit) companies rate) 
e.g's Marginal fraction for Apri I 78/March 79= 60,000 _ x 
100,000-60,000 
(52% - 42%) = 3/20 
Marginal fraction for Apri I 77/March 78 50,000 x 
85,000 - 50,000 
(52% - 42%) = 1/7 
The marginal tax rate when marginal smal I companies rei lef applies Is 
determined in turn by the addition of the ful I rate of Corporation Tax 
and the marginal fraction: 
~~ for April 78/tJlarch 79 52% + 3/20 = 52% + 15% = 67% . I 
for Apri I 77/March 78 52% + 1/7 ~ 52% + 14.29% = 66.29% 
Although a lower limit of £60,000 may seem very sma I I for a sizeable 
company, the net taxable income is calculated after stock rei ief, cap-
ital allowances and other deductions and hence the sma I I companies 
rate may be charged on companies with high pre-depreciation profits but 
substantial capital allowances. Smal I companies rate is therefore not 
a tax on sma I I companies as such but a tax on companies with smal I net 
taxable Incomes. 
Note that where an accounting period straddles more than one Financial 
Year for tax purposes then more than one marginal tax rate may be 
applied to the same level of capital allowance of the accounting period. 
For instance, capital expenditure of £10,000 on plantand machinery 
during the accounting year ended 31 December 1978 wi I I. change the tax 
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b I I I by (see eq uat ion (6» 
£10,000 
where T = 
K 
(T X· 3/4 + T x 1/4) 
K C l 
the marginal tax rate for the Financial Year 1978 
TK_I = the marginal tax rate for the Financial Year 1977 
From Table 23 we see that the marginal tax rates could be T = 67%, 
K 
T I = 42%, and hence the capital allowance changes the tax bi I I by K-
£(10,000 x 3/4 x 67%) + £(10,000 x 1/4 x 42%) = £6,075. 
Hence the marginal tax rate is effectively 60.75% ignoring the time 
value of money. 
5.9 The Imputation system 
Under Schedule 14 Finance Act 1972 a company is required to make 
advance payments of Corporation Tax (ACT) on the 14th day of the 
month following a "quarter" during which dividends paid exceed 
dividends received. For this purpose "quartera"end on 31st March, 
30th June, 30th September, 31st December and on the last day of the 
accounting period If this fal Is on another day. 
With a basic rate of income tax at 30?o, a dividend of no has an ~CT 
attached payment of £30. The shareholder Is treated as having received 
£100 gross on which he is I iable to Income tax at a marginal rate 
which may be in excess of the 30% basic rate. If he pays tax on 
investment income at the marginal rate of say 50% the dividend bears 
a total tax of 50% of £100 = £50. However, since £30 has already 
been paid by the company he pays the difference of £50 - £30 = £20. 
In this way, under the imputation system, the tax the company pays on 
the dividend is "imputed" to the shareholder. 
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More generally, the ACT on the dividend paid at time j (OJ) 
will be 
b 
I 
1 - b 
where b = the basic rate of income tax. Similarly, the 
tax credit on a dividend received at time j (R j ) will be 
b 
1 - b 
Since ACT payable is based on the difference between franked 
payments and franked investment income during the quarterly 
return period, the ACT payable for the accounting period ending 
at time q, say at the end of the month j = 12, will normally be 
12 
= 1: 
j = 1 
12 
(D. -
J 
R. ) 
J 
b 
1 -b (18) • 
Note that 1: D. includes interim dividends both declared and 
j = 1 J 
paid between months j = 1 to 12 ( the current year); and also 
includes final dividends declared in the previous year, but paid 
within the current year. Since the Corporation Tax for the same 
period is 
( P T (1) ) N TIq 
. I( + - P T 1(-1 
the net mainstream corporation tax after ACT setoff will therefore 
normally be 
MeT )N TI N = PT k' + (1 - P) T 1(-1 q q 
12 b 
1: (D. - Rj ) 1 - b J (19) I j = 1 
payable at time (q + y), provided 
ACT < b.N TI 
q.... q. 
a reQyirement of the tax orovisions. 
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Restriction in ACT setoff 
Since there is a maximum amount of ACT paid on dividends which is 
available for offset against the Corporation Tax bill for the year, 
there is a minimum rate of net mainstream Corporation Tax. With a 
34 per cent setoff of ACT against a 52 per cent corporate tax rate, 
there remains a net mainstream corporation tax rate of 18 per cent, 
if ACT setoff is t·estricted. 
Hence the immediate tax benefit of capital expenditure in this case 
is only at the rate of 18 per cent (Buckley - 1975). Therefore 
where ACT setoff is restricted 
MCT 
N q = {PT,~ + (l - p) T - b) N TI 1\ K'-1 q 
payable at time (q + y) 
(20) I 
Hence where ACT setoff is restricted throughout the foreseeable 
future, the decision criterion for project acceptance {s modified 
to: 
n 
L 
j = 0 
X. - J. J J 
(1 +k) j 
m 
- 1: 
q = 0 
(PTK + (1 - P)T - b) ~N TI t(-1 q 
. q+y 
(1 + k) (21) 
With variable rates of income tax, the maximum ACT restriction for 
the accounting 
b k-l 
period ending 
(1 - P) NT! 
q 
at time q is : 
+ bK P N T! q 
(T1(-bK'lP. (~1(_1-bK_1)(l-P)) 
(1 + k) q + Y 
(22) 
>0 
• 
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No restriction in ACT &etoff 
If ACT setoff is not restricted ~nd the portfolio of the firm's 
investments is treated as one project. then the decision criterion 
for "acceptance" may be represented by: 
n 
1: 
j=o 
m CPT K + ( 1 - P )T ] 6N TI - [0 - R] b 1<-1 q q q l-b 
1: --------------------~----~--~~----(1+k)q+y q=o 
> o 
where 0 and R represent respectively dividends paid and q q 
received during the accounting period ended at time p. 
(23) 
Clearly, the sensitivity of the test. ceteris paribus. would depend 
upon the extent to which franked payments exceeded franked investment 
income. With constant dividends paid and received the decision 
criterion would still be represented by inequality (17) since the 
change in net taxable income due to acceptance of the incremental 
project is equal to the change in the net mainstream corporation 
tax base. However, the investment decision is one of the principal 
determinants of the level of future dividends in that future dividends 
are paid out of the benefits of current and future investments. 
Returning to our model, let 6 0 represent the increase in the 
payment of dividend, 6NTI the change in net taxable income and 
MCT \ 6N the change in net mainstream corporation tax, due to 
acceptance of the incremental project such that in a given period: 
= (24) , 
Outlined below is a numerical example of the changes in the tax bill of 
a project for a particular accounting period where there is an explicit 
dd . d H 
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Table 24 Net mainstream corporation tax 
Net taxable income for accounting 
year ended 31 December 1978 
Net dividends paid on 1st January 1978 
Advanced Corporation Tax at a tax 
inclusive rate of 34/100 i.e., at a 
tax exclusive rate of 34/66 
Mainstream Corporation Tax @ 52% 
Setoff 
Net Mainstream Corporation Tax (NMCT) 
Before 
Project 
£ 
100,000 
33,000 
17,000 
52,000 
17,000 
35,000 
After 
Project 
£ 
100,100 
33,033 
17,017 
52,052 
17,017 
35,035 
An example of a possible set of tax payment dates is given below: 
1. The extra Dividends of £33 are paid on 1st January 1978. 
2. The extra ACT of £17 is paid on 14th April 1978. 
3. The extra Net Mainstream Corporation Tax of £35 is payable on 
1st October 1979. 
Because of the explicit dividend policy, there is an extra dividend 
of £33. If shareholders are non-taxpayers they also receive a rebate 
from the Inland Revenue for the ACT of £17. Hence, the dividend 
plus the ACT is part of the required return to shareholders and 
taken into account in the time preference rate, denoted k. The tax 
attributable to the cash flows of the project is therefore the £35 
increase in the Net Mainstream Corporation Tax: 
(£100,100 - £100,000) x 0,52 
(£33,033 £33,000) x 0.34 = £35 
0.66 
Since £35 = 6NMCT 
1 
£100,100 - £100,000 = 6NT1 
I 
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D.52 T 
I 
£33.033 £33.000 = 60 and 
0.34 = 
we derive a general expression as in equation (24): 
= 
b 
60 1-b 
Hence the revised decision criterion would be to accept the 
incremental project if: 
m 
- L 
q=o > o 
Although this criterion would be based upon the best available 
information at the time of the appraisal. the effect of future 
expenditure on other projects may be to reduce taxable income 
(25) 
further by extra capital allowances. perhaps to the extent that 
bNTI becomes less than ACT; with the consequence that the decision 
criterion for the current project needs to be amended in retrospect 
to inequality (22) or at least to a hybrid of the two if ACT setoff 
is restricted for only a part of the project's life. 
If inequality (25) corresponds with the financial framework of a 
particular firm. then the capital investment appriasal team will need 
quidelines from the board of directors on the extent to which 
future dividends will be increased in line with higher levels of 
profits. Without a detailed model the team would have to perform 
sensitivity analyees on the changes in future dividends as a result 
of project acceptance. although clearly such tests would also be 
carried out on the other estimates. 
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5.10. Marginal tax rates for investment decisions 
Let us now recapitulate the marginal tax rates relevant to 
capital investment decisions. Even if we extend 100% depreciation 
to all capital expenditure and freeze the current rates of taxation, 
different annual net inflows or outflows may still be subjected 
to one of at least a dozen marginal rates of taxation. Since 
capital allowances reduce schedule 0 Case 1 net profits, let us 
investigate how the marginal tax rate, based on a £100 change 
in net taxable income, may depend upon the degree of Advance 
Corporation Tax setoff, stock appreciation relief,and the level 
of net taxable income. Using the rates for the Financial Year 
1977 we note from table 25 how the marginal tax rate varies with net 
taxable income. 
Table 25 Marginal tax rates 
Examples (i) (iil (ii1) 
Trading profits 
after capital 
allowances 
£100,000 £100,100 £10,000 £10,100 £71,000 £71.100 
Tax thereon 52.000 52.052 4.200 4,242 34.920· 34,986.29 
Marginal tax rate (%) 52 42 66.29 
• £34,920 = £71,000 x 52% - 1/7 £(85,000 - £71.000) , 
Furthermore, where Advance Corporation Tax setoff is 
~estricted throughout the life of the project. then the 
marginal rax rate may be reduced to (T - b). where T is 
the corporate tax rate and b is the basic rate of income 
tax. Hence. even though the corporation tax rate may be fixed 
at 52% for a number of years, changes in the basic rate of 
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income tax may affect investment decisions in the corporate sector: 
<Tab Ie 26) 
Table 26 Marginal tax rates 
Examples ( I v) (v) (vI) 
Net taxable income £100,000 100,100 10,000 10,100 71,000 71,100 
Mainstream Corporation 
Tax 52,000 52,052 4,200 4,424 34,920 34,986.29 
Dividends pa i d (less 
dividends received) 99,000 99,000 9,900 9,900 36,300 36,300 
ACT thereon 51,000 51,000 5,100 5,100 18,700 18,700 
Setoff 34,000 34,034 3,400 3,434 24,140 24,174 
Net Mainstream Corporation 
Tax 18,000 18,018 800 808 10,780 10,812.29 
Total tax paid 69,000 69,018 5,900 5,908 29,480 29,512.29 
Marginal tax rate(%> 18 8 32.29 
Since the convention In this country is to charge the usage of stock 
on a FIFO basis, in a period of inflation part of the accounting profit 
on sale of stock is related to the rise In its cost from the date of 
purchase to sale. However, the current stock rei ief reduces this extra 
burden of tax on the enterprise by al lowing a tax deduction equal to 
the excess of the increase in stock value during the accounting period 
over a proport1on'~currently at 15%) of trading profits for tax pur-
poses, with capital allowances already deducted. A £1 increase in 
trading profit leads to an increase in after tax profits of £(I-T) 
only If the increase In stock value Is less than the given proportion 
of trading profit before stock rei lef. The two Instances when this 
occurs Is when either stock clawback applies or when no stock adjust-
ment for tax purposes is made. However, when stock rei ief Is claimed, 
an increase in net trading profits of £1 wi I I reduce stock relief by 
£0.15, where Z= 15%. The resultant marginal rates of corporation 
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tax are therefore increased by the factor (I+Z): (Table 27 ). 
Tab Ie 27 Marginal tax rates 
Without restrictions in 
ACT setoff 
Trading profit after 
(vi I ) (v I i I ) (I x) 
capital allowances (TP) £100,000 £100,100 30,000 30,100 80,000 80,100 
Increase in stock 
15% of TP 
Stocl<. re I I ef 
Net taxable Income 
30,000 30,000 20,000 20,000 30,000 30,000 
15,000 15,015 
15,000 14,985 
85,000 85, I 15 
4,500 4,515 12,000 12,015 
15,500 15,485 18,000 17,985 
14,500 14,615 62,000 62,115 
~einstream Corporation 
Tax 44,200 44,259.80 6,090 6,138.30 28,954.29 t 
29,030.51 
Marg I na I tax rate ('I.) 59.8 
----- ---_._--- ----_. ----- ----------
With restrictions In 
ACT setoff 
Net taxable Income 
(x) 
48.3 76.2 
(xl) (xl I ) 
(as above) 85,000 85, I 15 14,500 14,615 62,000 62.1 115 
Ma i nstream corp-
oration tax (as 
above) 44,200 44,259.80 6,090 6,138.30 28,954.29 29,030.51 
Dividends paid 
( less rece i ved) 99,000 99,000 9,900 9,900 66,000 66,000 
ACT thereon 51,000 51,000 5, 100 5,100 34,000 34,000 
Setoff 28,900 23,939.10 4,930 4,969.10 21,080 21,119.10 
Net Mainstream 
Corporat i on Tax 15,300 15,320.70 1,160 1,169.20 7,874.29 7,911.41 
Total tax paid 66,300 66,320.70 6,260 6,269.20 41,874.29 41,911.41 
Marginal tax rate(%) 20.7 9.2 37.1 
-----~=- -- ---_ ... __ .- ~ ..... - . - ----- ---
Hence,in the absence of foreign Investment we may tabulate the marginal 
rates of corporat Ion tax as fo I lows: (Tab Ie 28 ). I n tab I e 29 the figures 
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are updated for the Financial Year 1978. 
Where net taxable income is negative then unless capital allowances 
may be carried back under section 177(3A) ICTA 1970 or group relief 
is avai I~ble under section 258, then the discount factor applied to 
the capital allowance would be less than unity, resulting in a dls-
incentive to invest. Indeed the growth in success of the leasing 
industry has been greatly aided by passing the fu! I capital allowance 
onto the lessor with an appropriate adjustment In the leasing rental. 
To obtain tax neutral ity any losses carried forward would need to be 
inflated at the firm's reinvestment rate. Even if interest were 
applied to losses carried forward at a rate laid down by statute, those 
firms In more risky industries which apply discount rates higher than 
the statutory rate would be penalised. 
Table 28 Marginal tax rates for the Financial Year 1977 
Example Net taxable income Stock app rec-
iation Rei ief 
i i 
iii 
Iv 
v 
vi 
vi i 
xi i i 
ix 
over £85,000 
under £50,000 but 
positive 
Between £50,000 
and £85,000 
over £85,000 
under £50,000 but 
positive 
Between £50,000 
and £85,000 
over £85,000 
not claimed 
not claimed 
not claimed 
not claimed 
not claimed 
not claimed 
claimed 
Under £50,000 but claimed 
positive 
Between £50,000 and claimed 
£85,000 
ACT setoff ~~ar91 na I tax 
rate for the 
Financial Year 
1977 
not 52% = T 
restricted 
not 
restricted 
not 
restrl cted 
restricted 
restri cted 
restricted 
not 
restricted 
not 
restricted 
not 
restricted 
42% = T 
s I 
66.29% .. T 
18% .. T-b 
8% .. T -b 
s 
m , 
32.29% .. T -b 
m 
59.8% .. T(1+z). 
48.3% = T (1 + z) 
s 
76.23% = T (1+z) 
m 
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Exam~ Ie Net taxable income Stock a~~rec- ACT setoff Margl na I tax 
i at I on re I I ef rate for the 
Financial Year 
1977 
x Over £85,000 claimed restrl cted 20.7% :: (T-b) (1+z) 
( I +s > 
xi Under £50,000 but claimed restricted 9.2% (T - b) (1 + z) 
positive s 
xi i Between £50,000 claimed restricted 37.13% (T -b)(1+z) 
and £85,000 m 
Notation: 
T = the fu II rate of Corporation Tax.· 
T = Sma 1 I Companies Rate. 
s 
T :: the marginal rate when marginal smal I companies relief Is 
m 
claimed, (MSCR = 52% + (50,000/(85,000 - ~OOO» x (52%-42%> 
= 66.29%> • 
b = the basic rate of income tax 
z = the percentage applied in the stock appreciation relief form-
ula. 
Table 29 Marginal tax rates for the Financial Year 1978 
Net taxable income Stock appreciation ACT setoff 
relief 
Over £100,000 not claimed not restricted 
Under £60,000 but 
positive not claimed not restrl cted 
Between £60,000 
and £100,000 not claimed not rest r I cted 
Over £100,000 not claimed restrl cted 
Under £60,000 
but positive not claimed restricted 
Between £60,000 and 
£100,000 not claimed restricted 
Over £100,000 claimed not restri cted 
Under £60,000 but 
positive claimed not restricted 
Between £60,000 
and £100,000 claimed not restricted 
Over £100,000 claimed restri cted 
Under £60,000 
but positive claimed restricted 
Between £60,000 
and £100,000 claimed restricted 
Marginal tax rate 
for the Financial 
Year 1978 
52% = T. 
42% = T s • 
67% = Tm , 
19% = T-b . 
9% = T -b 
s ' 
34% = Tm-b . 
59.8% = T(1+z) • 
48.3% = T (1+z) 
s • 
77 .05% = Tm(1+z)' 
21 .85% (T-b)(1+z). 
10.35% =(f s -*1 +z). 
(T -b)(1+z) 39. 1% = m 
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5.11. Foreign investment and the marginal tax rate 
Let us now extend the analysis to foreign Investments and assume a 
basic rate of income tax at 34%. Only with a restriction of ACT setoff 
would we prima facie expect a marginal tax rate of 52% to be reduced 
to 18%. However, even though Advance Corporation Tax on foreign profits 
may not be restricted, the double taxation rei lef restriction under s. 
100 Finance Act 1972 reduces the marginal tax rate on UK profits by the 
.. 
basic rate of income tax. This is shown In table 30 where we assume 
that: 
(I) ACT setoff Is restricted against UK profits but not against foreign 
profits (hence 'UK' ACT setoff equals 34% UK profits and 'foreign' 
ACT setoff equals the balance of 34/66 x Dividends less 34% UK 
prof Its). 
(II) Double taxation rei ief Is restricted, I.e. to 52% foreign profits 
less the 'foreign' ACT setoff. 
Table 30 Double taxation 
Mainstream Corporation Tax (MeT) = 52% UK profits + 52% foreign profits, 
ACT setoff 
Double taxation rei ief (OTR) 
Net Mainstream Corporation Tax 
• 34% UK profits +[34/66 x Dividends 
- 34% UK proflt~ • 
a 52% foreign profits - 34/66 x Dividends 
+34% UK prof its 
(NM:T> • 18% UK profits. 
Total tax • 34/66 Dividends + 18% UK profits + 
[foreign tax rate x foreign profits] • 
Note 
I. NM:T· MeT - (ACT setoff + OTR) , 
2. Total tax paid = 34/66 Dividends + NMCT + foreign tax. 
By observing the coefficients in the equation for 'Total tax' we note 
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that the marginal tax rate on UK profits Is 18% and that on foreign 
profits is the foreign tax rate. The same marginal tax rates pertain If 
ACT setoff and DTR are both fully restricted (table3l), and table32 
demonstrates the position where ACT is fully offset against UK profits 
(with no offset against foreign profits) and double taxation rei ief is 
rest r I cted • 
Table 31 Double taxation 
~T :: 
ACT setoff = 
,. 52% UK Prof i ts + 52% F. Prof i ts (where F= fore I gn) • 
34% UK Profits + 34 %F. Profits. 
OTR .. 18% F. Profits 
N~T = 18% UK Profits. 
Total 
Tax :: (34/66) x Dividends + 18% UK Profits + foreign tax 
rate x F. Profits 
• 
Hence: the marginal tax rate on UK Profits is 18%, and that on foreign 
profits is the foreign tax rate. 
Table 32 Double taxation 
MeT • 52% UK Profits + 52% F. Profits 
ACT setoff :: 
OTR .. 
NMeT .. 
Total 
Tax .. 
34/66 Dividends 
52% F. Prof i ts • 
52% UK Profits - 34/66 Dividends 
52% UK Profits + foreign tax rate x F. Profits 
• 
Hence: the marginal tax rate on UK Profits is 52%, and that on foreign 
profits is the foreign tax rate. 
We are now able to tabulate the marginal tax rates according to whether 
there are restrictions In 
(a) ACT setoff on UK Profits 
(b) ACT setoff on foreign Profits 
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(c) Double taxation rei ief (Table 33 ). 
TABLE 33 Marginal tax rates 
Restrictions in (a), (b) or (c) Marg i na I Tax rates 
UK Prof its Foreisn Profits 
NONE (Tab I e 34) 
(a) (Table 35) 
(a), (b) (Tab I e 3B ) 
(a), (d (Table30) 
(c) (Table32) 
(a), (b), (c) (Table 31) 
AssumDtions 
-r:-Net taxable income is over £85,000. 
52% 
52% 
18% 
18% 
52% 
18% 
2. No rei ief is claimed for stock appreciation. 
52% 
52% 
18% 
foreign tax rate 
foreign tax rate 
foreign tax rate 
3. The ful I rate of Corporation Tax is 52~on net taxable Income over 
£85,000 • 
4. The basic rate of income tax is 34% , 
5. The Financial Year is 1977, 
TABLE 34 Double taxation 
f'lCT = 
ACT setoff fully 
DTR : 
Nf'lCT '" 
Total tax = 
52% UK prof I ts + 52% fore i gn prof I ts . 
against UK profits : 34/66 Dividends. 
foreign tax rate x F. profits. 
52% UK profits + 52% F. profits - 34/66 Dividends 
- foreign tax rate x F. profits. 
52% UK profits + 52% F. profits 
, 
TABLE 35 Double taxation 
'MeT = 52% UK prof i ts + 52% F. Prof Its. 
ACT setoff (restricted against UK profits) 
= 34% UK profits + 34/66 Dividends - 34% UK profits. 
DTR'" foreign tax rate x foreign profits. 
N~T = 18% UK profits + 52% F. profits - 34/66 Dividends + 
34% UK profits - foreign tax rate x F. profits. 
Total tax = 52% UK profits + 52% F. profits. 
TABLE 36 Double taxation 
MGT = 
ACT setoff (fully 
OTR = 
NMGT = 
Total tax = 
52% UK profits + 52% F. profits, 
restricted) = 34% UK profits + 34% F. profits. 
fore i gn tax rate x F. prof I ts • 
18% UK profits + 18% F. profits - foreign tax rate 
x F. pro fits . 
(34/66) x Dividends + 18% UK profits + 18% x F. 
profits , 
5.12Appl ication of multiple marginal tax rates 
Let us now assume the 1977 tax rates to be frozen Into the future and 
examine the effects on capital market efficiency in our basic NPV decision 
model. With heavy capital investments during one accounting period It 
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is not unl ikely that net taxable income may be reduced to below the 
threshold of £40,000 with the result that dividends paid les5 dividends 
received wi I I exceed the basic rate of income tax appl ied to net 
taxable income or that double taxation rei ief wi I I be restricted and 
the increase in the value of trading stocks become high enough to claim 
stock rei ief. The benefit of the capital allowance on the last 
investment project may very wei I be 9.2% (e9 xi), with future income being 
taxed at 37.13% (eg xi i) and later 20.7% (eg x). Substituting these tax 
rates in table12we have (table 37): 
Table 37 : Tax cash flows 
Year Cash flow D.F. NPV 
Capital allowance Now £2,486 x 9.2% 1.000 £229 
Tax on inflow (1,000) x 37. I 3% 0.909 (338) 
" 
2 (1,000) x 20.7% 0.826 ( 171 ) 
" 
3 ( I ,000) x 20.7% 0.751 ( 155) 
£(435) 
In th i s case we note from tab I e 37 that the marg I na I I nvestmen-t before 
tax may result in an after tax NPV which is negative. Even with a one 
year tax time lag this would stl I I be negative by £396.= £435 x 1/(1+10%), 
assuming a 10% discount rate. 
5.13.Requlrements of a neutral tax system 
We have seen that the present system of corporation tax bears some of 
the features of a cash flow (or expenditure) tax. 
One of the advantages of an expenditure tax base is that the relationship 
between present and future consumption before tax is the same as that 
between present and future consumption after tax, which are both equated 
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with the investment discount factor. For instance, if we let the 
consumption potential without taxes in period 0 be C, then the con-
sumpt I on potent I a I without taxes in per I od lis C( I +k) where k = the 
reinvestment rate, [follOwing Musgrave and Musgrave (1976U • 
Hence the ratio between present and future consumption Is 
C = 
• 
Simi larly, the present consurnption after tax = cU-t ) where t = the-
e e 
marginal rate of expenditure tax, and the future consumption after tax 
= C(I+k) (I-t
e
) determining a ratio between present and future consumption 
of 
C( I - t ) 
e .. 
I+k 
equating, once more, with the investment discount factor. 
Turning now to an income tax base, let the present income in period 0 
without taxes = I. With reinvestment the accumulated wealth in period 
without taxes I (/+k>, giving a ratio between present and future 
consumption potential without taxes of 
I = as before 
1<1 + i<J 
With an income tax, the present income after tax = I(1-h) where h = 
the marginal rate of income tax. Where the capital of I(I-h) is reinvested 
the income thereon after tax = I (1-h)k(1-h) 
Hence the future wealth in period I avai lable for consumption Is 
IC1-h) + I(1-h) k (1-h) IT I(1-h) [1+k(1-hJ] 
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Therefore the ratio between present and future consumption after 
income tax = 
I(1-h) 1 (Musgrave and Musgrave (1976)) I(1-h)[1+k(1-hlj 1 + k (1-h) 
Since the lower the denominator. the higher the ratio. the effect 
of an income tax is to value present vis-~-vis future income more 
highly than is warrented by the pre-tax yield of the investment. 
causing a disincentive to invest. Moreover, where the tax rate 
is not constant. under both tax systems consumption preferences 
are altered. resulting in economic inefficiency. Indeed we 
have highlighted the existence of several marginal rates of 
corporation tax applicable to the investment decision even if 
the present tax system and rates were perpetuated throughout the 
life of a project. Some of this excess burden would be removed by 
abolishing small companies rate. marginal small companies relief. 
and ACT setoff restrictions. However. as lo~g as the corporate 
tax system remains a hybrid based on both income and expenditure 
principles. and given the multiple tax rates, our complicated 
analysis of the tax implications for investment decisions will 
remain. 
- . 
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5.14 Conclusions 
The main conclusions of the chapter are as follows: 
The timing of capital expenditure in relation to the accounting period 
affects the delay in receiving the benefit of a lower tax bi I I. Expend-
Iture incurred at the end of an accounting period wi I I attract rei ief 
within a shorter time interval, in which case the rei ief wi I I be even 
more beneficial the greater the time value of money. 
If stock rei ief is claimed, the marginal tax rate appl ied to a capital 
allowance is increased under the present legislation. Expenditure 
on plant and machinery may effectively be rei leved at a marginal tax 
rate of, say 59.80% (T(I+z) = 52% (1+15%) = 59.8%> 
To the extent that tax computations fol low historic cost accounting 
principles, a corporation "Income" tax may in some circumstances be 
appl ied when the real "income" is negative. It is therefore necessary 
to predict money cash flow~ and, after certain adjustments, the tax 
thereon. The effect of inflation during the time interval between the 
date of capital expenditure and that of paying a lower tax bi I I is 
to devalue the benefit of the allowance. This may be particularly costly 
where taxable profits before capital allowances are insufficient to 
fully offset the allowances, which then may have to be carried forward 
to future accounting periods. Clearly, however, the firm benefits by 
paying tax on income at a date when the currency wi I I be worth less In 
real terms. 
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If it is believed that the corporation tax system should be 
based on profits then for reasons of equity an historic cost 
tax base would generally be thought to be inferior to a CCA 
tax base. But the introduction of 100 per cent capital 
allowances was a relative incentive to invest compared with 
the older systems of capital allowances based on a form of 
historic cost depreciation with relief spread over a number 
of years. However, assuming constant tax rates, constant 
tax time lags between cash flows and taxes/allowances thereon 
and full relief for losses, free depreciation offers neither 
an incentive nor disincentive to invest, and would therefore 
be an appropriate basis for promoting economic efficiency. By 
contrast it has been shown that the CCA capital allowance 
system would not nECessarily have a neutral effect on the 
investment decision. For this reason it is recommended that 
the present system of 100 per cent allowances on plant and 
machinery be retained and that on buildings be changed accordingly. 
Although investment decisions under the NPV model are based on 
cash flows, the tax calculations reflect on accrual accounting 
system. In addition to forecasting a project's pre-tax cash 
flow it is necessary to include in the tax base the project's 
periodic investment in working capital since there is effectively 
a tax on working capital in addition to a tax on cash flaw. However, 
this is partly mitigated by stock appreciation relief. 
Despite the fact that depreciation is replaced by capital 
expenditure when predicting pre-tax cash flows, and replaced by 
capital allowances when predicting capital asset consumption for 
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tax purposes, we saw how the depreciation policy of the 
firm may have a subtle effect on cash flows in that depreciation 
included in the overheads element of the stock valuation has 
an influence on taxable profits. 
A multiplicity of marginal tax rates was shown to exist. 
Hence expenditure incurred on some projects may reduce net 
taxatile income to such an extent that the marginal tax rate 
for the next project being considered is now different. 
Interdependencies between projects are also affected by the 
capital allowance carry forward provisions. Furthermore the 
claiming of stock relief or reductions in stock on one project 
may cause the marginal tax rate on another project to change. 
To deal with these interactivities the basic NPV model is 
inadequate and we require a programming model instead. This 
will be developed in chapter seven. 
Under an imputation tax system it is important to predict whether 
there may be any restriction in Advance Corporation Tax setoff. 
Any surplus ACT in an accounting period may result in a lowering 
of the marginal rate of corporation tax for investment decisions. 
The dividend policy was therefore shown to have critical tax 
implications for investment decisions suggesting the need for a 
simultaneous solution of investment and dividend decisions. A 
model to cater for such a solution is provided in chapter seven. 
But to avoid losing sight of the tax complexities of financing 
decisions, let us next consider financing decisions to some extent 
in isolation to investment decisions. 
CHAPI'ER 6 
Corporate financing decisions within the framework 
of income tax, corporation tax and capital gains tax: 
a model under certainty 
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6.1. Notation 
, b 
d 
D 
g 
= basic rate of income tax, 
= see equation (30) for definition 
= dividend payout rate. 
= expected dividend. 
= capital gains tax rate 
G/ = see equation (31) for definition 
h = higher rate of income tax , 
• 
h* = marginal rate of income tax on interest 
D 
for the marginal debentureholder 
. 
h~ = marginal rate of income tax on dividends 
S 
for the marginal shareholder, 
1 = quarterly rate of interest 
4 
I 
J 
k 
If 
p 
Q 
R 
t 
= gross interest. 
= investment outlay. 
= annual rate of interest 
= expected net profits after tax. 
= the change in mean sharehol~er return 
caused hy taxation. 
= 
retained profit. 
the value of a retention after personal 
and corporate tax 
= pre-tax return on asset. 
= personal income tax rate under a non-
imputation system, 
T = corporate tax rate. 
TI = see equation (29) for definition. 
w 
w 
y 
z 
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= the time lag between receipt of a net 
dividend or net interest and the 
payment of the excess of the higher rate 
tax on the gross equivalent over the basic 
rate tax oeducted at source. 
= the time lag in years from the time of the 
capital gain accrual to the capital gains 
tax payment date on realisation of the 
gain. 
= expected increase in shareholder wealth. 
= the number of years between 'c 
the time of the dividend payment and 
the time that the ACT is setoff against 
the mainstream corporation tax. 
= the number of years between the time when 
the debenture interest is paid and when a 
payment is to be made for the net mainstream 
corporation tax, against which the interest 
1s clA-imed. 
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6.2 Introduction 
The role of this chapter is to analyse the micro-economic effects 
of the UK tax system on financing decisions of the company under 
certainty. The models employed will introduce variables additional 
to those found in the econometric work by King· to represent, in 
particular, the following tax characteristics: 
(a) Capital gains not being realised immediately, the effective 
capital gains tax rate being determined by the length of 
iime the asset is held, 
(b) the Schedule 20 income tax deductions at source on debenture 
interest and the inherent tax time lags; 
(e) the similar tax time lags resulting from Schedule 14 quarterly 
deductions for Advance Corporation Tax; and 
(d) the existence of multiple marginal rates of corporation tax. 
It must be stressed that financial risk and other non-tax 
considerations will be ignored. It will be shown that excluding 
(a) to (d), the results are not surprisingly consistent with those 
of chapter 3 where risk was explicitly recognised. 
6.3. A non-imputation tax system 
It is convenient to begin by analysing a non-imputation tax system 
along the lines developed by Stiglitz·· and make the following 
assumptions: 
Cal a shareholder buys all the shares of a new firm for J units 
of currency; 
(bl the company then invests J in a project obtaining a capital 
allowance of T x J on an asset yielding a return of R units 
of currency, greater than J; 
•• 
King (1977) See references 
Stiglitz (1972) See references 
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(c) at the end of the period the asset is worthless and is sold 
for scrap at the market price of zero; 
(d) the shareholder disposes of the shares at the end of the 
period at market value; 
(e) there are no tax time lags; 
(f) there is no time value of money; 
(g) there are no special tax rules relating to "close" companies; 
(h) capital markets are perfect. 
The expected net profits after tax, denoted 
by the summation of: 
N is represented 
(I) the expected after tax income of the company; and 
(2) the tax allowance on the capital investment 
N • R(J-T> + T.J 
With a dividend payout rate of d, the expected dividend for the 
perIod is given by 
o 
Hence, under the assumption of perfect capital markets the retained 
profit, and proceeds on disposal of the shares are both equal to 
p 
The capital gain Is therefore equal to 
(I-d) [RCI-T> + T.JJ - J 
Hence the expected increase in shareholder wealth during the period 
Is equal to 
-J 
( I ) 
• 
(2) ~ 
(3) 
~ 
(4) , 
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W • (I-t)d [R<I-T) + T.J] 
+ (I-g){ (I-d) [!H 1-T) + T.J ] - J} 
Where the first term on the right hand side of the equation 
represents the dividend after the personal income tax at the tax-
exclusive rate of t. and the second term represents the capital 
gain on dlsp9sal after the capital gains tax payment at the rate 
of g. By rearranging equation (5) we have 
W • RU-T)d (I-t) + T. J .dCl-t) + R<t-T)( I-g)( I-d) 
+ (l-d)(I-g)T.J - J(I-g) 
Now. let us consider the effect of earnings retention on the share-
holder wealth. When a ful I distribution is made. by substituting 
for d • I In equation (5) we have 
W (for d = 1) 
• R( I-t)( I-l) + J [T<J-t> + g - IJ 
Simi larly. for a ful I retention 
W (for d = 0) 
• R(J-g)( I-l) + J LTU-g) + g - D 
As expected. if the personal income tax-exclusive rate and capital 
gains tax rates are identical, W (for d=O) .. W (for d-I) 
and the shareholder is Indifferent to the retention of earnings or 
the payment of dividends, ceteris paribus. However, if g < t. a 
common feature under the present UK tax system. the shareholder 
benefits by retention of earnings 
(5) 
~ 
(6 ) 
(7) 
, 
(8) 
• 
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W (for d = 0) - W ( for d = 1) 
.., 
= (t-g) LR( I-T) + T. J J 
• Ct-g)N 
Hence, by a ful I retention of earnings the shareholder wealth is 
Increased by the excess of the personal income tax-exclusive rate 
over the capital gains tax rate applied to the firm's net profit 
after tax. 
Now that we have established that the personal tax system appears 
biased in favour of Internal finance through the ploughback of 
profits, let us examine how the relationship of the marginal tax 
rate on dividends versus capital gains affects the Investment 
decision of a capital project which Is marginal in the absence of 
taxation. 
W (without taxes) = R - J 
Hence, the effect of taxation is to change the mean shareholder 
return by the va r i ab I e 0, such that 
~ = W (with taxes) - W (without taxes) 
From equations (6), (IO) and (I I) we obtain 
Where 
~ c RCI-T) [dCl-t) + CI-d)( l-g)J + d( I-t) T. J 
+ CI-d){l-g) T.J - (I-g)J - (R-J) 
R = J, and, < 0 we have 
(9 ) 
• 
(10) 
• 
(II) • 
U 2) , 
(I-T)d<l-t) + CI-d){l-g)(I-T) + dCl-t>T + <I-d)(l-g>T - I + g<O 
(13 ) 
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which simplifies to 
t > g ( 14) 
Hence, in the case of a marginal project, where R=J, the effect 
of taxation is to reduce the mean shareholder return provided t>g. 
6.4. The dividend decision under the tax imputation system 
So far we have assumed that there is no integration of personal 
and corporate taxes. Let us now consider the UK imputation 
system under which a tax payment at the basic rate of income 
tax, denoted b, is made on the gross equivalent of the dividend 
and offset against the Mainstream Corporation Tax of the 
company. The gross equivalent of the dividend is 
o 
l-b 
= 0 x 100 
67 I 
where 
b = 33% 
The total personal tax thereon is 
hD 
l-b 
Where h is the shareholder's marginal rate of income tax. Against 
this is offset the advance payment of Corporation Tax on the 
dividend of 
where 
bD 
1-b = 
b :: 33% 
33 67 x 0, 
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Hence, the net personal tax is 
that is, 
h-b .0 
I-b 
t = h-b 
I-b 
I 
From equation (9) we note that by a ful I retention of earnings, 
the shareholder wealth is increased by the excess of the adjusted 
personal income tax rate, denoted 
t = h-b 
I-b 
over the capital gains tax rate, appl led to the firm's net profit 
after tax. Hence the shareholder makes a gain if 
h-b > 9 
I-b 
Under the Finance Act 1978 the basic rate of b Is 33 per cent, and 
the values of hand 9 are shown in tables 38and 39. Although the 
( 15) 
(16) ~ 
higher rates of income tax are wei I understood, the 50 per cent marginal 
rate of tax on capital gains between £5,000 and £9,500 is perhaps 
not very wei I known. 
Where the basic rate of income tax is 33 per cent and the capital 
gains tax is 30 per cent, the critical value of h, the higher rate 
of personal tax, is 53.1 per cent. Under these conditions, share-
holders with marginal income tax rates of more than 53.1 per cent 
would prefer retentions, and those with lower marginal tax rates 
would prefer distributions, ceteris paribus. 
Note that if inequality(16) were an equality. the result would give 
the same as equation (66) of chapter 3, the latter being a requirement 
of a neutral tax system under conditions of risk. 
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A further refinement in the model is to take account of time 
lags between the payment of Advance Corporation Tax (ACT) and the 
Net Mainstream Corporation Tax (NMCT). Assuming a 33 per cent 
basic rate of Income tax, a £67 dividend has an attached £33 credit 
on which the shareholder pays tax at the (usually) higher rate of 
h on £100, but receives rei ief of £33. If the ACT is paid in the 
quarterly period fol lowing the dividend payout and the NMCT paid 
one year after the dividend, then the present value of the extra 
cost to the company of the dividend vis-a-vis a retention is therefore 
£67 r x 33 x 'l I 
67 ( I + i~) , 
where I = the relevant quarterly rate of interest. 
If 
We may now formally incorporate into the analysis the effect of 
tax time lags. 
Let w = the time lag in years from the time of the capital gain accrual 
to the capital gains tax payment date on real isation of the 
gain, 
y = the number of years between the time of the dividend payment 
and the time that the ACT is setoff against the mainstream 
corporat i on tax, 
z = the number of years between the time when the debenture interest 
is paid and when a payment is to be made for the net mainstream 
corporation tax, against which the interest Is claimed, 
0.25 = the number of years between the payment of a dividend and the 
ACT thereon and between the payment of interest and the basic 
rate of Income tax thereon, under the quarterly accounting 
tax system. 
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Table 38 Marginal rates of income tax = h (Finance Act 1978) 
Margl na 1 rate of 
Investment Marg i na 1 tax 
Net taxable income surcharge rate = h 
% % 
First £750 NIL 25 
- 10 35 
- 15 40 
Next £7,250 NIL 33 
- 10 43 
-
15 48 
Next £1,000 NIL 40 
,.. 10 50 
-
15 55 
Next £1,000 NIL 45 
-
10 55 
-
15 60 
Next £1,000 NIL 50 
-
10 60 
, 
- 15 65 
Next £ 1,500 NIL 55 
- 10 65 
- 15 70 
Next £1,500 NIL 60 
- 10 70 
-
15 75 
Next £2,000 NIL 65 
-
10 75 
- 15 80 
Next £2,500 Nil 70 
-
10 80 
- 15 85 
Next £5,500 NIL 75 
- 10 85 
- 15 90 
Remainder NIL 83 
- 10 93 
- 15 98 
Table 39 Marginal rates of capital gains tax = g (Finance Act 1978) 
Gain 
First £1,000 
Next £4,000 
Next £4,500 
Total £9,500 @ 30% 
Remai nder @30% 
Tax 
NIL 
£600 
£2,250 
= £2,850 
Marginal tax 
rate = 9 
% 
00 
15 
50 
30 
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With a time lag of w years from the time of the capital gain 
accrual to the capital gains tax payment on real isatlon of the 
gain, the gain Is taxed at the effective rate of 
where 
9 '"/ I ( I +k)' 
k = the relevant rate of interest (= the risk-free rate since 
risk Is Ignored In this chapter) 
Therefore, in net of tax terms a dividend is worth to the shareholder 
I-h .0 
I-b I 
yet the retention of an amount equal to the cost to the company, of 
this dividend is worth to the shareholder 
b 
(i-b)( I +k)O.25 
where y = the number of years between the time of the dividend 
) 
payment and the time that the ACT is setoff against the NMCT. 
Therefore a retention is preferable to a new issue (ignoring flotation 
costs) If 
I-h < 
I-b 
b 
(i-b){ I +k)O.25 
giving 
h > I - [- (I~k)~ [- b ·-(-I+-k";;"~O""'."""2=5 - <I.:)y J 
, 
( 17) 
, 
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The basis for the comparison between retentions and new issues 
is the same as that presented by Miller and Modigliani (1961). 
In the absence of taxation then, given the investment decision 
of the firm, in a perfect frictionless market (i) earnings 
retentions are financially equivalent to (ii) the payment of 
dividends and the raiSing of a new issue to cover the dividends 
so that the capital projects can be financed. 
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Illustration I 
If we consider the case of an immediate real isation of the capital 
gain on retention of profits together with the NMCT payable at the 
same time as the ACT, then we have w=O and y=0.25. With these 
values inequality (17) simplifies to: 
h > g ( I-b) + b 
Hence, for a shareholder paying income tax at the basic rate and 
capital gains tax at a rate of 30 per cent, a retention of profits 
is preferred to a dividend distribution if the marginal rate of 
tax on investment income is greater than approximately 53 per cent. 
However, this assumes that the capital gain is immediately real ised 
(w=O) and that the rei ief for ACT setoff is achieved at the same 
time as the tax payment on the dividend. 
Under this simpl ified model, where the shareholder is a basic 
rate taxpayer then h=b and t=O. Therefore with a marginal rate 
of capital gains tax of zero (g=O), a basic rate taxpayer in theory 
foels indifferent between a dividend and a retention of earnings, 
but a higher rate taxpayer prefers a retention. 
With a marginal rate of capital gains tax at 15 per cent (g=0.15), 
<18 ) 
a retention of £67 is worth 85 per cent of £67 = £56.95 net of tax. 
By contrast, a dividend of £67 is treated as £100 franked investment 
income and worth £100 x (I-h) net of tax. Hence where h = 43.05 per 
cent the shareholder is indifferent between a dividend and a capital 
gain; where h < 43.05 per cent a dividend is preferred; and where 
h > 43.05 per cent a retention is preferred. 
• 
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Illustration 2 
Let us now relax the assumption of a zero time lag between the 
payment of ACT and NMCT. The fol lowing values wi II be used in 
the illustration: 
b = 0.33, 0.34 , 
w = 0 ) 
y I, 2 
k = 0.07, 0.14 
I 
9 = 0.30 
With an annual time preference rate of 7 per cent. 
(1+1)4 = 1.07 
It , 
1'1 = 0.0171, and 
(1+1)-1 - (l+i)-4 = 0.0486. 
't .., 
Hence a dividend of £67 costs the company (when y=I): 
£67 + 0.0486 x £33 = £68.60. 
However, the time lag between the dividend payment and the ACT set-
off may be at least two years (y=2>' For instance, with a December 
year-end an old establ ished company paying a dividend In January 
1978 wil I pay ACT In Aprl I 1978 and receive ACT setoff rei ief in 
January 1980. Hence a dividend of £67 is equivalent to a retention 
of: 
.-
£67 + £33 (I+i)-I 
If. 
-e l (1+1) i = £70.62. 
II I 
. ...J 
From Inequality (17) we derive h > 51 per cent. The same value 
for h is obtained when b=0.34. Hence, assuming the capital gain 
to be real ised immediately (W=O) and a time preference rate of 7 
per cent, retentions are preferred for taxpayers with marginal tax 
rates on Investment income in excess of 51 per cent. A variation 
In the rate of k only causes a sl ight variation in the result. For 
Instance, whenk=O.I~nd b=0.34, at the margin we obtain h=49 per cent. 
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Illustration 3 
Let us now consider deferred realisations of the capital gain of 
5 and 10 years: 
w = 5, 10 , 
b = 0.34 
g = 0.3 , 
y 2 , 
.k = 0.14 
With a 5 year time lag between the capital gain accrual and the 
tax thereon (w=5), from inequality (17) we derive h > 38.6 per cent. 
Similarly with a 10 year time lag we obtain h > 33 per cent. In 
the latter situation all taxpayers with a marzinal rate of tax on 
investment income not lower than the basic rate of 34 per cent will 
prefer a retention to a dividend payment, ceteris paribus. Further 
sensitivity tests of the retention versus dividend decision are shown 
in Table 40 and Figure 4. 
The table illustrates that it does not necessarily follow that if 
the basic rate of income tax exceeds the capital gains tax rate then 
from a tax standpoint a shareholder who is a basic rate taxpayer 
prefers the company not to pay a dividend. 
We observe from figure 4 that for very low discount rates (k~ 0) 
retentions are always preferable if the higher rate of income tax 
exceeds 51.3 per cent. For higher discount rates the critical 
value of h is reduced and the longer the shareholding period the 
bigger the reduction. Delays in ACT setoff of a further year create 
marginally smaller critical values of h. As k 4 ~ the critical value 
of h approaches the basic rate of income tax. 
=Z69= 
Table 40 Critical valu8s of the hjgher r3te of income tax~ 
retentions versus new issues 
g b IN Y k h 
0.3 0.33 00 1 0.1 0.3078 
0.3 0.33 20 1 0.1 0.3386 
0.3 0.33 10 1 0.1 0.3878 
0.3 0.33 5 1 0.1 0.4367 
0.3 0.33 4 1 0.1 0.4496 
0.3 0.33 3 1 0.1 0.4638 
0.3 0.33 2 .. 0.1 0.4794 I 
0.3 0.33 1 1 0.1 0.4966 
0.3 0.33 0 1 0.1 0.5154 
0.3 0.33 00 2 0.1 0.2805 
0.3 0.33 20 2 0.1 0.3126 
0.3 0.33 10 2 0.1 0.3637 
0.3 0.33 5 2 0.1 0.4145 
0.3 0.33 2 2 0.1 0.4589 
0.3 0.33 0 2 0.1 0.5036 
0.3 0.33 00 1 0.05 0.3183 
0.3 0.33 20 1 0.05 0.3954 
0.3 0.33 10 1 ·0.05 0.4439 
0.3 0.33 5 1 0.05 0.4785 
0.3 0.33 2 1 0.05 0.5038 
0.3 0.33 0 1 0.05 0.5228 
0.3 0.33 00 2 0.05 0.3033 
0.3 0.33 20 2 0.05 0.3821 
0.3 0.33 10 2 0.05 0.4316 
0.3 0.33 5 2 0.05 0.4671 
0.3 0.33 2 2 0.05 0.4930 
0.3 0.33 0 2 0.05 0.5123 
0.3 0.33 1 to 00 1 to 00 0 0.5310 
0.3 0.33 1 to 00 1 to 00 00 0.3300 
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Fi gure 4 : Critica l va l ue s of the hig her rat e of income tax : 
ret entions ver sus new i ssues 
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Key 
(1 ) k = 0 
(2) k :: 0.05, y = 1 
• 
(3) k = 0.05, Y = 2 . 
(4) k = 0.10 , Y = 1 , 
(5) k = 0.10, Y = 2 . 
(6 ) k = CIO 
Assumptio n g = 0 . 3, b = 0. 33 
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6.5 The borrowing decision under the tax imputation system 
Under Schedule 20 Finance Act 1972 a company is required to deduct, 
at the basic rate, income tax at source on debenture interest 
payments on a quarterly basis. The explicit cost to the company 
of paying the interest is given by: 
(a) the net interest, plus 
(b) the payment of income tax at source in the next quarter, less 
(c) the reduction in the mainstream corporation tax bill for the 
debenture interest relief. 
Algebraically, the net present cost is: 
(1-b) I + bI TI 
(l+k)O.25 I 
where I = the gross interest I 
z = the number of years between the time when the debenture 
interest is paid and when a payment is to be made for the 
net mainstream corporation tax against which the interest 
is claimed. 
Similarly, the net present cost to the company of a dividend is: 
o + bD bD 
C1-b) (1+k)O.25 
If the security holder were to ignore risk, as is assumed in this 
chapter then we may let 
0= C1-blI 
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Hence borrowing is preferred to dividend payments (i.e., to new 
issues, ignoring flotation costs) if 
1 + b T ~ (20) (1-b) (1+k)0.25 (1-b)(1+k)z 
1 
< 1 + b b 
(1-b)(1+k)0.25 (1-b)(1+k)Y , 
where the left-hand side of the inequality represents the explicit 
cost to the company of paying the interest and the right-hand side 
reflects the cost of the dividend. 
The above expression may be simplified to 
T > b (21) 
We observe that where z=y, borrowing is preferred if 
T > b (22) 
Note that if in inequality (22) were an equality. this 
would be the same as equation (65) of chapter 3, a requirement 
of a neutral tax system under conditions of risk. 
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The relative tax advantages of borrowed versus equity funds may 
be demonstrated by the use of arithmetical examples. Let us assume 
that the company has an option whether to payout £100 in debenture 
interest (£67 net of income tax deducted at source, assuming a 33% 
basic rate of ~come tax) or £100 in dividends (£67 net of Advance 
Corporation Tax). If the debentureholder has the same marginal 
tax rate as the shareholder then the £100 gross of tax is worth 
the same after tax, ignoring risk. However, the position as far 
as the company is concerned is more interesting. 
With Schedule D company profits of, say £100,000 we see below in 
table 41that the tax advantage of debenture interest relative to 
dividends is 19%, assuming a 52\ rate of Corporation Tax. It may 
be thought that where ACT is restricted then the cost of the 
dividends becomes, re1ativelYJeven more expensive than before. 
This is not true. Although the dividends become more expensive, 
the same applies to the interest. In table 42 we show a base 
situation of restricted set-off of ACT with unrelieved ACT carried 
forward indefinitely. Even if we can relieve the ACT carried 
forward to the next year, the reduction in the net mainstream 
corporation tax applies to cases (ii) and (iii) (Table 43) • 
The relative tax benefit of debenture interest can be increased to 
29\ if the charge of income is sufficiently great to reduce the net 
taxable income below £50,000 at which point the small companies rate of 
42\ becomes effective. This is demonstrated in table 44. Although the 
tax deductibility of the interest reduced the cost of the debt by 62\, 
being £31,000 as a percentage of £50,000, the ACT setoff relating to 
the dividend reduces the cost of the dividend by 33%. Hence the 
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relative tax advantage of debt finance is 62% - 33% = 29%. Note 
that the generous relief of 62% is made up of relief at the 52% 
normal rate plus the extra 10% relief from the application of small 
companies rate at 10 percentage points lower than that of the normal 
rate. 
Furthermore, the relative tax advantage of debt finance may be 
exceptionally increased to 33.29% if the marginal small companies 
relief is applied to net taxable income between £50,000 and £85,000 
lIDder the Finance Act 1978. Hence, in table 45 we see that the debenture 
interest is relieved at the effective marginal small companies rate 
of 66.29%, whereas the gross dividends are relieved at 33%, giving 
a relative tax advantage of 33.29%. 
Not surprisingly, with net taxable income at less than £50,000 the 
relative tax advantage of debt finance is only 42% - 33% = 9% (see 
table 46). 
Occasionally, the debenture interest may be great enough to spread 
a mnnber of tax bands. For instance, the marginal tax rate for 
taxable profits between £50,000 and £85,000 is 66.29%, being 52% + 
[ 50,(0) / (85,000 - 50,000)] x ~2~ - 42%] , under the Finance 
Act 1978, and the marginal rate for net taxable income below £50,000 
is 42%. Hence, if the debenture interest spreads the twu bands 
equally the marginal tax relief on all the debenture interest is 
n x 42%) + G x 66.29%) = 54.145% . 
Since debenture interest is relieved at 54.145% compared with ACT 
setoffs on dividends of 33%, the relative tax advantage of debt finance 
is 54.145% - 33~ = 21.145% (see table 47) • 
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Finally, if the corporate tax rate were the smne as the basic rate 
of income tax, then the tax preference for debt finance would be 
removed (see table 48). TI1is situation, however, does not arise 
tmder current Revenue Law. For convenience, a stmmary of the tax 
advantages of debt versus equity finance is given in table 49. 
Interestingly, if bank interest is used to replace debenture interest 
then a higher tax relief is obtained provided the company is clanning 
relief on the appreciation of trading stock. Since the stock appreciation 
rules presently in force allow a deduction equal to the excess of the 
increase in stock value during the accounting period over a proportion, 
currently at 15 per cent, of trading profits for tax purposes after 
bank interest but before charges on income, then bank interest relief 
is effectively 15 per cent higher than debenture interest relief. 
The numerical illustration in table 50 shows that by substituting 
£100 bank interest for debenture interest, the tax bill is reduced 
by £100 x S2~ x 1St = £7.80. In this way if we compared the relative 
tax advantage of bank finrulce versus equity finance the figures in the 
final column of table 49 would all be increased by l5~, to 21.85%, 
10.35%, and 38.2835%. Bank finance in the remainder of this analysis 
is ignored. 
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Table 41 (£s) After-tax cost of finance 
. 
Base Si tuation with Situation with 
Situation debenture interest gross dividends 
of £100 of £100 
(i) (ii) (iii) 
Schedule D 100,000 1oo,CXX) 100,000 
Charge on income NIL 100 NIL 
Net taxable income 100,000 99,900 100,000 
Mainstream Corporation Tax 52,000 51,948 52,000 
Dividends paid NIL NIL 67 
Advance Corporation Tax NIL NIL 33 
Net mainstream corporation tax 52,CXX) 51,948 51,967 
Change in net mainstream 
corporation tax over base NIL (52) (33) 
After-tax cost of finance 100-52=48 67+33-33=67 
The relative tax advantage of debenture interest is £67 - £48 = £19 
being 19~ of £100 gross cost. 
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Table 42(£S) After-tax cost of finance 
Base Situation with Situation with 
Situation debenture interest gross di videnck 
of £100 of £100 
-------
(i) (ii) (iii) 
Schedule D 100,(XX) 100,000 100,()(X) 
Charge on income NIL 100 NIL 
Net taxable income 100,(XX) 99,900 100,000 
Mainstream Corporation Tax 52,000 51,948 52,(XX) 
Dividends paid 67,(XX) 67,000 67,067 
ACT 33,000 33,000 33,033 
ACT setoff 33,(XX) 32,967 33,000 
ACT c/fd NIL 33 33 
Net mainstream corporation t~ 19,(XX) 18,981 19,000 
Change in net mainstream 
corporation tax over base (19) NIL 
After-tax cost of finance 100-19=81 67+33=100 
The relative tax advantage of debenture interest is £100 - £81 = £19, 
being 19% of £100 gross cost. 
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Table 43(.£S) After-tax cost of finc::mc8 
Base Situation with deb- Situation \<lith gro~f 
Situation enture interest of dividends of £100 
in year 2 £100 in year 1 only in year 1 only 
(i) (ii) (iii) 
Schedule D, say , 200,000 
Charge on income NIL 
Net taxable income 200,000 
Mainstream Corporation tax 104,000 
Dividends paid 
ACT 
ACT blfd 
ACT setoff 
Net ~a 
67,000 
33,000 
NIL 
33,000 
71,000 
Change in net MCT over base 
After tax costs of finance over 
the 2 years 
200,000 
NIL 
200,000 
104,000 
67,000 
33,000 
33 
33,033 
70,967 
(33) 
100-19-33=48 
200,000 
NIL 
200,000 
104,000 
67,000 
33,000 
33 
33,033 
70,967 
(33) 
67+33-33=67 
The relative tax advantage of debenture interest is £67 - £48 = £19, 
being 19% of £100 gross cost. 
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Table 44 (£5) After-tax cost of finance 
Base Situation with Situation with gross 
Situation debenture interest dividends of 
Schedule 0 
Charge on income 
Net taxable income 
Mainstream Corporation 
Tax 
Dividends paid 
ACT 
ACT setoff 
Net Mainstream 
Corporation Tax 
Change in net MCT over 
base 
(1) 
100,000 
NIL 
100,000 
52,000 
NIL 
NIL 
NIL 
52,000 
After-tax cost of finance 
of £50,000 £50,000 
(ii) (iii) 
100,000 100.000 
50,000 NIL 
50,000 100,000 
21,000 52,000 
NIL 33,500 
NIL 16,500 
NIL 16,500 
21,000 35,500 
(31,000) (16,500) 
50,000-31.000=19.000 33.50o~16.50o-
16.500=33.500 
The relative tax advantage of debenture interest is £33.500 - £19.000 = 
£14.500, being 29% of £50,000 , 
Table 15 (£s) After-tax cost of finance 
Base Situation 
.. (j) 
Schedule 0 60,000 
Charge on Income Nil 
Net taxable Income 60,000 
Tax @ 52% 31,200 
I ~ 25,000 
i 
less marginal small companIes relief 
a 3,571 
MaInstream Corporation Tax 27,629 
Dividends paid Nil 
ACT Nil 
ACT setoff Nil 
Net r"!a i nstream Corporat ion Tax 27,629 
Change in net MCT over base 
After-tax cost of finance 
Situation wlfh debenture 
Interest of £10,000 
(I j) 
60,000 
10,000 
50,000 
26,000 
I x 35,000 
.,-
• 5,000 
42% 50,000 .. 21,000 
Nil 
Nil 
NIL 
21,000 
(6,629) 
. 10,006 - 6,629 .. 3,371 
Situation with gross 
dividends of £10,000 
(j i I) 
60,000 
NIL 
60,000 
3! ,200 
I x 25,000 
"1 
.. 3,571 
27,629 
6;700 
3,300 
3,300 
24,329 
<3,300) 
6,700 + 3,300 M 3,300 = 6,700 
The relaTive tax advantage of debenture Interest is £6~700 - £3,371 = £3,329, being 33.29% of £10,000. 
I 
N 
N 
? 
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Table46 After-tax cost of finance 
Base Situation with dcb- Situation with 
Situation cnture interest of gross dividends 
£10,000 of £10,000 
(i) (ii) (iii) 
Schedule D SO,CXX) SO ,()(X) 50,000 
Charge on income NIL 10,000 NIL 
Net taxable income SO,()(X) 40,(XX) 50,000 
Tax at 42~ 21,CXX) 16,800 21 ,()(X) 
Dividends paid NIL NIL 6,700 
ACT NIL NIL 3,300 
ACT setoff NIL NIL 3,300 
Net Jvcr 21,()(X) 16,800 17,700 
Change in net Mer over base NIL (4,200) (3,300) 
After tax costs of finance 10,.coo - 4, 200 = 6,700+3,300-3,300 
5,BOO 6,700 
The relative tax advantage of debenture interest is £6,700 - £5,800 = £900, 
being 9~ of £10,000. 
0-
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Table 47 (£5) After-tax cost of finance 
Base Situation with deb- Si tuation 'vi th 
Situation enture interest of gross dividends 
£20,000 of £20,000 
(i) (ii) (iii) 
Schedule D 6O,CXX) 60,000 6O,cxx> 
Charge on income NIL 20,000 NIL 
Net taxable income 60,000 40,CXX> 6O,cxx> 
Mainstream Corporation Tax 27,629 16,800 27,629 
Dividends paid NIL NIL 13,400 
ACT NIL NIL 6,600 
ACT setoff NIL NIL 6,600 
Net MCT 27,629 16,800 21,029 
Olange in net MCT over base (10,829) (6,600) 
After-tax cost of finance 20.,000 - 10,829 13,400 + 6,600 -
= 9,171 6,600 = 13,400 
The relative tax advantage of debenture interest is £13,400 - £9,171 = 
£4,229, being 21.145% of £20,000. 
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Table 48 After-tax cost of finance 
Schedule D 
Charge on income 
Net taxable income 
MCT @ 33% 
Dividends paid 
ACT 
ACT setoff 
Net MCT 
Change in net M:T over base 
After-tax cost of finance 
Base 
Situation 
(i) 
loo,(XX) 
NIL 
100,000 
33,(XX) 
NIL 
NIL 
NIL 
33,000 
Situation with 
Hoo debenture 
interest 
(ii) 
100,000 
100 
99,900 
32,967 
NIL 
NIL 
NIL 
32,967 
(33) 
100 - 33 = 67 
Situation with 
gross dividends 
of £100 
(iii) 
100,000 
NIL 
100,000 
33,000 
67 
33 
33 
32,967 
(33) 
67 + 33 - 33 = 67 
'!he relative tax advantage of debenture interest is £67 - £67 = zero • 
Table 49 A summa,), of the tax advantages of debt ver!;us equity finance under the Finance Act 1978. 
Net taxable 
J ncorr.e 
Over £85,000 
Under 50,000. 
but positive 
Between £50,000 
and £85,000 
Over £85,000 
Under £50,000 but 
positive 
Between £50,000 
and £85,000 
NIl or negative 
ACT setoff 
not restricted 
not restricted 
not restricted 
fully re5trlcted 
fully restricted 
fully restricted 
fully restricted 
Marginal corporate 
tax relief on gross 
debenture Interest 
. (I ) 
52% 
42% 
66.29% 
19% 
9% 
33.29% 
NIL 
ACT setoff against net 
mainstream corporation 
tax, as a fraction of 
gross dividends 
( i I ) 
33% 
33% 
33% 
NIL 
NIL 
NIL 
NIL 
Relative tax advantage 
of debt finance 
(I) - (ii) 
19% 
9% 
33.29% 
19% 
'. 
9% 
33.29% 
NIL 
I 
I\) 
I\) 
~ 
I 
Table 50 {£s} Debenture versus bank interest 
Tax computatton with £100 debenture 
• Interest 
Schedule 0 profIt before bank 
Interest and before stock 
relief 100,100 
less bankinterest NIL 
Profit before stock relIef 100,100 
Opening stock 13,000· 
Closing stock 43,000 
Increase 30,000 
. I ess 15% of prof I t before 
stock rei ief <l5,0IS} 
Stock re lief (14,985) 
Tax before debenture Interest 85,115 
less debenture interest ( 100) 
Net Taxable Income 85,015 
Tax thereon @ 52% 44,207.80 
Tax computation with £100 bank 
Interest 
100,100 
( 100) 
100,000 , 
13,000 
43,000 
30,000 
<15,000) 
<l2.tOOO ) 
85,000 
NIL 
85,000 
44,200 
I 
f\) 
I\) 
Ul 
I 
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perhaps a surprising outcome of the analysis is that the relative 
tax advantage of debt finance is unaffected by the restricted setoff 
of ACT, since the narginal tax rate on the interest is reduced to the 
same extent as the marginal tax rate on the dividend. However, the 
size of net taxable incx:rne is a critical factor. Since high levels 
of capital allowances may reduce the level cf net taxable incx:me to 
below £85,C:X::X> or even £50 ,c:x::x> then capital expenditure decisions 
create interesting interactivities with respect to marginal tax 
rates for financing decisions. 
In table 51 we illustrate the effects of an increase in gearing on 
the after-tax returns to those who provide sources of coqorate 
finance. Finns (a) (b) and (c) each have the same total market 
capitalisation of Elm. and earn a 20% rate of return, detennined 
exogenously by the business risks of the finns' activities. For 
finn (a) the 20% rate of return before tax becanes 9.6% after tax, 
Le. the effective total tax rate, personal and rorporate, is 
20 - 9.6 = 52%. 
20 
By canparing (a) with (b) we note that with £5,CXJ:J debenture interest 
the total return to all providers of capital increases by £5,<XX) x 
19% = £950. 
Hence for finn (b), the effective total tax rate, personal and 
corporate, is 20 - 9.695 = 51.525%. 
20 
Similarly, by ccrnparing finn 
(a) with finn (c) we observe that the total return increases by 
EI0,CX:O x 19% = El,9oo, and that the total tax rate is 
(20 - 9.79) /20 = 51. 5%. In this way as nore debt finance is 
introduced to replace equity capital, the total annual returns available 
to all providers of capital increase by the debenture interest times 
the 'relative tax advantage of debt finance' as per table 12-
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Table 51 Overall rate of return 
Value of the firm 
20% return before tax 
Interest 
Tax base 
Tax thereon @ 52% 
After tax return 
Dividends (net) 
ACf 
Net ~cr 
Returns to equity holders 
after personal tax @ 33% 
Returns to debentureholders 
after personal tax @ 33% 
Total return after personal tax 
Overall rate of return after all 
taxes 
(a) 
£1,cxx>,(X)() 
200,000 
NIL 
200,000 
104,cxx> 
96,000 
96,000 
47,284 
56,716 
96,()(X) 
NIL 
96,<XX:l 
9.6% 
(b) (c) 
£1,OOO,cxx> £1,000,000 
200,000 200,000 
5,000 10,000 
195,000 190,000 
101,400 98,800 
93,600 91,200 
93,600 91,200 
46,101 44,919 
55,299 53,881 
93,600 91,200 
3,350 6,700 
96,950 97,900 
9.695% 9.79% 
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'!he foregoing analysis has implied that, ceteris p:tribus, £1 
after tax in the hands of a debenture holder WJuld be equivalent 
to £1 after tax in the hands of a shareholder; and that a £1 
pa.yrnent after tax for debenture interest would be equivalent, as 
far as the cx:rnpany is concerned, to a £1 payment after tax for 
dividends. Clearly this ignores the way roth investors and 
corporate managers view the risk attached to alternative fonns 
of finance. Since debenture interest is pa.id in priority to 
dividends it is nore certain and hence has a lower rate of 
interest required by the investor. The effect of financial 
risk on capital structure ha~ already been considered in chapter 3 
within the frame\lOrk of the Capital Asset Pricing M:x1el. 
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Let us now analyse the borrowing versus retention decision by 
comparing a retention worth Q after tux in the hands of a share-
holder with Interest worth Q after tax In the hands of a debenture 
holder. Bef0re capital gains tax the retention is worth 
Q 
I - g 
(I+k)w 
By contrast, the expl icit cost to the company of debenture interest 
Is given by 
\ l' -b , I b (l+k)O.25 
Since the debenture Interest after personal tax is worth Q to the 
debenture holder, then 
giving 
I (I-h) = Q 
I = ~ 
I-h 
Hence, borrowing is preferred to a ret6ntion if 
b 
that is, if 
h < I [- lr - 9 ' I • J w II U+k) .' Jl - b + b 
Q 
I - 9 
(I+k)w 
T l 
(I +k) 0.25 U+k)z( I 
,,--
The critical values of h are shown in Table52 and Figure 5. 
(23) ) 
(24) 
(25) 
I 
(26) 
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Figure 5 bears similarities to figure 4. It is assumed 
that capital gains tax is 30 per cent and the basic rate 
of income tax is 33 per cent 
With a marginal corporate tax rate at 52 per cent the 
critical value of h will be 66.4 per cent when the discount 
rate is zero. The greater the discount rate, the lower the 
corporate tax rate, and the longer the shareholding period, 
then the lower the critical value of h. Where k ~ m h 
J 
approaches 33 per cent. Note that where the company is not 
paying any corporation tax, perhaps through heavy capital 
allowances wiping out taxable income before allowances, then 
a retention can be preferable to borrowing where h is greater 
or equal to the basic rate of income tax (e.g. w = 0, T = 0, 
k ~ 0.05, b ~ 0.33, g = 0.3, h = 0.3028). 
. f 
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Table ;92 Critical values of the higher rate of income tax: 
r8tentions v(~rSlJS detJt. 
9 b w z T k h 
i , i 
0.3 0.33 5 J 0.6629 0.05 0.7211 i 
0.3 0.33 5 J 0.6629 0.10 0.6830 ! 
0.3 0.33 5 0.52 0.05 0.6169 ! i 0.3 0.33 5 0.52 0.10 0.5773 I 
0.3 0.33 5 0.42 0.05 0.5441 I 0.3 0.33 5 0.42 0.10 0.5033 
0.5 0.34 0 0 0.05 0.5021 
0.5 0.33 0 0 0.05 0.5020 
0.5 0.32 0 0 0.05 0.5019 
0.3 0.33 5 0.3329 0.05 0.4806 
0.5 0.34 I 0 0.05 0.4784 
0.5 0.33 I 0 0.05 0.4783 .-
0.3 0.33 5 0.3329 0.10 - 0.4388 
0.3 0.33 5 0.19 0.05 0.3765 
0.3 0.33 5 0.19 0.10 0.3332 , 
0.3 0.34 0 2 O. 0.04 0.3077 I 0.3 0.33 5 I 0.09 0.05 0.3037 I 
0.3030 I 
10 •3 0.34 0 I 0 0.05 
I 
0.33 0 I 0 0.05 I 0.3028 ! ,0.3 , 
0.3 0.32 0 I 0 0.05 0.3027 I 0.3 0.34 I I 0 0.05 0.2887 
0.3 0.33 I I 0 0.05 0.2886 
0.3 0.33 2 I 0 0.05 0.2750 
0.3 0.33 3 I 0 0.05 0.2621 
0.3 0.33 5 I 0.09 0.10 0.2592 
0.3 0.33 4 I 0 0.05 0.2498 I 0.3 0.33 5 I 0 0.05 0.2381 0.3 0.33 5 2 0 0.05 0.2381 I 0.3 0.33 5 0 0.10 I 0.1926 
O. 15 0.34 0 0 O.O~ 0.1535 I I 
0.15 0.33 0 0 0.05 0.1534 , 
0.15 0.32 0 0 0;05 . 0.1533 ! 
0.15 0.34 I 0 0.05 0.1464 1 
0.15 0.33 I 0 0.05 0.1463 
0 0.34 0 0 0.05 0.004 
0 0.33 0 0 0.05 0.004 , 
0 0.33 I 0 0.05 0.004 I 
0 0.34 I 0 0.05 0.004 
0 0.33 2 0 0.05 0.004" 
0 0.33 3 0 0.05 0.004 
0 0.32 0 0 0.05 0.004 
O· 0.33 5 1 0.52 0.10 0.5773 
0.3 0.33 10 1 0.52 0.10 0.5406 I 0.3 0.33 0 1 0.52 0.10 0.6364 
0.3 0.33 W>.O Z~O O<T<! co 0.3300 
0.3 0.33 w>"o Z~O 0.52 0 0.6640 
0.3 0.33 ~O Z~o 0.6629 0 0.7640 
d.3 0.33 10 2 0.52 0.10 0.5026 I 0.3 0.33 0 2 0.52 0.10 0.6063 I I I 0.3 0.33 5 1 0.19 0.10 0.3332 I 
0.3 0.33 ~o z~o 0.19 0 0.4330 
0.3 0.33 0 1 0:19 0.10 0.4264 
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Figure 5 Criticll values of the higher rate of income tax: 
retentions versus debt 
" 
Assumption g = 0.3, b = 0.33 
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A further refinanent would be to introduce time lags in 
relation to the delay between the receipt of a net dividerrl 
or net interest and the payment of the excess of the higher rate 
tax on the gross equivalent over the basic rate tax deducted at 
source. 
Let this be denoted v-
Hence instead of [l-h] in the analysis, we substitute: 
1 -[b + h-b 1 
(l+k) '1 
Therefore inequality (26) is m:xUfia:1 to 
giving 
h < 
similarly inequality (17) WDuld be modified to 
h > 
- T J (l+k) z 
-~~ -bJ+ b ~ 
J 
(27) 
• 
(l+k) \1"". (1- ~ - g 1 [l - b + b -
t L (l+k)~ (l+k)O.25 b ] -b 1 +b (28) (l+k)Y ~ • 
These modifications create slightly higher critical values of h. 
For instance for k = 10 per cent and b = 30 per cent, then if the 
estimates of h (Le. without these roodififations) is 50 per cent, 
the true value of h is 50.98 per cent for v:::: 0.5, and 52 per cent 
for v = 1. 
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When the estimate of h has a snaller value the discrppency is 
reduced. For instance, for k = 10% and b = 30% then if the 
estimate of h is 40 per cent, the true value of h is 40.49 
per cent for v-= 0.5, and 41 per cent for v-= 1. However 
as the discount rate increases the discrepancy is increased. 
For k = 20% and b = 30%, then if the est:ima t e of h is 50 per 
cent, the true value of h is 51. 9 per cent for v- = 0.5, and 
54 per cent for v- = 1. 
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6.6. Taxes and mnrket eQuilibrium 
Let us modify the notation to simplify the general 
, equilibrium analysis. IJet 
T I = 1 _ r1- b + b L o. 25 
, (l+k) 
B' = 1 - f-b 
and 
, 
G = 1 -
furthermore let 
+ 
b 
0.25 
(l+k) 
T J Z (l+k) 
h* 
S 
= the marginal rate of income tax on 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
dividends for the marginal shareholder 
~ 
and 
= the marginal rate of income tax 
on interest for the marginal 
debentureholder. 
I 
J 
, 
.. 
,'.',,-, .. ,-., 
\ . '~', 
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Therefore in general equilibrium inequality (17) can 
be modified for the cage of the irrelevance between 
retentions and new iSRues, when 
and from inequality (26) there is an irrelevance 
between borrowing and retentions when 
When the after-tax value of the dividend to the 
marginal shareholder equals the after-tax value of 
the interest to the marginal debentureholder then 
or 
I-b 
l_h'Jt 
D 
= 
= I (l_h'Jl') 
D 
I (I-b) 
(:32) ; 
(33 ). 
'.i 
, .. '.,. 
" 
• 
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The net cost to the company of the interest is 
(I-b) I + 
= 
bI 
0.25 
(l+k) 
TI 
Z 
(l+k) 
The net cost to the company of the dividend is 
[1 b (l-b)(:+k/ J D + o. 25 (l-b) (l+k) 
D G-b b = + (1-b) 0.25 
(l+k) 
D(l-B') 
= • (1-h) 
These two costs are the same when 
I (l-T') 
or 
tel-b) = 
= 
D(l-B ') 
l-b 
D(l-'S' ) 
1-T' 
.I'J 
b J y (l+k) 
.. '.', .. , 
_ ' ~, t 
('36) • 
r-
• 
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Prom (35) this gives 
.. D(l-h~) 
S 
l-h"" 
D 
= 
,. -It 
Substituting for h (from equation (32) ) into 
S 
equation (38) gives 
which is the same as equation (33). Hence in general 
(38) 
• 
(39) , 
, 
equilibrium the marginal shareholder has a marginal tax'f 
rate on dividends of h~, as determined by equation (32); 
S 
and the marginal debentureholder has a marginal tax 
rate on interest of h* , as determined by equation (33). 
D 
The result is an irrelevant capital structure for the 
firm in market equilibrium. 
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6.7 Conclusions 
Although the nxxlel has been based on certainty, and hence the 
discount rate k was constant, the conditions for tax neutrality 
were the srune as those of chapter 3, where risk was then explicitly 
considered, assuning that canplexities in relation to tax time lags 
and multiple marginal tax rates are ignored. This is not to 
suggest that all the present results will necessarily exactly 
follow under conditions of risk. Where the tax payments, reliefs 
and allowances are highly certain then the foregoing analysis with 
constant k may be generally acceptable for roost purposes. A 
simple adjustment for risk may be to attach subscripts, 1, 2, 
3, ... , to the values of k \vhen identifying time lags for different 
tax effects. Each risk-adjusted discount rate of kI' kz, k3' ... , 
can therefore be regarded as different, and can in theory be derived, 
inter alia, according to the covariability of the respective tax 
cash flow with the rate of return on the efficient market 
portfolio. The purpose of this chapter however is to danonstrate 
that even in a certain world, in partial equilibrium (i) 
the optimal financing decision is a complex issue per se, 
and (ii) it is not independent of the investment decision. 
Since this can be achieved without resorting to a more 
. complex risk-adjusted model, a present value framework 
.with constant discount rates was adopted. 
Since debenture interest is relieved at the corporate tax rate 
and ACf is setoff at the basic rate of incane tax then there is a 
general preference for debentures instead of new issues. It was 
shown that although ACT setoff restrictions increase the cost of 
the dividends the debenture interest becanes IOOre costly also, such 
that the general preference for debt finance is maintained. It is 
, 
.' '4,_. 
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possible however for the tax lags, denoted z (re: interest relief) 
and y (re: Acr setoff), to be different. For instance, Acr may 
be carried back up to too years whereas unrelieved interest may 
only be carried fOr\v.trd. If heavy capital expenditure wipes 
out net taxable income in the current year then the debenture 
interest relief in present value tenns will be reduced. By 
contrast the Acr on dividends paid now may be setoff llnnediately 
to the extent that the previous t\\O years' setoff limits have 
not been fully utilized. Hence where z is sufficiently greater 
than y then T/(l+k)z is not necessarily greater than b/(1+k)Y. 
FUrthermore with heavy capital allrnvances even large companies 
with high pre-tax accounting profits may pay small companies' rate, 
mich will be applied as the marginal tax rate on debenture interest. 
The investment decision is therefore not independent of the financing 
decision. 
If the marginal rate of corporation tax on debenture interest were the 
same as the basic rate of incane ta.x then the oorrowing versus 
retention decision could be rrodelled in almost the same Wcl.y as the 
retention versus new issue decision. In this case the relationship 
between the critical higher rate of income ta.x and the capital 
gains tax lag v.ould be identical to that depicted in figure 4 by 
substituting z for y. Hence for very low discount rates (k ~ 0) 
retentions would be preferable if the higher rate of income 
tax exceeded 51.3 per cent. For higher discount rates the critical 
value of h would be reduced and at the limit (k = 00) it would 
approach the basic rate of incane tax. It has been srown that 
under the Finance Act 1978 the marginal rate of corporate tax 
relief on debenture interest is 33.29 per cent if ACT setoff 
is restricted and net ta.xable income falls between the marginal 
relief limits. Since this approximates the basic rate then the above 
.,1 
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relationship would appear to hold in this instance. 
Where AGr setoff is not restricted then, within this band 
of net taxable ineane, the marginal tax relief is 66.29 
per cent, and for very low discount rates and short shareholding 
periods the critical value of h can be very high; and for k = 0 
equals 76.4.. per cent. Consequently for canpanies \\hose net 
taxable ineane fa1ls within the marginal relief bands the 
borrowing or retention decision is very sensitive to whether 
ACf setoff is restricted or not. It may then be queried oow 
ACf setoff restrictions may arise when the finn is retaining 
profits. This may result from optimal distribution decisions 
of previous years which no longer hold·. Consider a higher rate 
of ineane tax at 40 per cent being representative, and let 
g = 0.3, b = 0.33. W = 5, y = 1, and k.= 10 per cent. Fram 
table 40 it can be observed that for these {:W"WIleters a dividend 
is preferable to a retention. Now if unforeseen expenditure 
is then incurred on acquiring plant and machinery (I assume here 
a disequilibrium situation in an otherwise perfect market) the 
net taxable inccme may be wiped out, resulting in a delayed setoff 
of ACT. if there were ACT restrictions in the previous two years 
and there is insufficient franked investment ineane. But even 
with a t\\O year lag in obtaining the setoff (y = 2), fran table 
40 the critical value of h changes such that a retention is now 
preferable to a dividend. Hence investment decisions may affect 
financing decisions by changing the lag in obtaining the setoff 
for ACT. Furthenoore we have already argued that the investment 
decisions may result in substantial changes to the marginal 
tax relief on debenture interest, upsetting previously opt~l 
decision rules. A programning rwclel to deal with inter-activities, 
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caused by taxation, between investment and financing 
decisions, will be presented in chapter 7. 
The earlier models presented in this chapter have been 
based on homogeneous rates of personal taxation on 
investment income. It was shown that the conclusions 
are the same as those of chapter 3 ignoring tax time 
lags. ~imilarly, in general equilibrium with 
heterogeneous tax rates both the one period model of 
chapter three and the multi-period model here have 
proved an irrelevant capital structure after tax. It 
was stated that the firm's financing decisions may 
change over time due to interactivities between 
investment and financing decisions. In particular 
the capital allowance effects fromexpenditure may alter 
the relative attractiveness of new issues, retentions 
or debt. The result is that the firm may now attract 
a different clientele of investors. During the period 
of temporary disequilibrium the value of the firm may 
not he indifferent with regard to capital structure. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The use of mathematical nrogramming in 
corporate financial planning un~er the 
imputation tax system 
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7.1. NOT~TI0N (for chqpter 7 only) 
a 
. Bj 
CT 
A 
p 
CTBA 
A 
p 
CTEIA 
A 
p 
CTB2A 
A 
p 
CTF 
= net cash outflow of project B at period j 
(exogenous), 
= total ACT on dividends paid in the accounting 
period ended at time p (endogenous), 
CTBIA 
= a variable to help determine A 
(see morlel) (endogenous) , 
p 
= ACT considered for being carried back at 
least one year (endogenous) • 
= ACT considered for being carried back at 
least two years (endogenous)', 
A = ACT carried forNard from period p to 
p 
CTFlA 
A = 
P 
CTF2A 
A = 
p 
p+4 (endogenous). 
the first of two components constituting 
ACT carried forNard from period p to 
p+4 (endogenous) 
• 
the second of two co~ponents constituting 
ACT carried forward from period p to p+4 
(endogenous) 
• 
- 1-, 
CTFB 
A 
p 
CTFC 
A 
p 
CTFD 
A 
b 
j 
B 
ABI 
o 
p 
p 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
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a1ditional ACT carried forward from period 
p-4 to period p as a consequence of the 
carry-back of capital allowancws from 
time p (endngenous). 
additional ACT carried forNard from period 
p-8 to period p-4 as a consequence of the 
oarry-baok of oapital allowances from 
time p (endogenous). 
additional ACT carried forNard from period 
p-12 to period p-8 as a consequence of the 
carry-baok of capital allowances from time 
p (endogenous). 
basic rate of income tax at ti~e j 
('Parameter) • 
refers to project B (subscript) , 
total number of projects (parameter) 
. 
capital allowances considered for being 
carried back at least one year (endogenous). 
r 
AB2 
C 
p 
AB3 
C 
p 
AF 
C 
p 
.10 
C 
Bj 
AP 
C 
B'j 
c 
j 
ABIU 
C 
p 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
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capita1 allowances considered for being 
carried back at least two years (ennogenous) 
capital allowances considered for being 
carried back three years (endogenous) • 
capital allowances carried forward from 
period p (ennogenous) 
the contribution of the Bth project (if 
accepted) to the capital allowances on 
items other than plant and machinery 
arising in period j (exogenous) 
the contribution of the Bt~ project (if 
accepted) to the capital allowances on 
plant and machinery arising in ~eriod j 
(exogenous) 
• 
closing balance of cash in pertod j 
(endogenous) 
a carryback figure ignoring the constraint 
that it must only relate to plant and 
machinery (endogenous) 
• 
• 
, 
~ ... 
l' 
v 
c 
D 
j 
E 
Bj 
Q 
E 
j 
Q limit 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
E = j 
f = 
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cash flows exten~ing beyon~ the horizon 
of projects,discounted to period n+l 
(exogenous) 
• 
(net) dividend paid at time j (endogenous) 
the change in accounting depreciation in 
period j of those fixed assets relating_ 
to production overhea~s, resulting from 
project B's acceptance (exogenous). 
the contribution of the Bth project (if 
accepte~) to the expenses for period j 
based on accrual accounting principles 
(exogenous) . 
. 
new equity issue in period j (endogenous) 
limit on amount of new equity issues in 
period j (parameter) 
the proportion of the accounting period 
ending at time p that is covered by the 
latter tax year involved (parameter). 
i' 
" .,.. .. l ,-4 
- \I, .~! 
g 
G 
I 
Bj 
NTB! 
I 
P 
NTBB 
I 
p 
NTBe 
I 
P 
= 
= 
= 
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a tax lag equal to the gap between the 
date of payment of tax and the end of the 
accounting period on which the tax is 
based (parameter). 
the time gal' between the date of payment 
of the divi~end anQ the ACT thereon 
(normally 3 months) (parameter). 
the contribution of the Bth project (if 
accepted) to the investment outlay at time 
j (exogenous). 
= interest paid brought forward under section 
177(8) rCTA 1970 from period p to p+4 
(under a quarterly model) (endogenous). 
= interest paid brou~ht forward under section 
177(8) from period p-4 to p, revised on 
account of the carry-back of capital 
allowances from time p (endogenousl 
interest paid brought forward under section 
177(8) from period 1'-8 to p-4, revised on 
account of the carry-back of capital 
allowances from time p (endogenous) 
r 
_ It,~· 
NTBD 
I 
P 
NTBQ 
I 
j 
J 
Ie 
j 
k 
L 
k 
yt 
k 
lfS 
L 
j 
j 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
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interest paid brought forward under section 
177(8) from period p-12 to p-8, revised 
on account of the carry-back of capital 
allowances from time p (endogenous) 
unrelieved income tax on interest brought 
forward under the quarterly accounting 
system for income tax from period j to 
j+1 (endogenous) 
refers to period number (subscript) 
refers to time subscript in summation 
expressions (subscript) 
cash flows at period j arising froe existing 
activities (exogenous) 
short-term pre-tax lending rate (exogenous) 
long-term pre-tax borrowing rate (exogenous) 
short-tp-rm pre-tax borrowing rate (exogenous) 
amount of short-term lending incurred at 
period j (endogenous) 
, 
_".", :'\'<1 
F 
L 
p 
HS 
L 
0 
L 
p 
M 
p 
eTA 
M 
'p 
CTIA 
M 
p 
CT2A 
M 
p 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
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losses carrie~ forward from period p to 
p+4 (endogenous). 
left-hand side of an equation (in my 
workings the sides of the equations are 
occasionally switched::) (endogenous) 
F 
a variable to help detr:rmine L (see model) 
(endogenous) • 
p 
a million or such constant high enough to 
ensure that any constraint cont'1.ining M is 
satisfied in theoptimal solution (parameter~ 
r 
, , 
mainstream corporation tax.fo~ the accounting 
period ended at time p (endogenous). 
mainstre~ corporation tax for the first 
' .... ~ 
quarter of the acc"unting period enrled at 
time p (endogenous) • 
- .. ,', 
mainstream cor~oration tax for the remaining 
quarters of the accounting period ended 
at time p (endogenous) 
I' 
CTB 
M 
p 
CTIB 
M 
p 
CT2B 
M 
eTe 
M 
P 
p 
OTIO 
M 
P 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
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mainstream corporation tax for the 
accounting period emded at time p-4 , 
adjusting for the carry-back of capital 
allowances from time p (endogenous) . 
mninstream corporation tax for the first 
quarter of the accounting period ended at 
time p-4, adjusting for the carry-back of 
capital allowances from time p (endogenous) 
mainstream corporation tax for the remaining 
qu~ters of the accounting period ended nt 
time p-4, adjusting for the carry-back of 
capital allowances from time p (endogenous) 
mainstream corporation tax for. the accounting 
period ended at time p-S, adjusting for the 
carry-back of capital allowances from time 
p (endogenous) , 
mainstream cDrporation tax for the first 
quarter of t~e accounting period ended at 
time p-S, adjusting for the carry-back of 
capital allowances from time p (endogenous) 
CT2C 
M 
p 
CTn 
M 
p 
CTID 
M 
p 
CT2D 
M 
P 
M 
P 
RL 
M 
p 
p 
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= mainstream corporation tax for the remaining 
quarters of the accounting period ended at 
time p-8, adjusting for the carry-back of 
capital allowances from time p (endogenous). 
= mainstream corporation tax for the 
accounting period ended at time p-12, 
adjusting for the carry-back of capital 
allowances from time p (ennogenous) 
= mainstream corporation tax for the first 
quarter of the accounting period ended at 
time p-12, ad!usting for the carry-back of 
capital allowances from time p (endogenous) 
, 
= mainstream corporation tax for the remaining 
quarters of the accounting period ended at 
time p-12, adjusting for the carry-back of 
capital allowances from time p (endo~enous) 
. 
= 
marginal fraction at time p (parameter) 
marginsl relieflower limit at time p 
(parameter) 
• 
.' ...... '~ 
... '-, . 
RU 
M 
n 
p 
MOTA 
N 
p 
MOTB 
N 
p 
MCTC 
N 
p 
MOTD 
N 
p 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
-253-
marginal relief upper limit at time p 
(parameter). 
project horizon date (parameter) 
net mainstream corporation tax based on 
net taxable income for the accounting period 
ended at time p (endogenous). 
net mainstream corporation tax based on net 
taxable income for the accounting period 
ended at time p-4, adjusting for the carry-
back of canital allowances from time p 
(endogenous) 
• 
net mainstream corporation tax based on 
net taxable income for the accounting period 
ende~ at time p-8, adjusting for the carry-
bact of capitalallowances from time p 
(endogenous) 
• 
net mainstream corporation tax based on 
net taxable income for the accounting period 
ended at time p-12, adjusting for the carry-
back of canital allowances from time p 
(endogenous) 
, 
-" .. " 
TIE 
N 
Bj 
TIA 
N 
P 
TIB, 
N 
p 
TIC 
B 
p 
TiD 
B 
p 
~1,+2 
etc. 
p 
1 
P 
= 
= 
= 
= 
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net taxable income attributable to project 
B (if accepted) in period j excluding 
capital allowances and stock relief 
(endogenous ). 
net taxable income in period p (en~ogenous) 
net taxable income in pertod p-4 
adjusting for the carry-back of capital 
allowances from period p (endogenous). 
net taxable income in period p-8, 
adjusting for the carry-back of aapital 
allowances from period p (endogenous) 
. 
= net taxable income in pertod p-12, 
adjusting for the carry-back of capital 
allowances from period p (endogenous) 
• 
= 
.= 
= 
formulae as per a~pendix 1. 
refers to accounting period number 
(subscript) 
• 
refers to accounting period in summation 
expressions (subscript) 
P 
Bj 
q 
r 
R 
Bj 
HS 
R 
P 
ECS 
S 
Bj 
ESA 
S 
p 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
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the contribution of the Bth project 
(if accepted) to purchases of materials 
in period j based on accrual accounting 
principles (exogenous). 
number of ty~ical projects for inclusion 
at horizon (parameter). 
cost of equity capital (exo~enous) 
the contribution of the Bth project 
(if accepted) to the revenues in period j 
based on accrual accounting principles 
(exogenous) 
• 
right-band side of an equation (endogenous~ 
schedule D case 1 profits attributable to 
project B (if accepted) in period j 
excluding capital allowances and stock 
relief (ennogenous). 
schedule Dease 1 profits for the accounting 
period ended at time p excluding stock relief 
(endo~enous) 
- . , .. 
ESB 
S 
p 
ESC 
= 
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schedule D case 1 profits for the 
accounting period ended at time p-4 
excluding stock relief, adjusted fO·r the 
carry-back of capital allowances f·lbm 
period p (endogenous), 
S = schedule D case 1 profits for the 
p 
ESD 
S 
p 
HDA 
S 
p 
H"DB 
S 
p 
= 
= 
= 
accounting period ended at time p-8 
excluding stock relief, adjusted for the 
carry-back of capital allowances from 
period p (endogenous) • 
schedule D case 1 profits for the accounting 
period ended at time p-12 excluding stock 
relief, adjusted for the carry-back of 
capital allowances from pe~iod p (endogenous) 
schedule D case I profits for the accounting 
period ended at time p (endogenous) 
schedule D case I profits for the accounting 
period ended at time p-4, adjusted for the 
carry-back of capital allowances from period 
p (endogenous). 
• 
HDe 
s 
p 
HDD 
S 
p 
RA. 
S 
p 
RB 
S 
Re 
s 
p 
p 
RD 
S 
p 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
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schedule D case I profits for the 
accounting period ended at time p-8, 
adjusted for the carry-back of capital 
allowances from ~eriod p (endo~enous). 
schedule Dease 1 profits for the 
accounting ~eriol'l ended at time p-12, 
a1justed for the carry-back of capital 
a110wances from period p (endogenous). 
stock increase for the accounting period 
ended at time pless 15 per cent of 
schedule D case 1 profits after capital 
RA 
allowances (if S is positive; otherwise 
RA p 
S is zero) (endogenous). 
p 
RA 
revised value of S 
p-4 
to adjust for the 
carry-back of capital allowances from 
period p (endogenous). 
RA. 
revised value of S 
p-8 
to ad~ust for the 
carry-back of canital allowances from period 
p (endogenous) 
RA. 
revised value of S to arljust for 
p-12 
the carry-back of canital allowances from 
period p (endogenous) 
_., .. 
T 
j 
u 
L 
1f 
j 
j 
L limit 
W 
j 
S 
W 
j 
S limit 
W 
j 
x 
B 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
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the corporate tax rate applied to net 
taxable income at time j (parameter). 
a zero-one variable (endogenous). 
the proportion of the volume of unsold 
goods to the volume of production during 
period j .( parameter). 
amount of long run borrowing at period j 
(endogenous) • 
limit on amount of long run borrowing 
incurred in period j (parameter) • 
amount of short-run bowrowing incurred 
at period j (endogenous) 
• 
limit on amount of short-term borrowing 
incurred in period j (parameter) . 
fractional acceptance of project B (o~)( ~l) 
• (endogenous) 
• 
_., , ~ 
z 
1 
z 
2 
z 
4 
z 
6 
= 
= 
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the proportion that the closing balance of 
accounts receivable in period j bears to the 
revenues of period j based on accrual 
* accounting principles (parameter) 
the proportion that the closing balance 
, of accounts payable in period j bears to 
the purchases of period j based on accrual 
accounting principles (parameter) 
= 
= 
= 
= 
the proportion that the closing balance 
of expenses owing in period j bears to 
the expenses of period j based on accrual 
accounting urinciples (parameter) 
the proportion that the crosing stock of 
raw T.sterials in period j bears to the 
purchases of materials in period j based 
on accrual accounting principles (parameter) 
the proportion that the closing stock of 
finished goods in period j bears to the 
cost of production during period j 
(parameter) 
the stock appreciation relief proportion, 
currently at 15 per cent (parameter) 
~ footnote:e.g. in table 19 zl = 25000/200000 = 0.125 
--', . 
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7.2. Introduction 
" In earlier chapters assumptions have been made 
regarding perfect frictionless capital markets in 
which investment and financing decisions can be 
determined independently. The only imperfection 
that has been introduced is that the tax system 
may create potential incentives or disincentives 
for the firm to invest and that the choice of 
financing mix may also be distorted by taxation. 
It has been shown that under a corporate cash flow 
tax system with full instantaneous relief for losses 
and constant tax rates, the decision as to whether to 
proceed with a capital investment proposal is not 
affected by taxation. when the method of, appraisal 
is based on discounted cash flow analysis. Several 
factors may in practice create an environment in 
which tax neutrality no longer holds. The carry-forward 
ot capital allowances may result in a present value 
of capital allowances as a proportion of cost being 
less than 100 per cent. It has been shown that this '~,., 
may result in a potential disincentive to invest. 
Yet when several divisions of a firm are appraising 
projects independently some may be unaware of the extent 
to which the firm has a sufficiency of profits against 
which to offset capital allowances. One division may 
assume that capital allowances have to be carried forward 
on the basis that it is generating a low level of 
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current taxable profits. Since the present value 
of capital allowances as a proportion of cost for 
this division may appear to be less than 100 per cent 
this division . may regard its projects to be unacceptable, 
yet they could be attractive when account is taken 
of profits from other divisions. It follows that all 
combin~tions of projects be jointly considered, a 
view supported by Fawthrop (1971), Grundy and Burns 
(1979), Buckley (1975), Rickwood and Groves (1979), 
and Berry and Dyson (1979). Further reasons for _ 
considering combinations of projects include claims 
for stock relief. For one division may be running 
down stocks to such an extent that the firm as a whole 
may not be able to claim relief for the appreciation 
of trading stocks. A smaller division that is 
considering projects, which re~uire an investment in 
working capital, may have to pay tax not only on its 
net operating cash flow but also on the periodic 
investment in net working capital (se~ chapter 5 ). 
Since a tax system based on cash flows can have a 
neutral effect on the investment decision, then a 
tax based on working capital in addition to operating 
cash flows can be a disincentive to invest. As the 
incremental tax effects arising from projects depend 
on the tax position of the firm as a whole then all 
combinations of projects, including those representing 
the existing activities of the firm, need to be 
~, , ",. , 
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considered together. Furthermore, it is the firm's 
overall tax position which determines the extent to 
.which Advance Corporation Tax is restricted. 
Investments in plant and machinery may reduce net 
taxable income to such an extent that part of the tax 
benefits for the firm, from the setoff of Advance 
Corpor~tion Tax against its mainstream corporation 
tax liability, may be reduced in present value terms. 
It has been shovm in chapter 5 that this may reduce 
the marginal corporate tax rate applied to the benefit 
of the capital allowance on plant and machinery. But it 
has been argued in chapter 6 that the delay in the setoff 
of ACT affects the after-tax cost to the company of 
paying a dividend and thus may distort the optimal 
financing mix of the firm. 
The reduction in net taxable income as a result of 
heavy capital allowances may distort too the marginal 
tax rate at which relief is obtained on debenture 
interest and where capital allowances fully wipe out 
taxable profits, the reduction in the mainstream 
corporation tax liability may be delayed for many 
years. In present value terms the after-tax cost of 
interest may be increased substantially. Hence not 
only do projects need to be appraised simultaneously 
but also the total investment programme and the firm's 
financing decision policies need to be analysedtogether. 
.... , 
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As a means of achieving this end a mathematical 
progranrning model may be used. The mathematical 
programming methodology has already been applied to 
corporate financial planning in particular by 
Weingartner (1974), Chambers (1967 and 1971), 
Ca~sberg (1976), Wilkes (1977), Ashton (1978), 
and Bhaskar (1978). Yet, the provisions of the tax 
system'have either been omitted or grossly over-
simplified. Note that although the work by Ashton 
has suggested that accept or reject decisions for 
capital projects may be performed fairly efficiently 
without using oonplex mathematical programming models, 
the tax interactivities of the type discussed in this 
chapter were not considered. A notable paper that has 
oonsidered tax interactivities between projects has 
been published by Berry and Pyson(1979) and represents 
a parallel study which confirms the main argument in 
this chapter that~e tax system can be programmed in 
an optimisation model. They demonstrate that because 
of the tax system, investment projects under 
oonsideration need to be appraised simultaneously 
and may be solved by a mathematioal programming model 
normally used for cases of capital rationing. In the 
present oha~ter; the situation of potential rationing 
of capital is included, not because in order to 
incorporate the tax provisions the firm needs to be in 
a capital rationing situation, butpartly since t~e 
resultant model may be of more general interest and 
oapital rationing constraints after tax may, in any 
- , . ", 
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case, be excluded if desired. More significantly, 
the existe.nce of borrowing and lending opportunities 
is important firstly through the tax deductibility of 
interest payments, which may be deferred under section 
177(8), perhaps as a result of capital allowances on 
new investments wiping out profits against which to 
dffset the interest,and secon!ly because of the tax 
treatment of interest received. Also, in contrast to 
the Berry and Dyson paper, which incorporated net 
present values of projects, in this chapter the 
objective function is based on a discounted dividends 
approach,which provides an important link with the 
constraints pertaining to the tax treatment of Advance 
Corporation Tax. The model will be an extension to that 
by Bhaskar (1978), whose work will be briefly reviewed 
shortly. 
7.3. ~~odel complexi tyand the nurnose and usefulness of 
the model 
A significant characteristic of the model presented 
in this chapter is the use of integer values for some 
of the variables. These arise directly from constraints 
to accommodate the tax rules. In principle one~way of 
finding the optimal solution is by the method of branch 
and bound (Wagner, 1975), although mixed integer 
programming problems can be considerably more complex 
to solve than a linear programming model. Furthermore 
-".- . 
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the tax system is of such complexity that the resultant 
model is a lengthy one. This is not to say that all 
constraints should be programmed for a particular 
firm on every occasion. For instance, if it is 
obvious that the firm has taxable profits from other 
existing projects that are so large as to absorb the 
capi tal allo·,"Iances on new projects being considered; 
and hence the capital allowances carry-back provisions 
and carry-forward provisions are not needed, then 
clea~ly the appropriate constraints for capital 
allowances can be readily omitted.- Similarly, if the 
periodic investment in trading stocks will always be 
less than 15~ of taxable p~ofits after capital 
allowances, then appropriate sections of the full model 
are not requieed. Also, different firms have different 
tax profiles with respect to the size of taxable profits 
compared with the marginal relief limits, and ACT carried 
forward of backwards. Again, this may permit some 
reduction in the size of the model under appropriate 
circumstances. 
In an attempt to be realistic , quarterly periods are 
used to accommodate the quarterly payments for 
Advance Corporation Tax and income tax deducted at 
source on debenture interest. For many firms this 
refine~ent to the programme may be too costly in 
running the model compared with the benefits over a 
smaller model using annual time periods. Kevertheless 
- -, ~ . 
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it would be fairly straightforward to condense the 
model to ignore the quarterly refinements. 
A sceptic may query the purpose of presenting a model 
which for practical purposes may be too time-consuming 
to solve. The pri"nPiple of pa.zeimony, noted by 
Bhaskar (1978 p.160) may long since have been violated: 
,. 
"A liberal interpretation would define a parsimonmous 
model as being ceteris paribus, sufficiently simple for 
I 
the manager to understand, yet sufficiently complicated 
to embody the most important relationships holding in 
the real world. If a model becomes too complicated, 
practical experience would suggest that the model loses 
its usefulness because the manager cannot have an overall 
grasp of the model. On the other hand, if the model 
is too simple, it may o~1t important financial 
influences which are found in reality". 
But the purpose of this chapter is to e~plain that 
the tax complexities ~ be incorporated into a 
mathematical programming model that seeks an 
optimal solution to the selection of capital projects 
and the determination of an optimal financing mix. 
the main problem in presenting a general model is that 
many-firms have different . tax profiles and so parts 
of the general model would be redundant for the particular 
firm. The objective of the model presented here, however, 
is to demonstrate to financial model builders how to 
-. ~ . 
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include in the mathematical program constraints to 
I 
accommodate the complex tax effects of investment 
and ~1nancing decisions of the firm. The role is more 
of an educational one and the chapter is addressed to 
experts in financial modelling who may require some 
guidelines on the area of taxation. Indeed since the tax 
system changes rapidly parts of the model as they stand 
, 
would soon become outdated •.• But once the model 
builder appreciates the natu~e of the programming 
constraints that are described here it should not be too 
difficult to accommodate anticipate~, and actual, 
changes in the tax legislation. In this way as a 
guide to taxation and financial ~odel-building, within 
an optimisation model, this chapter attempts to fill a 
serious gap in the literature. The model builder may in 
practice seek a model which, in terms of its efficiency 
in the determination of an optimal solution, lies somewhere 
between the more simplistic models of chapters 5 and 6 
and the present model which is theoretically more 
sensitive to the reality of the tax environment, yet 
operationally very difficult to solve. 
In any event a model needs to be ad~pted to its 
particular situation and it would be unwise to attempt 
to ap~ly the model in this chapter without any adaptations. 
It is left to the discretion of the ~odel-builner to 
simplify the present general model for the more critical 
aspects of the tax position of the firm in question. 
-..... 
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Theresultant s~lution may be suboptimal, when programming 
costs are excluded, yet the full model which ought to 
provide an optimal solution may not warrant the 
! programming and related costs. 
_. 4· , 
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7.4 The pre-tax corporate financial plarming m:::xiel by Bhaskar 
'!he main features of the linear programning ncdels used in 
corporate financial plarming are conveniently surnnarised by Bhaskar 
(1978) as follows (with sane changes in notation) 
Max:imise: 
n D. -E9 t J J j=o I + J 
1 
n (l+r J) 
J=l 
+ (l+~) Ln - (1 + ~) ~ - (1 + kwr,) ~ ~ ] 
j=o , 
~h represents [disa:runted (dividerrls less new ~ity issue~ 
plus [disa:runted horizon values of (projects) plus (lending am 
interest accruing at horizon) less (short-tem borrowing and 
interest owing at mrizon) less (principal of long-tenn lx>rrowerl 
furds and interest at mrizon~ • 
Subject to 
a) j = 0 - the first capital constraint of the ncdel 
B'" 
ta JL + L -rJ3-vf + D -iJ = K 9=1 Eo H 0 0 0 0 0 0 
b) j + 0 typical capital constraint of the ncdel 
j = 1, 2, ••. n , 
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B' 
1: a L+L. - (l+~)L. l- l.r.+ (l+k __ )~ 1 
B=l Bj ~ J -"L J- J -1\'5 J-
_ 'If j-l _L 
J + k_ 1: WJ + D . 
-"WI. J=O J 
- E9 = K. 
J J 
, 
representl.nJ (project net cash outflows) plus (fo.nds lent) 
.... 
minus (interest plus principal on funds lent in previous 
peric:rl) minus (new sOOrt-term l:x>rrowl.nJ) plus (interest and 
~incipal of old short-term oorrowinq minuS"" (new l:x>rrowing) 
plus (interest on existing l:x>rrowing) plus (dividends) minus' 
(new equity issues) equals (capital fran existing operations) • 
c) ~ lxrund project l:imits (for all B) 
d) Financing l:imits, far j = 0, ••• n t 
_L J: limit 
Wj' J 
e) !b1-negativity constraints . 
~ ~ 0 for all B • 
similarly D j , E~, ~, 
'1, Lj , for all j . 
....... , 
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7.5 M::xUfications to the rrodel for personal and corp:?rate 
taxation 
Bhaskar notes that 
n one anission :in the nodel is ooqorate taxation .•. However, 
there is a problan to the inoorIXlration of tax :into a general 
node!. First, tax is often peculiar to the organisation 
arranganent of a finn and the nature of the investnent and 
financing decision. Second, it is difficult to provide an 
accurate yet precise functional form for corporate taxation. 
lbweVer, it is IXlssible to include oorporate taxation :in a 
sinplistic ani rather unsatisfactory way ••• Because this 
meth:>d of including oorporate taxation makes a number of 
assumptions al:out the sufficiency of profits and the extent 
of the tax liability ••• For practical use the anission of 
oorporate taxation is serious. Assuming that taxable profits 
are sufficient always to pay tax, then coqorate taxation can be 
added as indicated earlier by defining a project to include 
all differential cash flows. 'lhls ~lies that in periods of net 
cash outflows for a project an allowance for };Ossihle tax relief 
w::Wd be added to the cash flows. In periods of net cash inflows 
an additional arramt nust be added to represent tax payable. 
Similarly, net interest may be shown as net of corporate taxation 
relief. In the UK, 1Cr payable on issued dividends and mainstream 
oorporation tax is nore difficult to inoorporate. Ole method 
is to add the relevant arcount of 1Cr to dividends. An associated 
tax allowance may then be made in the period :in which the associated 
maJnst;ream tax liability falls due ••• However, this method for 
the inclusion of corporation tax does make a number of assumptions 
as to the sufficiency of profits and the extent of the existing 
tax liability. n 
• n-~ t' 
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Bhaskar's rocrlel will now be extended to incorporate the 
min features of the .iJnI:utation tax systan. 
A SlmlllarY of the changes to be made is outlined below: 
In the objective function: 
(i) the discounted dividerrls will be adjusted for personal 
incx:me tax 
(ii) the disca.mted mrizon valuation will include the 
p:>st-horizon net mainstream corp::>ration tax payments and 
the ~ after the h:::>rizon on dividerrls paid before the 
lxlrizon. 
In the liquidity constraints: 
(iii) the net cash outflows of each project will be broken 
down in tenns of accounting flows ani \\Orking capital 
OCI'lStituents to distinguish between the cash flow base 
for discounting ~ses and the accrual accounting base 
for tax ~ses 
(iv) advance ooq:oration tax pa}ll'lS'lts will be introduced 
(v) adjustments will be mde to interest received ani paid 
for ina:::me tax deducted at source 
(Vi) net minstream ooqoration tax payments will be dealt with. 
In particular calculations will be required for 
a) Scherlule D Case I profits excluding capital allowances 
and stock appreciation relief 
b) Schedule D case I profits after capital allowances and 
losses carried forward and bacberds 
c) Schedule D Case I profits after stock appreciation relief 
dl Schedule D Case III interest receival 
e) Charges on inoane and the carry-forward provisions 
fl '!he restriction of 1Cr setoff in the detennination 
of net mainstream ooqoration tax 
• h', ,. 
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g) The relie~ ~or income tax on any un~ranked 
receipts. 
vii) Quarterly payments ~or income tax on net u~ranked 
payments will be introduced. 
viii) ACT repayments arising ~rom the carry-back 
provisions will be considered. 
7.6. Objective ~unction 
From the full model, which is presented in Appendix 2, 
it can be seen that the first term in the objective function, 
which relates to dividends, is adjusted ~or personal tax 
by multiplying by (l-h )/(l-b ) • By dividing by 
j j 
(l-b ) a net dividend o~ 70p for instance is grossed up 
j 
to £1 where the basic rate b at time j ,b = 30~. 
j 
The expression of minus h reduces the gross dividend 
j 
to a net dividend after higher rate tax of h at time j • 
The cost of equity capital r is a~ter personal tax. 
Two additional expressions are added to Bhaskar's 
objective function • The first amendment is to insert 
the net mainstream crorporation tax payments, ~C.T., for 
J 
post-horizon peTiods j= n+l , •••• ~ where n is the 
horizon date. The other adjustment is for Advance 
Corporation Tax a~ter the horizon on dividends paid 
before the horizon • Apart ~rom the ~irst two terms in 
the objective function the ~ormula represents an horizon 
valuation. It is implicitly assumed that the cash flows 
. ".',' 
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after corporation tax arising after the horizon date, 
which are cnntained in th: ~ )ubrackets, are paid out 
as dividends and so the resultant figure is multiplied 
'by (l-hj )/(l-b j ). Problems of' restricted setoff of ACT 
after the horizon are ignored and the lag between the 
time for the payment of the ACT based on dividends paid 
after the horizon, and the setoff against the mainstream 
corporation tax liability is treated as nil • 
7.7. Liguidity constraints 
Constraint (1) corresponds with Bhaskar's capital 
constraints. The contents of the first squared bracket 
in constraint (1) relate to the pr~tax net cash inflow 
of project B at period j , and is the same as Bhaskar's 
-~j. The constituent parts of the cash ~low are, however, 
decomposed to take account of debtors, creditors, accruals 
and pr~payments, since tax is to some extent based on 
• profit rather than cash flow' ( Lawson and Stark, 1975). 
The first constraint shows the funds generated from 
existing operations', Kj' after payments of net mainstream 
corporation tax of NMCTj_g'after tax rebates of 
Me!]) MeTC MCTe MeTB 
(N - If ), ( If - If ) , and 
"j-g' j-4-g" j-g' j-4-g' 
MCTB MC1!'A 
(N - If ) j-g' j-4-g' arising from the carry-back of 
capital allowances ; after dividends 0'1 Dj' less e~ity 
issues of E~; after advance corporation tax of 
D (b /(l-b »; after lending ot'Lj , less amounts 
j-G j-G j-G 
.. footnote : e.g. see table 19. 
.1'<-.". 
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receivable from last period's lending of L ,with j-l 
interest of k L ,after income tax deducted at source 
L j-l 
at the rate b ; after appropriate after-tax adjustments 
j 
S 
for ~hort-run borrowing of W and long-run borrowing 
j 
of wf; and finally after income tax payments aTising from 
intere~t paid or received. Note that the final. 
adjustment for income tax is given by the term including 
9 • The 9 variables require special consideration and 
pIS 
will be discussed later. 
7.8. Schedule D Case 1 profits before capital allowances 
The Schedule D Case 1 profits attributable to project B 
(if accepted) in period j, excluding capital allowances 
ECS 
and stock appreciation relief'i~ denoted· by Sand 
Bj 
is derived from constraint (2) which is an equality. 
The terms are s"imilar to the net operating cash flow of ..... . 
-a except that capital expenditure of I is 
Bj Bj 
excluded and account i~ taken of the periodic change in 
trading stock so that operating cash flows can be 
oonverted into profit figures. The model assumes that 
the closing,stock of raw materials in period j is a 
constant proportion z4 in relation to the purchases 
of material~ in period j, P ,based on accrual accounting 
Bj 
principles. Similarly, the closing stock of finished 
footnote : e.g. where there is no finished stock, from 
table 18 : z = 43000/130000 ~ 0.33 • 
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goods in period j, bears a constant proportion z5' of the 
cost of production during period j. Work-in-proeress is 
treated as nil at the beginning and end of each time 
period. 
7.9. A quarterly model and a: December year-end 
Since there is a quarterly aecounting system for both 
ACT payments and income tax on unfranked payments it is 
convenient to assume that the standard period of time 
j used in the model relates to one quarter. If it is assumed 
that the company's year-end is' 31st December then j = 1 
might conveniently represent the March quarter for the 
first planning period. Clearly, alternative year-end dates 
may be modelled following procedures not too dissimilar 
to the ones that are about to be explained. Since there are 
different tax rules for different periods there are 
various groups of constraints' relating to different time 
periods: sections (a) for j # Z,6,10,14 ••• ; (b) for 
j = 4',8,12,16 •• .; (c) for j = 1,5, •• .:{d)for i/7 l,~ •• ;and(e) 
.I .•... ' 
for j = 2,6,10,14 •••• With a December year-end, the 
December quarter relates to j = 4',8,12,16 •••• The group 
of constraints under (b) which determine the net ma~nstream 
corporation tax payable, following calendar years, are 
therefore based on these particular values of j • 
7.10. Capital allowances 
To the extent that capital allowances exceed Schedule D 
Case 1. profits' (before capital allowances) from the same 
trad" the balance may be carried back three years under 
section 177(3A), Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970 
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if it relates to a claim for 100 per cent capital 
HSI 
allowances on plant and machinery. If L of equation 
p 
(9) is negative then it ghows that there may be Bome 
, capital allowances cons1.dered for being carried back 
at least one" year. This depends on whether (1) the 
capital allowances brought forward from period p-4, 
AF 
C , i.e. from a year ago under a quarterly model; 
p-4 , 
plus' (2) the capital allowances on plant and machinery, 
AP AO 
C.~, and on item~ other than on plant and machinery, C8~' 
for the four quarters of the current year J = p-3 to p 
for all projects B; plu~ 
period p-4, L' exceed 
p-4 
(3) losses brought forward from 
(4) SEeS denoting Schedule D a~' 
Case 1 profits excluding capital allowances and stock 
relief • 
Consider the constraint~ (10) to (14) , r~roduced 
below: 
A.BIU RBI 
C = L p p 
RBI 
L -MQ ~ p pI 
HSI 
L .Q 
P pI 
1 ~ 9 ~ 0 
pI 
e 
pI integral 
( Q 
- 1 ) 
pI 
(10) 
J 
0 (11) ) 
0 (12) 
I 
(13) I 
(14) • 
,"' ...... . 
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M represents a million or a figure 80 high that any 
oOnstraint containing M is satisfied in the optimal 
solution. From (13) and (14) e is either zero or one. 
- . .I pI 
HSI 
. The question is whether L is negative. Consider 
HSI 
three values for L 
p 
and (iii) minus £1,000. 
(i) £.l ,000 
From oonstraint (11) 
p 
, 
for 
(i) plus £1,000 , (ii) zero 
RBI 
L - Me to be negative, 
p pI 
Me must be greater than IO~O • Sinoe Q is either 
pI pI 
zero or one it must therefore be one. If it takes on the 
value of one then (12) reads 1000 ~ 0 whioh is true. From 
ABIU 
equation (10) C 
p 
= 
UIU 
1000(1-1) = O. But C 
p 
represents the oarry-baok figure , ign~ring for the 
moment the oonstraint that it must only ralate to plant 
BSI 
and machinery , and since this value is zero for L 
p 
positive, it may be oorreotly inferred that there are no 
carry-back aonsideration~when there are sufficient profits 
against which to offset capital allowances. 
(ii) zero 
-
GHSI Prom oonstraint (11) for L p -MQ 1, to be negative,o~ 
pI 
zero, Q is' either 
pI 
zero or one. • Constraint (12) 
. '.",-
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now reads 0 ~ 0 which is true, and equation (10) 
ABIU 
becomes C = 0 
• 
The rationale' ie that 
p 
'when capital allowances- exactly cancel ouit. taxable profits 
" 
before capital ~llowances the carry-back figure of allowances 
~ 
is zero. 
( iii) - £1 to no 
HSI 
From constraint (11) L - MQ is negative since 
P pI 
the first term is negative and the eecond term is minus 
M (if 9 
pI 
= 1) or zero (if' 9 
pI 
=0 ). The constraint 1s 
therefore satisfied for both values of 9 • But from 
pI 
constraint (12), if Q is one then the constraint reads 
pl 
-1000 ~ 0 which is untrue, and if Q = 0, we obtain 
pI 
o ~ 0 which is correct. Hence Q = 0 • By referring 
pI 
back to constraint(lO): 
.ll3IU 
C 
p 
= -1000(0-1) = IOnO 
J 
which means that the maximum amount considered for carry-back 
is .£1000. 
Constraints- (15) to (20) ensure that only that part relating 
. .~.~ ," 
--" 
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to capital allowances on plant and machinery can be carried 
back. Since the carry-back is allowed for three years, lhe 
procedure is repeated three more times via constraints (21) 
,to (:30), ('31) to (40) ,and (41) to (50). In particular 
AF 
o is determined, which re~resents any remaining capital 
p 
allowances on plant and machinery that have no~ been offset 
against, the profits of the three preceding years and 
therefore are carried forward from period p to p+4 under 
the quarterly model. To the extent that some losses may be 
created other than by claiming 100 per cen~ capital 
~llowances, further constraints are required ( (50i) to 
(50Wi) ). 
7.11. Stock appreciation r~lief 
Relief for the appreciation of trading stocks may be 
claimed to the extent that there are sufficient profits 
against which to offset the relief. Constraints (5la) to 
(56a) determine whether there is a positive value for 
ESA 
S ,denoting Schedule D Oase 1 profits for the 
p 
a"ccounting period ending at time p excluding stock 
a~preciation relief. Stock relief is claimed if the 
periodic increase in stocks exceeds z6 times 
Schedule D Case 1 profits' after capital allowances but 
before stock relief ((57) to (67aD. stock ciawback has 
. '''-',' 
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been ignored. Indeed it is I~ntioipated that olawbaok 
will disappear from the legislation provided the oompany 
o~ntinues to trade • Where oapital allowanoes are oarried 
baok one yearJstook relief is recomputed for the preoeding 
year ( (SIb) to (67b», for the seoond preoeding year 
( (510) to (670) ), and for the third preoeding year 
( (SId) to (67d) ). 
7.12. Interest and the quarterly aooounting for inoome tax 
Inoome tax is deduoted at souroe on interest paid and 
offset against inoome tax on interest reoeived on a 
quarterly basis. At the end of the aooounting year any 
unrelieved tax on net interest reoeived may be offset 
against the oharge for the oorporation tax liability. 
In appendix 2 the group (0) oonstraints (133) to (137) 
. NTBQ 
begin a new oalendar year and therefore exolude I 
j-l 
, 
denoting unrelieved inoome tax on interest brought forward 
under the quarterly aooounting system from period j-l 
to period j, unlike the group (d) constraints (138) to 
(142). 
Consider oonstraint (13~ reproduoed below: 
lJTBQ 
I 
j 
s 
= ( b (k L - k W 
j L j-1 WS j-l 
j-l L 
k ~ W ) )Q 
WL ~ J p12 
J=O 
If 9 equa1~ one (determined from constraints (134) 
p12 
to (137) ), indioating that there is some interest 
• 
. '""',' 
-. 
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to be brought forward from the first quarter of an accounti~ 
period, then the interest is calculated according to the 
,present basic rate of income tax bj • This rate is applied 
to (i) the short-term pre-tax lending rate of kL on 
one-period lending ~_Ifrom period j-l; less (i i) the 
short-term pre-fax borrowing rate of ~s on one-period 
borrow!ng WJ~,from period j-1; less (iii) the long-term 
pre-tax borrowing rate o~'~ on the cumulative amount 
of long-run borrowing W; from time 0 up to the preceding 
period j-1. Hence for j = 2,6,10,14 ••• , there are income 
tax payments in the liquidity constraintg (143) arising 
from net interest paid in periods j= 1,5,9,13 ••• • This 
is denoted by 
r_k L 
[ L j-2 
S 
+k W 
WS j-2 
j-2 L 
+ k "" W Jb WL ~ J j-1 
J=O . 
A zero-one variable of g determines whether this 
p14 
• 
additional term of income tax is zero, i.e. if there is 
any unrelieved interest carried forward. 
7.13. Advance Corporation Tax Setoff 
.. 
The total Advance Corporation Tax on dividends paid in the 
four quarters ended at time pis' DJbJ /(l-bJ) for 
J = p-3 to p, where p=4,8,12 ••• ( equation (68) ) • A 
dividend of 70pence ,(DJ) has a gross value of £1, 
I 
~J/(l-bJ)]' where the basic rate of income tax bJ= 30%. 
. '~"',. 
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The ACT on the dividend is 30 pence = b~ £1 = DJb~(l-bJ)' 
as above. 
! Now, the maximum AC1r restriction fOr the accounting 
period ending at time p is given by the basic rate of 
income tax times net taxable income. When the basic'rate 
of income tax changes in the second quarter of the 
calend~r year (from April) ther~ is' a need to take a 
weighted average of net taxable income. 
Assume net taxable income of £400,000 and a basic rate 
of income tax of 30~ in period one (January to March) 
and 32~ in periods two to four (April to December). The 
maximum ACT setoff is therefore restricted to £126,000; 
being 
(30~ (l-t) + 32~. t) £400,000 
(b 
p-3 
TIA (I-f) + b f) N 
p P 
, or 
for p=4. 
ACT is' carried forwards or backwards if the ACT brought 
CT]!, CTFB 
forward of A + A (see ~ootnote) , plus 
p-4 p 
CT 
the ACT for the present year of A 
p 
exceeds 
TIl 
(b (I-f) + b f)N fOr p=4,8, ••• • p-3 p p 
footnote 
OTPB 
A 
p 
represents additional ACT arising from the 
carry-back of capital al1owances. 
.... "'~'.' 
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To simplify the notation this' value is denoted ~6A 
(Appendix 1): 
CT TIA 
~6A CT]!, =A CTFB +A + A - (b (l-f)+b f)N p-4 p P p-3 p p 
Constraints (69a) to (72a) can now be written as: 
CTBlA A A· 
A =(A6A)Q Q 
P i p16 p17 
OTBA 
A 
p 
(f6A) 
OTBA 
A 
= (~6A)Q 
p16 
A 
- MQ ~ ° p16 
A ~ ° p 
CT 
+ A 
P 
A 
(l-Q ) 
p17 
(69a) 
I 
(70a) , 
(71a) , 
(72a) • 
M represents g' million (or higher) value as before. The' 
A 
9 
p16 
A 
and Q 
p17 
variables have values of zero or one 
. CTBU 
(constraints (73a) to (75a~. A denotes the ACT 
p 
considered for being caTried back at least one year. 
Consider three ~lternative values of[~6~at (1) £50,000; 
(ii) 0; and (iii) -£50,000. 
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(1) £50,000 surplus ACT 
A 
From (7la), 50,000 - M Q 1s negative only 1f 
p16 
A 
Q is one. 
p16 
CTBA 
Hence from (70a), A 
p 
(~6A) 1 = 
required. 
,. 
(ii) Zero Surplus ACT 
From (71a), 
CTEA. 
A = 0 
p 
zero. From (70a), 
as required. , 
(1i1) -£50,000 (and no surnlus ACT) 
Prom (71a) , [-50 ,000 - MQ
A 11S negative 
pI6 
A 
Q is one,of'" 
r16 
no matter 
A 
whether Q 
p16 
CTEA 
(70a), A 
A 
is zero or one. If Q 
p16 
is zero, from 
= (-50,000) o = 0, which satisfies (72a). 
p 
A CTEA 
Conversely, if Q is one, from (70s), A = 
. p16 p 
(-50,000) 1 = -50,000, which no longer satisfies (72a), 
. _____ '. A CTBA 
Hence Q 1s zero and A = 0, as required. 
p16 p 
A problem arises in that a further requirement is that 
the ACT considered for being carried back at least one 
CT 
year from period p to p-4 is restricted to A ,being 
p 
the ACT for quarters p-3 to p. 
.~-.. ' 
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. CTBIA CTEA CT 
Hence ~6A = A if A ~ A ; otherwise 
CTBIA 
A 
CT 
= A 
p p 
Example 
p 
• 
ACT c/fwd from previous year 
CT 
ACT f~r present year (A ) 
p 
p p 
;v 
90,000 
64,000 
Total ACT 154,000 
Maximum ACT setoff 126,000 
ACT considered for carry back 28,000 
ACT carried forward only nil 
CTBIA . 
A r (=(~ 6A) = Total ACT: -- - -' 
less maximum) 
OTBIA 
A , 
CT 
(= A ) 
P 
-- .... ,..".,,-
.~ ~ •. ~_ l .. ,. 
28,000 . 
From (76a) and (77a) re-produced below I 
o TEA CT A 
J!... 
147,600 
6,400 
154,000 
126,000 
6,400 
21,600 
6,400 
- (A - A ) - MQ '* 0 
p p p17 
-:..,...~ (76a) 
. -. I , 
CTBA CT A 
- (A - A ) Q 
P P p17 
~o (77a) • , 
OTBA CT 
if A exceeds A (example (v)}the left-hand side 
p p 
A 
of constraint (76a) is negative whether Q is zero 
pl7 
[ 
OTBA CT] 
or one. But - A _ A 
p p will be negative, and 
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A 
so Q must be zero for constraint (77a) to be 
pl7 
satisfied. 
A 
Using Q = 0, we may refer back to equation (69a) 
pl7 
CTBlA A CT CT 
and deduce A = (~6A)Q .• 0 + A (1-0) = A 
P pUt P P 
= £6,400 as in example' (v). 
CT CTEA 
Consider A exceeding A (example (iv)). 
p p 
r CT'SA CT J 
The value -LA p - A P is now positive and so 
A 
fromfo qu at ion 9 = I to satisfy (76a). Therefore (69a) 
pI7 
OTBlA A CT A 
A = (~6~Q • 1 + A ( 1-1) = (~6~ • p pI6 P p16 
But it has been argued earlier that with surplus ACT 
(consider the previous illustration of +£50,000 surplus), 
CTBIA A 
then Q is one. Hence, A = (~6A) = £28,000 as in 
p16 p 
example (iv). 
By similar procedures, constraints (78a ) to (96a) 
determine the ACT rules for the second year of carry-
CTF 
back and any remaining ACT carried forward,A ,which 
p 
CTFlA 
is split into two components A 
p 
for each year. 
CTF2A 
and A , one 
p 
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7.14 Net taxable income 
Constraints (97a) to (lOla) determine net taxable income 
for the current year, which is based on schedule D 
HDA"* 
profits of S ,interest on lending at the rate k , 
P L 
less interest on borrowing at the. tate k (short-term) 
WS 
NTBA 
and at k (long-term), less I • The last term of 
WL p-4 
lfTBA 
I represents interest paid brought forward under 
p-4 
section 177 (8) Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970 
from last year (four quarters ago: hence p-4). Where 
there is no net taxable income unrelieved interest is 
carried forward further (constraints (102a) to (106a». 
Wet taxable income for each of the three·pr~ceeding 
years is recalculated for the carry-back of capital 
allowances (constraints: (97b) to (106b), (97c) 
to (106c), and (97d) to (106d» • 
7.15 Marginal tax rates 
Berry and Dyson (1979) have already discussed the different 
marginal tax rates in relation to net taxable income. 
One of the differences here is that the model divides 
the accounting year to cater for the possibilities of 
H'DA 
• Footnote: S is calculated in equation (63a). 
p 
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tax rates during April to December being different 
from those during January to March. The constraints 
,are numbered (107a) to (123a), (107b) to (123b), (107c) 
to (123c), and (107d) to (123d) • 
7.16 Net Mainstream Corporation Tax 
A 
If ACT setoff is restricted, Q = zero (from constraint 
p30 
(125a»; and equation (124a), which determines the net 
mainstream corporaeion tax, is reduced to 
MCTA 
If 
p 
CTA TIA f J NTBQ 
= M - N b (I-f) + b f - I 
P p p-3 p p • 
The three terms on the fight show respectively the gross 
mainstream corporation tax; the maximum setoff; and 
lfTBQ 
I ,(unrelieved income tax which can be set off 
p 
against the net mainstream tax liability). 
A A 
When ACT setoff is not restricted Q = 1 and ~ =1 
p30 p31 
(constraints (125a) to (132a)~ Hence (124a) is reduced to 
MCTA CTA CT!' 
If =M -A 
p p p-4 
CTFB CT 
- A - A 
p p 
NTBQ 
I 
p • 
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The five terms on the right denote respectively 
(i) the gross mainstream corporation tax, (ii) 
surplus ACT from last year before taking into account 
, the carry-back of capital allowances, (iii) extra 
ACT from last year after taking into acoount the carry-
baok of capital allowances; (iv) ACT for the current 
year; and (v) unrelieved income tax. 
Sinoe capital allowances can be carried back up to 
three years, previous years' figures for net 
mainstream corporation tax and extra ACT carried forward 
are recomputed (constraints: (124b) to (132b), (124c) to 
(132c), and (124d) to (132dll. Tax rebates arising from 
these retrospective calculations have already been 
inoluded in the program (see the heading entitled 
'Liquidity constraints'). 
Conclusion 
The purpose of the model was stated to be to 
demonstrate that the complex tax effeots can be 
acoommodated into a mathematical programming model 
which seeks an optimal solution to the f/,nn's 
investment and financing deoisions. It was shown 
that Bome of the variables are zero or one and hence 
the model beoo~es a mixed integer programming model 
which is very difficult to solve where there are 
numerous variables and constraints. 
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Earlier in the chapter it was stressed that the model-
builder in practice would wish to condense the present 
model to suit the tax profile peculiar to the particular 
firm, which should result in a significant improvement 
in the time taken to obtain the solution to the .. - , ... ".-: 
program. But since different firms have different 
tax profiles it seemed more appropriate here to 
... 
present a generalised b~t more complex model. 
Implications which follow from the requirement of a 
joint solution to investment and financing decisions 
are discussed in the concluding chapter which follows. 
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APPENDIX 1 
,7A -
j-l 
1: WL 
J==O J. 
ACTF + ACTFB + ACT - [b (l-f) + b f\ NTIA p-4 p p p-3 p"j p 
ACTF + ACTFB4 + ACT 4 _ A
CTBLA 
p-8 p- p- p-4 
_ A CTFLA + A CTFC 
p-4 p 
ACTFB ACT + 8 + 8 p- p-
+ 
_ ACTFB + ACTB1A 
p P 
ACTB1A p-8 
.~ .. "'.' 
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+ ACTFC + ACTFD _ ACTfC p-4 p p 
- [b' (l-f) + b fJ NTrC p-11 p-8 p-8 
t9A = ACTF + ACT + ACTFB p-4 p p 
- '[b (I-f) + b fJ NTIA _ ACTBlA p-3 p p p 
,10A = SHDA + 
p 
P 
1: 
J"p-3 kwS~J-l 
p-4 p-4 S 
,10B - SHDB + t ~LJ-I - t kwsW J-I 
p J-p-7 J-p-7 
rNTBB p-4 
p-8 p-8 
.lOC - SHDC + t LLJ _l - t lL ~ P J-p-ll -~ J-p-ll -VlS J-1 
,IOD _ SHDD + 
P 
r} ., _ rNTBD 
JJ p-4 • 
,11, ,12 - have been eliminated from the program • 
.... '.,. 
-294-
13 ACTF + ACT t D = p-16 p-12 + A
CTFB 
+ ACTFC p-12 p-8 
+ A CTBIA + A CTFD + A CTB2A 
p-8 p-4 p-4 
- [b (1-f) + b fJ NTID p-15 p-12 p 
t13C. ACTF + ACT + ~CTFB + ACTFC 
p-12 p-8 p-8 p-4 
+ ACTBlA + ACTFD p-4 p 
[ ] 
TIC 
- bp- 11 (I-f) + bp_8f N P 
+13B. ACTF + ACTFC + ACT + ACTFB p-8 p p-4 p-4 
- fb (1-f) + b fJ NTIB ~p-7 p-4 p 
+14B _ ACT + A
CTF + ACTFB 
p-4 p-8 p-4 
_ ACTBlA _ ACTFIA 
p-4 p-4-
- rb (1-f) + b fJ NTIB L p-7 p-4 p • 
ACT CTF + ACTFB _ ACTB1A +14C - p-8 + A p-12 p-8 p-8 
_ ACTFlA 
p-8 
+ ACTFC _ ACTFB 
p-4 p-4 
- .... " 
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+ ACTBIA _ ACTB2A + ACTFD 
p-4 p-4 p 
.14D c ACTF + ACT + ACTFB _ ACTBIA 
T p-16 p-12 p-12 p-12 
_ ACTFlA + ACTFC . _ ACTFB 
p-12 p-8 p-8 
+ ACTBlA _ ACTB2A + ACTFD _ ACTFC 
p-8 p-8 p-4 p-4 
+ ACTB2A _ ACTF2A 
p-4 p-4 
- rb (1-f) + b fJ NT1D ~p-15 p-12 p 
:',' 
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Appendix 2 
'!be full rrodel is given below 
Maximise 
n 
I 
j=o 
+6~+1:---1_-
n (l+r J) 
J=1 
- (1+~) Tlfn 
n·+G 
I 
j=n +1 
a) Calstraj,nts 
n 
I: 
j=o 
- (l+~) .~ if.] -
J=O J 
1-h 
--.J. 
1-b j 
for j + 2, 6, 10, 14, etc. 
B'" 
FfJ. 
J 
t. )-g : [~,. 1 
-I: [ZR.... .1+R.....-ZR.-L.-zP 8=1 I-B,J- -B) I-B) ~) 2 B,j-1 
-PB · + Z PB · - Z E- . 1 - E-. + Z R .1 L. J 2) 3£3,J- ~J 3~jJ H 
+0 '-G (lb~-G.\ + L
J
. - L. 1 - ILL. l(l-b.) 
J ~- j-G~ J- -L J- ~ 
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- tI. + 'If. 1 + K - wS. 1 (l-b. ) - If. J J- -~ J- j ) 
j-l 
L ""J (l-b).) + D. +~J=O J 
+ r/-C1'Bj , - ~-4'A , = 1(. 
-g J -g J 
{ +~ } e 15 >, 0 p 
9 15 integral 
P 
(1) • 
(2) • 
- . 
(3). 
(4) 
• 
(5) 
(6) • 
(7) • 
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b) j = 4, 8, 12, 16 etc 
j = p (B) . 
P 
E E 
J=p-3 B 
~-..}L- CAP -
W H p-4 
p P 
E E cf\P a.rn - r r cAD a:T~ 
J=p-3 B J=p-3 B 
TF = LHSl 
-.LI Jr4 P (9) • 
~IU = LHS1 (e 1 -1) 
P... P P (10) . 
THSl Me (11) ~ p - pI ~ 0 • 
1 ~ e 1 ~o (13). p 
8p l integral (14) • 
c!-BIU -
P 
P 
E E 
J~3 B 
~ ~o p 
1 ~ ep2 ~ 0 
8p2 integral 
(16) 
(17) 
• 
(18) • 
(19) .. 
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[~IU - ~ Bk ~ BJ--1ep2 ~ 0 p J=p-3 ~ 
LHS2 = 
f 
p-4 
I: 
J=:p-7 
-r! P-8 
LI#J32 e 3 > 0 
r p '" 
,. 
IS2 L - Me 3 < 0 p p .... 
e 3 integral p 
~p = [~p 
[cAB1 
. p 
_ LHS2] 
p 
[cAB1
p 
_ LHS2] 
P 
1 ~ 9p4 ~ 0 
e 4 integral 
P 
-
e LHS2] e 
p3 P p4 
- Me4<o p ... 
e 4 ~ 0 p 
p-4 
t t 
J=p-7 B 
FIS3 p-8 ~ c!P p-8 AP 
'r 'r C BJx... :t = 1: 1: ~- - L. L. B 
P J=p-11 B p-12 J=p-11 B 
LHS3 e ), 0 P pS .,. 
:-
(' 
(1.0) • 
(21) • 
(22) • 
(23) • 
(24) 
(25) 
· 
(26) • 
(27) , 
(28) 
· 
(29) 
• 
(30) 
(31) 
• 
(32) • 
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LHS3 - Me < 0 P pS ... (33) 
1 =!. epS ~ 0 (34) • 
e 5 integral 
P (35). 
cf-B3 = [~ - e LHS3] ep6 (36). p p pS p 
l~p - LHS3} - Me6~o (37) p p , 
[~p - LHS3] P e 6 > 0 P , (38) 
(39), 
(40) , 
~12 ~ -AF p;12 \" -.AP _T F LHS4 = 1: t s---_..x.....- c-~16 - I. I. c-~,.x.. ~ 
P J=p-lS B J:5U H r J=p-lS B eLI H p-' ~ 
(41) 
• 
(42) 
, 
LHS4 - Me 7 < 0 P p ..... (43) 
• 
(44) 
(45) 
• 
~ = [c!B3 - e 7 LHS4] e B p P P p P (46) ~ 
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L HS4] - Me < 0 p p8 '" (47) • 
r <fB3 _ L HS4 ] e 8 ~ 0 ~ p p p ~ (48) • 
(49) 
epa integral (soy 
• 
P 
E E 
J=p-3 B 
x -B c
AF 
_LF - ~ E 
p-4 p-4 J=p-3 B 
(50i) 
(SOH) 
• 
(SOUll 
(SOiv) 
• 
(50v) 
ep33 integral (SOvi) 
• 
F P -AO 
-L - r 1: C--BJ xB p-4 J-=p-3 B 
(51a) 
• 
(52a) .. 
HSIA A 
R P - M6p9 < 0 .. (53a), 
~ 0 
p-4 
RHSlB = L 
P l=p-7 
p-4 
_LF 
p-8 - L 
1 ~ 
RHS1C _ 
p 
p-8 
- L 
J-p-ll 
~B2 
P 
J=p-7 
~ 0 
L 
B 
L 
B 
~ 0 
SESC _ RHS1C e~ 
p p p9 
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ECS 
S BJxB 
d-0 BJ ~ 
~ 0 
(54a) 
• 
(55a). 
(56a) 
AF p-4 
d-:JXB - 1: 1: - C p-' J-p-7 B 
_°d-Bl 
P 
(SIb) 
(52b) 
• 
(53b) 
• 
(54b) 
(55b) 
• 000 
(56b) 
(5lc) 
(52c) 
, 
(S3c). 
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SESC >, 0 (54c) 
P 
C (SSe) I ~ ep9 ~ 0 
· 
e~ 
p9 integral (S6c) 
, 
p-12 
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The case for tax neutrality has been supported in that it is consistent 
with the minimisation of excess burden, which would otherwise arise 
from a loss of social utility through changes in economic choices 
distorted by taxation. Since the theory of finance is in turn 
concerned with the efficient allocation of resources over time by 
firms and individuals, the effects on corporate investment and 
financing decisions of the imposition of personal and corporate 
taxation ~s of crucial importance to corporate financial management. 
In order to isolate the effects of taxation from other imperfections, 
capital markets were initially assumed to be otherwise perfect. 
Given perfect capital markets the separation of investment and 
financing decisions ensue. But under the imputation tax system this 
separation theorem does not hold. Investment and financing decisions 
. are no longer independent even in capital markets which are perfect 
apart from tax complexities. The study began at the point where 
the existing theory of the one-period Capital Asset Pricing Model 
has presently reached under perfect capital markets. This enabled 
US to provide insights into the isolated tax effects under conditions 
of risk on (i) investment decisions and (ii) financing decisions. 
It was shown that there exists a potential excess burden on the 
activities of the private sector through the effect of imperfect 
tax allowances on capital expenditure. Except in the cases where 
taxable profits are large enough to absorb 100 per cent tax depreciation 
on plant and machinery and scientific research, the present system of 
capital allowances may reduce the expected return to an amount below 
that required by the post-tax level of risk. 
Under the present tax system there exists a multiplicity of marginal 
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tax rates for investment decisions. These depend in particular on 
the level of allowances, pre-depreciation accounting profits, 
dividend policy, stock appreciation relief and double taxation 
of foreign profits. It was stated that expenditure incurred on 
some projects may reduce net taxable income to such an extent 
that the marginal tax rate for the next project being considered 
is now different. Furthermore the claiming of stock relief, or 
reductions in stock on one project, may cause the marginal tax 
rate on another project to alter. The solution therefore 
requires thatal combinations of projects be jointly considered. 
As to the financing decision, it was demonstrated that ignoring 
personal taxation the single period CAPM supports the view that 
with tax deductibility of interest payments, maximum financial 
leverage is predicted in partial equilibrium; and it 
was not necessary to assume that debt capital is risk-free. 
By including personal taxation as well, a complex equation was 
derived to express the relationship between the after-tax 
valuation of the lever'ed firm and that of a firm financed wholly 
by equity, assuming each firm to have the same pre-tax risk 
attached to the operating cash flows. Two sufficient conditions 
for a neutral tax system are found. One of these conditions is 
that the basic rate of income tax should be the same as the full 
rate of Corporation Tax. It was noted that under the present 
imputation tax system, this is outside the draft EEC Directive. 
The second condition requires that the higher rate of income tax 
should be uniquely determined according to the corporate tax rate 
and the rate of capital gains tax. However, with heterogeneous 
tax rates ca~ital structure was found to be irrelevant in 
market equilibrium. 
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With perfect capital markets and a world of certainty there exists 
a basic preference for debt finance vis-~-vis new issues of shares 
even with ACT set-off restrictions under partial equilibrium. 
However (i) behavioural restrictions on excessive leverage, 
perhaps through the increased possibilities of takeove~resulting 
from a reJatively smaller equity base, and (ii) with bankruptcy 
costs through a short-fall between going concern values and asset 
scrap values, there would appear to be a limit to excessive 
leverage. 
The borrowing versus retention decision was found to be complex 
in partial equilibrium. In general, (i) the greater the 
discount rate, (ii) the lower the corporate tax rate and (iii) the 
longer the shareholding period, then the lower the value of the 
higher rate of income tax above which a retention is preferable 
to borrowing. The decision was found to be very sensitive to the 
marginal rate of Corporation Tax at which the debenture interest 
is relieved. Where heavy capital allowances wipe out taxable 
income before allowances, then a retention can be preferable to 
borrowing where the higher rate of income tax is greater or 
equal to the basic rate of income tax • 
-------------- --
....... . _--.---
In periods of disequilibrium it was shown that 
financing policies should vary over time even when 
higher ann basic income tax rates, shareholding periods 
and capital gains tax rates are held constant. These 
arise from the effect of capital investment decisions on 
(1) Advance Corpo~ation Tax set-off restrictions, 
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(ii) the determination of the extent of the carry forward of 
debenture interest relief and (iii) the marginal tax rate at which 
the relief is obtained. Tax inter-activities between projects 
,and between the total investment programme and the firm's financing 
decision policies, were subsequently analysed within the framework 
of a programming model. 
It may b~ observed that the programming constraints to accommodate 
taxation arose out of the tax laws and not out of specific assumptions 
on capital rationing. This supports the view expressed earlier 
that a joint solution to investment and financing decisions is 
required even if capital markets are perfect in the absence of 
taxation. 
Since the model presented can be reduced in size to eliminate 
capital rationing constraints, it i~ felt that it was more 
useful not to exclude capital rationing from the final model. 
The main point here is that the rationing due to taxation is 
essentially that of capital allowances rather than external capital. 
I am informed that a number of substantial firms, such as Imperial 
Chemical Industries, General Electric Company, Fisons, Bowaters and 
iowntree Mackintosh, are confronted with this real problem of 
capital allowance rationing. If there are large balances of capital 
allowances brought forward then it is arbitrary which division or 
. 
factory may receive the benefits of not paying tax on the profits 
from new projects. Alternatively it is arbitrary which unit may 
receive the benefits of being able to offset capital allowances 
from new projects against guaranteed taxable profits from other 
existing projects. 
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For the efficient allocation of resources it would seem that the 
decision whether to accept a project would need to be made centrally. 
For many firms this would violate the managerial philosophy of 
decentralisation of decision-making. Yet with divisional autonomy 
some projects in one division may be rejected because of capital 
allowances carried forward whilst other projects from another 
division may be rejected because of high marginal tax rates on 
future profits. By contrast the treasurer's department of the group 
may decide that both projects should be undertaken such that the 
capital allowances from one division may be offset against the 
profits from the other division, increasing the present value of 
the capital allowances for the first division and reducing the 
marginal tax rate for the second. By not letting divisions borrow 
capital allowances the value of the business as a whole may be 
reduced through the rejection of projects which are financially 
attractive for the group as a whole after tax. 
For one division the acceptance of some projects requiring heavy 
investments in trading stocks may be sensitive to the claiming 
of stock appreciation relief. Other divisions may be no longer 
investing in projects with heavy stockbuilding perhaps to the extent 
that stock levels are substantially falling. Because of this 
position the group as a whole may be subject to stock clawback. 
On this basis the decision to accept the projects requiring heavy 
investments in stocks may become suboptimal. 
Since the dividend policy of the firm as a whole, and its borrowing 
or lending decisions, are affected by investment decisions within 
the group, then the treasurer's department would need investment 
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plans from the divisions. In turn the divisions require statements 
regarding, inter alia, Advance Corporation Tax setoff restrictions 
in order to help determine marginal tax rates for investment 
decisions. Consequently, an iterative process is required if 
(i) divisions are to retain a large degree of autonomy and (ii) 
suboptimal decisions for the group as a whole are to be minimised. 
Thus the divisions need to submit broad statements concerning 
projections of capital investment outlays, net periodic adjustments 
, 
in trading stocks and profits, all on a pre-tax basis. From these 
plans the treasurer's department may make broad projections primarily 
concerning dividend payments, ACT setoff restrictions, debenture 
interest paid and received, new issues of debt and equity, debt 
repayments, stock relief, capital allowances and taxable profits. 
Consequently, marginal tax rates for projects may be estimated 
over the foreseeable future. together with estimates of the extent 
to which capital allowances may be offsettable against profits 
from different divisions. When this is conveyed to the divisions, 
revised investment and profit plans can be submitted to the 
treasurer's department and so the process may continue until a 
satisfactQ~equilibrium is hopefully reached. This does not 
preclude suboptimal decisions, since there may be tendencies 
to bias the estimates of costs and profits perhaps to understate 
profitability to safeguard being criticised in the future for 
underperformance. Furthermore, projects which appear financially 
unattractive before tax, and which may later prove to be financially 
attractive after tax, may never be accommodated in any financial 
plans submitted to the treasurer's department. They may be 
eliminated at an earlier stage and not reconsidered. 
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Finally. it is the author's view that one of the criticisms of 
the current state of the theory of business finance is that it 
ignores the complexities of the UK imputation tax system which 
in turn creates significant relationships between corporate 
investment and financing decision variables. It is hoped that 
this piece of research has made some progress in remedying this 
deficiency. 
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